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Abstract
ROUNDUP READY NATION:
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED SOY IN ARGENTINA
by
Amalia Leguizamón

Adviser: Professor Kenneth A. Gould

This dissertation is a case study of agrarian transformation in an agro-export society,
Argentina. I study the process of adoption of the technological package of genetically modified
(GM) soy in the Argentine countryside, its socio-ecological consequences, and Argentines’
responses to it. In particular, this research addresses Argentina’s unique situation of being a
developing country that has positively embraced the biotechnology of GM seeds as a key
accumulation strategy without the emergence of major contestation against GM soy
monocropping. In order to answer the puzzle of quiescence, I look at how power relations
structure access to social and environmental goods and bads, as well as at how power relates to
the causes of consensus and conflict. From a critical political economy perspective, in this work I
contribute to three major areas of substantive research: (1) Technology and socio-environmental
change; (2) Natural resource extraction as a model of neoliberal socioeconomic development for
Latin America; and (3) Social movements, in particular rural and environmental movements in
the Latin American region. It terms of data collection, I rely on a multi-method approach based
on archival research, quantitative analysis, and ethnographic methods (interviewing and
participant observation).
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Whether GM crops can alleviate poverty and address food security while conserving
ecosystems remains one of the most divisive questions in contemporary development studies.
This dissertation is thus a necessary and timely contribution to debates on agricultural GM
biotechnology. More broadly, the aim of this research is to contribute to discussions around the
dynamics of agrarian and rural transformations, technological adoption and resistance, and the
relationship between ecological modification and social change.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The biotechnology of genetically modified (GM) seeds is one of the latest and
most controversial developments in agriculture. Introduced to the world in the late 1990s
as ‘miracle’ crops that will feed a growing world population, soon thereafter a heated
debate arose questioning this promise (Schurman and Munro 2010; Stone 2010; Tokar
2001). Since then, farmers, activists, students, scientists, and consumers from North and
South have been organizing to protest against GM organisms (Magdoff and Tokar 2010;
Otero 2008; Schurman and Munro 2010). Extensive GM contestation has emerged all
across the world, from France and the UK (Bonny 2003; Doherty and Hayes 2012; Heller
2011; Schurman and Munro 2010), to Australia and New Zealand (Marsden 2008), in
India (Scoones 2008; Shiva 2000), and in Mexico and Brazil (Newell 2008; Otero 2008;
Scoones 2008).
Argentina is today the third largest grower of GM crops in the world (James
2012). In Argentina, contrary to most of the world, farmers have been early and eager
adopters of GM seeds, the government has, through varied means, encouraged the use of
the biotechnology, and civil society has remained, until recently, mostly silent. It is
striking that despite the real and potential impact of widespread adoption and use of GM
crops barely any public discussion has emerged on this issue. Thus, in contrast with the
widespread anti-GMO sentiment at the global level, Argentina stands out as an intriguing
case. The aim of this dissertation is to address this puzzle.
Starting in 1996, the adoption of GM seeds in Argentina has been coupled with
the replacement of traditional crops such as wheat and beef for GM soybeans produced
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for the export market, China and India in particular (Leguizamón 2013; Teubal 2008). In
the last 15 years, GM soy production has increased exponentially: Argentina is now the
third largest producer and exporter of soybeans in the world.1 One hundred percent of this
soy is genetically modified (Trigo 2011:9).
Genetically modified soy is Roundup Ready™ soy (RR soy), developed by
Monsanto to be resistant to their best-selling glyphosate herbicide Roundup™. In
conventional agriculture farmers have to till the soil to remove weeds before planting.
GM RR soy simplifies the process, as it is now possible to plant first and spray later,
when weeds appear: as the GM RR plant is tolerant to Roundup glyphosate, weeds die,
GM soy won't. As I show in chapters 3 and 4, to Argentine farmers this is a huge bonus:
simplified production means reduced costs and increased profits. Farmers in other parts
of the world, such as in Canada, the United States, and India, aren't so thrilled about it
though, as Monsanto sets oppressive contracts and high prices to seeds (Patel 2008).
People in general, all around the world, raise other important concerns: if glyphosate is
poison to plants, isn't it poison to people too, as we eat those crops? What happens when
glyphosate is released into the environment? Doesn't it pollute the soil, the water, and the
air? And most importantly, people question why a corporation like Monsanto has the
right to own patents to seeds (see Kloppenburg 2005).2 Seeds are the origin of life. By
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USDA, United States Department of Agriculture. USDA-FAS, Production, Supply and
Distribution (PS&D) database. http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdHome.aspx).
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These concerns are very well depicted in documentaries such as The World According
to Monsanto by Marie Monique Robin, The Future of Food, and Food Inc.
3
At this time, only six countries gave commercial permission to GM crops, including the
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giving Monsanto the right to control seeds, we've given a corporation the right to control
life (Shiva 2000; Shiva 2007).
For all these many reasons, and many more that I bring up throughout this
dissertation, GM is a widely controversial technology. Yet in Argentina, the
biotechnology of GM seeds has been met with little resistance. Most on the contrary, it
has been met with open arms. Back in late 1990s, when most countries were not willing
to try out this new, untested technology,3 Argentina became Monsanto's guinea pig in the
Global South, and the port of entry to GM crops in South America.

A Massive Agrarian Transformation
In less than two decades, Argentina has experienced a massive agrarian
transformation predicated upon the expansion of GM soy: It is the soyification of
Argentine agriculture. Nowadays, 18.7 million hectares, that is, over 46 million acres of
Argentine soil, are covered with GM soy.4 That’s far larger than the whole New York
state, or half the size of Germany. As I show in chapter 3, since 1996 when GM soy was
first available, production has expanded constantly, year after year, harvest after harvest.
While the modelo sojero, the soy model, is celebrated as a boom, this massive
agrarian transformation has radically transformed socio-environmental relations. As a
show throughout this dissertation, the expansion of extensive industrial agriculture and
the monocultures of GM soy have negative social and ecological impacts, creating
3

At this time, only six countries gave commercial permission to GM crops, including the
United States and Canada (James 1997). By now only 28 countries plant GM crops
legally in their territories (James 2012).
4
Data for season 2011/2012. Argentine Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishery.
http://www.siia.gov.ar/index.php/series-por-tema/agricultura. Last accessed October 27,
2013.
3

deforestation, pollution, and depletion of natural resources, violent land grabs and peasant
displacement, land consolidation, corporate concentration, and loss of local control,
health problems due to glyphosate spraying –including cancer, leukemia, and
miscarriages–, as well as hunger, poverty, inequality, and the loss of food security.
Nonetheless, despite the massiveness of this agrarian transformation, there has
been little resistance to it. On the contrary, in the main, Argentina has embraced the
biotechnology of GM seeds and a model of agricultural production of GM soy for export.
Therefore, the interesting question is how could such a massive agricultural transition
happen without major resistance? The purpose of this dissertation is to address this
puzzle. In other words, why is Argentina quiescent in the face of wide-scale agrarian
transformation based on the expansion of GM soy monocropping? This is the main
research question I answer in this work; a question that, until now, only Newell (2009a)
has tried to answer.
The study of quiescence, though, is not a straightforward matter. In contrast to
studying cases of rebellion, here there are no mobilizations to participate in or social
movement’s leaders to interview. Quiescence is, in a way, the absence of an event. The
question is then, how to study that which does not happen? Moreover, what about the
problem of imputing needs and values to the subjects of study? How can I, as a
researcher, assert that resistance against GM soy should emerge in Argentina? How can
an outsider “know better” than those implicated in the process of social change?5 These
are true epistemological and methodological concerns. However, the difficulty of
carrying out this study does not make the task impossible, less does it overrule its
5

Even though as an Argentine I am deeply invested in this process, the question is still
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significance (see Gaventa 1980). This is an important matter that has local and global
implications, as this study shows.
This dissertation is, thus, a case study of agrarian transformation in an agro-export
society. It studies the process of adoption and expansion of GM soy in Argentina, as well
as its socio-ecological consequences. The original contribution of this research lies in the
study of rural responses to GM soy: It is about quiescence, acceptance, and rebellion
towards an agro-industrial model of GM soy production for export. In this way, this
dissertation adds to necessary research on reactions and responses towards GM
biotechnology in the developing world (Stone 2010; Wield, Chataway, and Bolo 2010).
In particular, to the less explored topic of reasons for GM biotech take up in developing
countries, and on the class differentiation among different GM producers (Wield,
Chataway, and Bolo 2010).

1.1

RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Questions
Set in contrast to the anti-GMO panorama in the rest of the world, the lack of
controversy surrounding agro-industrial practices and GM seeds in Argentina is striking.
As it arises from this puzzle, the main research question this dissertation addresses is:
Why is Argentina quiescent in the face of wide-scale agrarian transformation based on
the expansion of GM soy monocropping? Because of the intrinsic problems of studying
quiescence, data was gathered on adoption and reactions toward GM crops. Thus, this
dissertation also addresses the following questions: Why did Argentine farmers decided
to switch their agricultural production to GM soy? What is the role of the government in
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GM soy adoption and promotion in Argentina? What are the ecological and social
consequences of GM crop production? How are these distributed? In other words, who
reap the benefits and who bear the burden of this model of agricultural production?
Which groups or actors are more active in supporting the modelo sojero? And which are
denouncing and/or mobilizing against it? Are there any groups or populations that are
being negatively affected by this process and yet remain unaware of it?

Methodology
This dissertation is a case study of agrarian transformation: It studies the process
of adoption of GM soybeans produced for the export market in the Argentine
countryside, its socio-ecological consequences, and Argentines responses to it. One
strength of case study as a research method is that it allows capturing the “causal texture
of social life”, the complexities, processes, and relationships of the issue at stake (Walton
1992:124). A common criticism against case study research is how much can be learned
from a single case (referred as the ‘small-N’ problem). However, it has been shown that
case studies can be generalizable and thus help with theory-building (Rueschemeyer
2003). Because there is scarcity of research on this topic, I argue that a case study is
necessary in order to learn about it thoroughly and from there advance to seek general
patterns in similar cases (Goldstone 2003).
While the study of quiescence is the truly original and interesting question this
dissertation addresses, trying to test quiescence directly would make this project
unfeasible. Thus, the research strategy I adopted was to do a rigorous study of GM soy
adoption in order to be able to make conclusions on quiescence afterwards. This study
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has been carried out using a comparative historical approach, as it is customary in case
study research (see Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). In this manner, chapter 3 traces
the historical process to uncover the causal sequence that produced the outcome under
study (Goldstone 2003); the unquestioned fast adoption of the biotechnology of GM soy
in the Argentine countryside.
While in the main Argentina has moved towards GM soy production, not all have
remained quiescent and some groups have emerged to protest against the model. Four
cases of rebellion were studied as counterfactuals: (1) Movimiento Campesino de
Santiago del Estero (MOCASE), the peasant movement of Santiago del Estero; (2)
Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó Anexo in Córdoba; (3) Campaign Paren de Fumigar, "Stop
Fumigating" in Córdoba and Santa Fe; and (3) Environmental assembly in La Leonesa,
Chaco. While the claims of these movements are ongoing, as I describe in chapter 5, it is
important to emphasize that these cases of rebellion are not equivalent, in size or
visibility, to the main event of general quiescence at the national level. As I show
throughout this dissertation, these movements and assemblies have very limited success
in their demands, and barely ever make it to national media. Their demands are not
shared by those that are in control of agricultural production and are mostly unknown to
the general public. In this dissertation I explain why this happens.
The case of study is defined in terms of the type of agricultural system. Thus, the
unit of analysis in this study is the agricultural export sector (Paige 1975). In Argentina,
this refers mostly to the Pampas region, Argentina’s historic core of agro-export
production, where over 80% of GM soy production takes place (see Figure 1, Chapter 3).
The Pampas region comprises the provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe,
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Córdoba and La Pampa. As I describe in chapter 3, in the last few years, the frontier of
the monocultures of GM soy has expanded north into the provinces of Chaco, Santiago
del Estero and Salta. These provinces of the north and northeast (from now on, the North)
have historically been regional economies, producing a diversity of produce for the
domestic market. Only in the last few years, with the expansion of the frontier of GM soy
production, they have been included in the “agro-export” sector.
Therefore, while this case study contains only one unit of analysis, the agroexport sector, the sector can actually be subdivided in two: the Pampas, the core of the
agro-export sector, and the North, the frontier of expansion. Quiescence in the Pampas is
my main case of study as it is the main event that defines the country’s position towards
GM biotechnology: This area produces almost all the GM soy that is source of
Argentina’s foreign income. This dissertation is then mostly a “single-case narrative”
(Abbot 1992:62-68).
The population under study is limited to the agrarian sector, meaning all those that
make a living from the land, either in crop, income, or profit, and who may or may not
live in the countryside. Types include: campesinos (peasants), rural workers, agricultural
producers, rural contractors, investment pools, and agribusinesses. In terms of data
collection, I recurred to a triangulation of sources of evidence, as it is tradition in case
study research (Yin 2009:114-118). I have thus recurred to a multi-method approach
based on (1) archival research; (2) quantitative analysis of micro and macro data from
statistical databases; and (3) ethnographic fieldwork, consisting of participant observation
and interviews with peasants, rural workers, small, medium and large producers, rural
contractors, and members and employees of agribusinesses, as well as with rural
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inhabitants who do not profit directly from soy production. I carried out 40 formal
interviews between 2009 and 2012, 27 in the Pampas region (in the provinces of Buenos
Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe) and 13 in the North (in Santiago del Estero and Chaco).

1.2

HOW THIS DISSERTATION IS STRUCTURED
This dissertation is divided in seven chapters. Following this introduction, chapter

2 is a review of the literature that this dissertation draws on and contributes to, including
(1) Technology and socio-environmental change; (2) Natural resource extraction as a
model of neoliberal socioeconomic development for Latin America; and (3) Social
movements, in particular rural and environmental movements in the Latin American
region.
Chapter 3 provides the background for analysis. I look at the historical and
structural context of adoption and expansion of GM soy in Argentina. Chapter 4 presents
the main case of quiescence in the Pampas and it is the core of this dissertation. Chapter 5
introduces the cases of contestation: (1) Anti-GM/neoliberalism movements in the North
and (2) Anti-glyphosate spraying, mostly in the Pampas. Chapter 6 is an ethnographic
account on latent grievances among women in the Pampas, primarily focused on the
health consequences of glyphosate exposure.
Chapter 7 is the Conclusions chapter, where I summarize this dissertation's main
findings and arguments, argue for the significance of this research, and suggest avenues
for future research.
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter I review the literature that provides a framework to the main
research question I address in this dissertation: Why is Argentina quiescent in the face of
massive agrarian transformation based on the expansion of genetically modified (GM)
soy? In order to do so, in this chapter I address the following topics: (1) Theories in
environmental sociology and their analysis of technological innovation and socioenvironmental change; (2) Agrarian technologies, in particular the biotechnology of
GMOs (methods, traits, use, debates); (3) Agro-industrialization and agro-exporting as
the neoliberal development project in Latin America; and (4) Social movements and
quiescence (anti-GM movements, theories).

2.1

TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
Technology is, at its most basic, how me make and do the things we need (Gould

2009). Examples are plows, factories, computers, satellites, and nuclear power plants.
"Technology," therefore, are tools, machines, and techniques. It is also, and most
importantly, the ways of organizing (and reorganizing) social relations and nature, the
source of all the "stuff" we need and work with (Gould 2009). As such, technology is one
of the primary ways human beings relate to the natural environment; it is the nexus
between society and nature (Gould 2009). Technology, especially as a means for
production, also defines the way human beings relate to each other, the social relations
within society (Marx and Engels [1845] 1998; Marx [1847] 1992; Marx [1867] 1990). In
consequence, changes in technology bring about changes within society and between
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society and nature. This dissertation underscores in particular how technological
advances have a tendency to produce socio-environmental crises (Gould, Pellow, and
Schnaiberg 2008; O'Connor 1998; Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).
Within environmental sociology, two streams of theory take divergent paths on
their analysis of technological innovation and socio-ecological change: authors within
Ecological Modernization theory (Lewis Mumford, Joseph Huber, Arthur Mol and Gert
Spaargaren) share a positive outlook of technological innovation and believe it to be a
higher stage in human development. By contrast, authors within critical theories such as
Ecological Marxism (James O'Connor) and Treadmill of Production (Allan Schnaiberg,
Kenneth Gould, David Pellow) argue that the capitalist logic of accumulation strives for
constant technological innovation, the key source of socio-ecological disruption.
Ecological modernization (EM) theory has its roots in the modernization
paradigm, a theory of human development where progress is understood as a series of
stages that societies go through as they adopt liberal Western values (Mumford [1934]
1963; Parsons 1977). Within this paradigm, science and technology have a very special
role to play, as they serve the human need to control and modify the natural environment
(Mumford [1934] 1963). As such, progressive technological innovation is celebrated as
evidence of the human ability to control nature as well as of having reached a higher
stage in human development (Mumford [1934] 1963). Ecological modernization is,
therefore, a historically higher phase of industrial society, which Mumford ([1934] 1963)
conceived as the "eotechnic phase" and Spaargaren and Mol (1992), "superindustrialism."
Hence, EM authors argue that we have entered a new industrial revolution, one of
restructuring of production and consumption along ecological lines (Spaargaren and Mol
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1992). In this "ecosocial switchover," as Huber termed it (qtd. in Spaargaren and Mol
1992:335), the design, performance, and evaluation of production processes is
increasingly based on ecological as well as on economic criteria. The goal is towards the
development and diffusion of new technologies that are "more intelligent" than previous
ones. These are "cleaner" technologies that benefit the environment as they "disconnect"
economic development from resource input, use, and emissions (for example, chip
technology) (Spaargaren and Mol 1992:335). Thus, in this paradigm, it is possible to
overcome the current ecological crisis "without leaving the path of modernization" or
capitalism (Spaargaren and Mol 1992:334), and that would be through further
advancement of technology and industrialization. Modern societies thus point towards
hyper- or superindustrialization (Spaargaren and Mol 1992:336).
By contrast to EM, Critical or Neo-Marxian theories take a critical stance towards
technology: building on Marx, these theories point at the conflict between capitalist
production and the environment. Authors like O'Connor (Ecological Marxism) and
Schnaiberg and Gould (Treadmill of Production) agree that the logic of profit ingrained
in capitalist production accelerates socio-environmental degradation. James O’Connor,
one of the leading authors within Ecological Marxism, points at a “second contradiction,”
beyond the “first” economic contradiction thoroughly described by Marx. O’Connor
argues that under capitalist production both capital and labor feed off the environment at
an increasing pace that will eventually undermine the system itself (O'Connor 1998).
In a similar vein, Treadmill of Production theorists argue that the logic of profit
ingrained in capitalist production accelerates socio-environmental degradation (Gould,
Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). As labor is
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replaced with machinery, natural resource extraction grows as well as the polluting
consequences of industrial activities, while at the same time social benefits are reduced
(i.e., reducing secure employment and increasing unemployment and social inequality).
For Treadmill of Production theorists, technological innovation becomes a key source of
socio-environmental degradation, as it is because of technology that societies can go
beyond ecological limits (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg 1980;
Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).
Therefore, while EM theorists dismiss questions and criticism to the capitalism
mode of production and accumulation as "not relevant" to overcome the ecological
problem6 (Spaargaren and Mol 1992:336), that is exactly where critical theories place the
burden of the ecological crisis. Certainly ecological disorganization is not unique to
modern societies and capitalism: the ancient empires of the Mayans, Aztecs, and Chinese,
colonialism and the primitive accumulation for the industrialization of Great Britain are
main events of environmental degradation in human history (Foster 1994; Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994). However, limited technological capacity forced peoples to live within
ecological limits. Since the industrial revolution, and in particular since post-World War
II, the treadmill of production has rapidly accelerated both locally and globally, thus
accelerating the pace and spread of ecological disorganization (Gould, Pellow, and
Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Mass production and
the development of new technologies (synthetics, chemicals), in a particular political
economic system based on the belief in economic growth, has allowed populations to
"overcome" these limits, creating the appearance of a limitless world (Foster 1994;
6

The justification for this dismissal is based on the belief that producing greener, cleaner
technologies can delink capitalism from the negative consequences of industrialization.
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Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Limits will eventually hit nonetheless, as
pollution and extraction depletes the natural base (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).
For EM scholars, the solution to ecological crisis lies on a "major transformation,
[an] ecological switch of the industrialization process into a direction that takes into
account maintaining the sustenance base" (Spaargaren and Mol 1992:334). Thus new
technologies can be created that are cleaner, more efficient, "greener". This is the most
widespread of beliefs today, Green Capitalism being the panacea that will salvage
capitalism. For critics, however, these are only 'technological fixes'. It is possible (and
happens often) that new technologies are created that, for example, reduce fossil fuel use
or CO2 emissions (the example of hybrid cars). These are, however, only a fix to a
broken system. As Schnaiberg and Gould (1994:53) argue, although these new
technologies "can bring some environmental gain, they also produce ecosystem losses.
For while there may be some reduction of impacts per unit produced, the total volume of
production has risen fast enough to offset this effect. [Therefore], the greatest threat of
the treadmill may not lie in deficient technologies that pollute, but in the competitive
logic of share[holders'] values without limits."
Therefore, it is not technology itself that is problematic, the source of the
"conflict" between societies and ecosystems, but the logic under which technological
innovation takes place (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). There is no, as EM scholars (and
most people) believe, objective and neutral science that researches and develops
technology for the general wellbeing of humankind (Wright 1992). Technological
developments have a trajectory, which is defined by the groups and institutions that have
the power to do so (Gould 2009). Which technologies are funded for research and
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development and which are taken off the research track is decided by a small elite of
powerful groups and institutions, in particular, states, universities, and increasingly so,
corporations (Gould 2009). It is estimated that 85% of current global investment in
agricultural biotechnology comes from the private sector (International Assessment of
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 2009:30). Moreover,
even though the release of any new technology has a direct impact on society and the
environment, the R&D process has little or no input from civil society (Gould 2009:104).
Without democratic input, technological trajectories clearly "reflect the power and
economic interests of the social institutions that control the process" (Gould 2009:102).
Following this perspective, this dissertation is not strictly a study of the biotechnology of
GM seeds, but a study on how specific social actors and institutions control and define
purposes for this technology. It is about technology as an exercise of power.

Agriculture as a Technique, Agrarian Revolutions
Some technological innovations are incremental and bring about minimal change.
At times, however, breakthroughs in technology take place, resulting in revolutionary
change. Ten thousand years ago, “agriculture” as a technique became –as the industrial
revolution would later on–, the source of one of the most revolutionary changes in human
life (Gould 2009: 97). Large-scale food production made possible cities, armies, and the
State. This first agricultural revolution also made possible, for the first time in human
history, the control of nature, to modify the environment to serve human needs on a mass
scale (Gould 2009: 98).
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A second revolution in the technology of agriculture took place not long ago, and
in a shorter period of time. In the mid-19th century (1830-1880), the scientific discovery
of soil chemistry created the fertilizer industry. Capitalist agriculture emerged (Foster
1999:373-378). Marx, in his third volume of Capital, was among the first critics of this
transformation (Foster 1999).
The third and latest agricultural revolution started in the mid-20th century, with
the emergence of the agro-industry in the United States, which implied a more intensive
use of energy and agro-chemicals, the replacement of animals by machines, and, later on,
the enclosure of animals in feedlots (“factory farms”) (Foster 1999:374). The
technological event that marks this revolution and will eventually transform social
relations and society-ecosystems relations relates to genetic science and the seed: First,
hybrids; then, GM (Kloppenburg 2005).

GM Biotechnology, Third Agricultural Revolution
The biotechnology of GM seeds is fairly new, from the last three decades.7
Scientists, through mechanical and chemical techniques, modify the DNA of a seed (or

7

A note on terminology: Biotechnology is the process of modifying living beings with
the purpose of fulfilling human needs, a process as old as agriculture itself. For example,
beer and cheese are the result of biotechnological processes. Breeding of plants and
animals is another common technique to improve desired qualities in crops or animals
(Kloppenburg 2005:1). The biotechnology of GM seeds, while a type of biotechnology, is
one that is qualitatively different from those traditional processes: Those first
biotechniques have a limit, the limit of nature. When breeding plants or animals, breeders
can only mix those that are sexually compatible. GM seeds are created in labs, and thus,
they do not exist as such in nature. The terminology, like many other aspects of this issue,
is also widely contested, and it is appropriated by advocates and opponents as it fits their
purpose (Stone 2010:382). Genetic modification (GM), genetic engineering (GE) and
transgenic are used interchangeably as they refer to the same technique (gene splicing
recombinant DNA); yet depending on emphasis (and scholarly tradition, I would add)
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animal), introducing a gene from another living being (or bacteria, or virus) in order to
create a new GM seed with a specific trait. The two most common traits available in GM
crops are herbicide tolerance and insect resistance, the latter known as Bt for the inserted
protein-producing gene of the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis. Recently released
varieties combine both traits; this is a technology known as "gene stacking." Soybean,
corn, and cotton are the most widely planted transgenic crops (James 2012).
Roundup ReadyTM soy (RR soy) is Monsanto’s GM soybean, engineered to be
tolerant of Monsanto’s best-selling glyphosate herbicide, RoundupTM. Monsanto thus
sells the farmer a whole 'technological package,' that includes the seeds and the
glyphosate, used with a no-tillage mechanized method. A 'no-tillage' method means that
farmers do not have to till the soil to remove weeds before planting the seed, as is
necessary in conventional agriculture. Because the GM RR seeds are tolerant or resistant
to the herbicide, farmers can plant first and spray later, when weeds appear. Then the
weeds will die but the GM RR plants will not. Bt crops, such as corn and cotton, operate
in a slightly different manner: the insecticide is inserted in the seed; it is the seed that
expresses the Bt toxin. Thus, when the insect feeds from the seed –insect species of the
orders Lepidoptera and Coleoptera in particular (rootworm, bollworms, beetles,
butterflies)–, it dies. Thus, the crop is "insect-resistant," and farmers do not have to spray
chemical pesticides to control insect populations. Varieties of soy and corn have been
developed with these traits combined (with two, three, and four genes stacked). For

one or another will be preferred; i.e., many prefer not to use GE as it gives the technology
a degree of certainty and predictability that current science is far from achieving (Tokar
2001:15). Transgenic is less used in US-based research (compared to GM) but common
in Argentine speech, as in soja transgénica, transgenic soy (whereas soja genéticamente
modificada is barely used).
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example, Monsanto's corn YieldGard™ Plus with RR combines one HT trait (glyphosate
tolerance) + two Bt traits (resistance to Coleopteran and Lepidopteran insects) +
antibiotic resistance.8
GM field trials first started in 1986 featuring mostly corn, tomato, soybean,
canola, potato, and cotton, and were conducted mostly in the USA and Canada (James
1997). The People's Republic of China was the first country to commercially release a
transgenic crop, a virus-resistant tobacco, in 1992 (James 1997:13). In 1994, Calgene
obtained permission to release the first GM food in the US market, a delayed-ripening
tomato branded Flavr Savr™ (James 1997:2). By 1996, transgenic crops, mostly tobacco,
cotton, and soybean, were grown commercially in six countries: the United States, China,
Canada, Argentina, Australia, and Mexico (James 1997:2). Since then, the area planted
with GM crops has grown 100-fold, from 1.7 million hectares in 1996 to 170.3 million ha
in 2012 (James 2012). In 2012, transgenic crops were planted commercially in 28
countries (James 2012). The United States, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and India are, in
that order, the largest GM crop growers (James 2012). These five countries account for
89% of the global area of planted GM crops (James 2012). The speed of adoption of
transgenic crops is unprecedented, hailed by some as "the most rapid uptake of a new
technology in human history" (Schurman and Munro 2010:xii).
GM biotech development is carried by and controlled almost entirely by
corporations: BASF, Monsanto, Bayer, Syngenta, DuPont, and Dow, the world's six
largest agrochemical and seed companies, own the patent monopoly for 42 of the 55
existing patent families (ETC Group 2008:14). Corporations respond primarily to their

8

http://www.isaaa.org/gmapprovaldatabase/event/default.asp?EventID=108
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shareholders; their goal is to increase profitability (Gould 2009). In terms of seed
development thus, the definition of a crop's 'desirable traits' is measured in relation to
final sales and not to other qualities that could be of general interest, such as nutritious
value (Patel 2008). The technological trajectory of GM crop development thus reflects
this profit-laden interest: dominant GM crops are soy, cotton, and corn, crops that require
large-scale mechanized production and that are not intended for direct human
consumption.9 Almost 100% of crops are engineered to be either herbicide-tolerant or
insect-resistant, or both.10 HT in particular is a very lucrative GM trait because it depends
on the sale of the company's companion chemical (Monsanto's RoundupTM glyphosate). It
is estimated that over 80% of the global area planted with transgenic crops carries at least
one trait for herbicide tolerance (ETC Group 2008:13). Gene stacking is an increasingly
more common technology in GM crops, one that it is also comparatively more profitable:
It is estimated that double and triple stacked traits generate nearly twice the profitability
(ETC Group 2008:13). In 2011, the global market value of GM biotech crops raised to
US$13.3 billion, representing 35% of the US$34.4 billion global commercial seed market
(James 2011). Since 1996, the accumulated global value of GM crops is estimated at
US$87 billion.11
Profit-making from seed development is a very recent event in the long history of
agriculture as a technique (see Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel 2000). Seeds have historically
been a public good, produced and reproduced by farmers. The third agricultural/agrarian

9

Soy and corn are mostly used as ingredients for food products (i.e., as high fructose
corn syrup and soy lecithin) and to produce biodiesel. Soy is also used as livestock feed.
Cotton, of course, isn't food.
10
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/16/default.asp
11
Op cit.
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revolution has implied a progressive commodification of the seed as a mechanism for the
accumulation and reproduction of capital (Kloppenburg 2005). The commodification of
the seed, however, has been no easy matter: agriculture has historically been a difficult
field for capitalism to colonize (Kloppenburg 2005). Once a farmer has acquired some
seeds and a few animals, s/he is not dependent on the market anymore: After the cropping
season, some seeds are sold in the market for income, some are consumed as grain (as
food), and some are saved for the next growing season. Also, traditionally farmers grow a
variety of crops and animals that are dependent on each other and that work as natural
pesticides and herbicides. For example, animals in the farm provide manure that is used
as fertilizer. Therefore, traditional farming practices, and the seed itself, are, by nature,
against capitalist practices. Unlike any other commodity, seeds reproduce (Kloppenburg
2005; Shiva 1993; Shiva 2000). Thus, transforming the seed from a public good into a
“commodity” became key to the development of industrial, corporate-led agriculture.
This transformation was possible by developments in science (genetics) and the help of
the government, which, by passing patent-like laws for genetically engineered seeds,
allowed corporations to own germplasm, the genetic code of plants12 (Kloppenburg
2005). As such, GM seeds have become the cornerstone of the agro-industrial model of
late capitalism (Kloppenburg 2005). This is what I will discuss next.

2.2

THE AGRO-INDUSTRY & THE GLOBALIZATION PROJECT
The agro-industry has its origins in the United States in the mid-20th century and

later expanded to the rest of the world (McMichael 2000). The agro-industry is an
12

Legal hinge was the US Supreme Court decision on Diamond vs. Chakrabarty in 1980
(see Kloppenburg 2005).
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energy-and-capital intensive model of agriculture: by contrast to traditional farming
practices, this type of intensive agriculture requires constant external inputs which are
provided through the market, such as machinery, oil, chemical pesticides and fertilizers,
hybrid and GM seeds, corn- and soy-derived animal feedstuff for the meat sub-sector13
(Foster 1999; McMichael 2000). As McMichael (2000:129) argues, this is significant on
two accounts: on a national (US) level, because it integrated the manufacturing and
agricultural sectors ("fuelling post-Second World War prosperity" in the US); and on the
transnational scale, because large agribusiness corporations started to coordinate input
exchanges across countries. What occurs thereafter is a re-arrangement of the
international division of labor as, in McMichael's (2000:129) words, "agro-industrial
complexes (where agriculture is subjected to, and integrated with, industrial processes)
were simultaneously nationally organized and internationally sourced." Poor countries of
the Global South then enter the international circuit of food and agricultural technology
as strategic agricultural-input and food suppliers. The Global South emerges as the
"world farm" at the service of a minority of high-income global consumers, providing
high-value foods such as off-season vegetables and fruits and feed crops to supply the
factory farm complex (McMichael 2007:106-107). For example, now Chile supplies the
US market with fresh fruits and farmed salmon, Thailand supplies poultry to Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan, and Brazil and Argentina sell soybeans to fatten cattle in the EU and
China.

13

The transition to industrial agriculture shows a classic treadmill-of-production
technological trajectory: Energy (oil, machinery) and chemicals (fertilizers, pesticides)
replaces labor in a process that reduces social benefits and increases ecological costs
(Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008, Schnaiberg 1980, Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).
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For the Global South to provide food and raw materials to the Global North is
hardly a new phenomenon: the extractive relation North-South has colonial roots. During
the colonial period, in a process that Marx ([1867] 1990) described as of primitive
accumulation, food and other commodities, in particular silver and gold, were shipped
from the colonies in Latin America and Africa to Europe to kick start the Industrial
Revolution in England in the 1800s. In this 19th century of British hegemony, the
international division of labor gives a binary view of the world: the Metropolitan
(European) world, specialized in industry, and the Peripheral (or non-European) world,
specialized in raw materials. With this view of the world, 'development' post-WWII came
to be understood as the process to overcome this division. Consequently, the governments
of the Global South (then, the "Third World") heavily intervened to promote the domestic
manufacturing sector (McMichael 2000:127). In Latin America, this is known as the ISI
period, Import Substitution Industrialization.
What is most interesting is that, as McMichael argues (2000:127), in this 20thcentury development paradigm, agriculture is "cast as the residual" and thus "a
specialization to be transcended." According to McMichael (2000:129, 127) this view
obscures two important facts: one, that for the US "development" did not mean
transcending agriculture, but its subjection and integration to the manufacturing sector, in
a model that is both inner- and outer-oriented, both public- and private-directed
("simultaneously nationally organized and internationally sourced")14; and two, "the
parallel story of the politics of agribusinesses in reshaping global political economy and
14

Keeping this in mind is most important with GM biotech under the Ecological
Modernization mentality: Development through the subjection and integration of
agriculture to industrial practices that are not polluting but cleaner, greener, more
effective.
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power relations." Hence the emergence of the Global South as the "world farm" is the
latest period of a historical process that shows continuity, but one that also shows change:
As an intrinsic part of the globalization process, corporations are at the helm, leading the
way (Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel 2000; McMichael 2007).
The role of agribusinesses in re-shaping the geo-political organization of food
production and distribution and the global political economy should not be understated
(McMichael 2000). A number of institutional mechanisms, in particular, in the 1970s, the
distribution of cheap food aid under Public Law 480 and foreign aid for the agricultural
modernization program known as The Green Revolution to selected (peasant revoltprone) Third World countries (South Korea, Mexico, India), were useful to promote agroindustrial technologies and crops (new markets for corporations; integrated commodity
chains) and create food dependency on the US (McMichael 2000:130-2). The pressure
exerted by the US to poor countries through the WTO also shows the extent of corporate
power, and helps to keep expanding the web of the corporate agro-industrial complex
over the Global South (McMichael 2000:137). (See also Raj Patel's Stuffed and Starved,
where he does a great job in fleshing out the details of these processes). As with the
transformation of the seed into a commodity (Kloppenburg 2005), corporations needed
the institutional and monetary support from the state to expand a model of transnational
agro-industrial production.15
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I do not want to imply that corporations "rule" without states and that states are
powerless now. The agribusiness complex had (and needed) institutional and financial
support from the US state, which benefited both corporations and the state. It is a power
alliance; one cannot exert power without the other (Mills [1956] 1999).
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Non-Traditional Agro-Export production in Latin America
In the late 1970s and 80s, with the collapse of the ISI project and immersed in a
deep debt crisis, Latin American governments decided to reorient their economies
outwards, promoting agro-industrialization and agro-exporting as the new model of
socio-economic development (Llambí 1994). These are the beginnings of neoliberalism
in the region.
Starting in the 1970s, a wave of coups d’états spread in Latin America –first in
Chile in 1973, in Argentina in 1976. These dictatorships started sweeping socioeconomic reform, based on a program of structural adjustments devised in American
institutions, in Chicago and Washington (see Klein 2007). In the 1990s, with the return of
democratic governments, this neoliberal program is legitimized in a package known as
the “Washington Consensus” and neoliberalism becomes the official model of
development for Latin America.
The neoliberal model proposed a re-organization of the international political
economy based on the principles of free trade and comparative advantage on the belief
that economic growth would bring, by spillover effect, social well-being (Harvey 2005a).
In Latin America, neoliberalism was implemented through a series of structural
adjustment programs and packages that generally comprised the end of subsidies and
tariffs, privatization, deregulation, and permitting unrestricted foreign investment
(Harvey 2005a).
From these neoliberal premises, two types of economic models arise in Latin
America. One model is based on the maquila industry: assembly factories where low-cost
labor assembles tax-free imported inputs (mostly textiles, cars, and electronics) for re-
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export to the US market. This model is centered on Mexico and the Caribbean countries.
The other one, the one I focus on here, is centered on the exploitation of natural resources
that are processed (if at all) in capital-intensive plants that require little labor–i.e.,
vegetable oils, paper, fish, wine–and it is the model mostly adopted by the South Cone
(Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil) and the Andean countries (Colombia, Peru, and
Ecuador). This model is referred to as Non-Traditional Agro-Export production (NTAE)
and it is based on the specialization of a few commodities for the export market (Kirby
2003:57). The countries that have adopted the NTAEs model are also known as NACs:
New Agricultural Countries, in an analogy to the emergent Asian NICs, the New
Industrial Countries (Taiwan, South Korea) (Friedmann 1991).
For the countries that adopted the NTAE model, increasing agricultural
production was linked to mechanization and a general "modernization" of agricultural
techniques. In order to do so, international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, gave conditional credits to governments that
would "encourage" their farmers to invest in new foreign technology, taking credits to
buy machinery and seeds (McMichael 2007; Shiva 2000). In this way, states, multilateral
agencies, and transnational corporations worked in conjunction to set in motion the
neoliberal project to modernize/mechanize agriculture as a means to development in
Latin America (Llambí 1994).
The introduction of agro-industrial practices in Latin America implied a dramatic
North-South technological and knowledge transfer. To the promoters of neoliberalism in
the region this was a necessary transfer, the key to Development. This notion is well
exemplified in the 1998-1999 World Bank report tellingly entitled Knowledge for
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Development, which urges to "close the knowledge gap" between the knowledge-rich
North and the knowledge-poor South. In this view, North-South technological transfers
are presented as neutral and objective, a description that recalls well the modernization
paradigm, where poor/underdeveloped countries will evolve/modernize as they adopt
Western liberal values and techniques (Parsons 1977). Neoliberalism is the latest version
of these beliefs, updated to embrace the technological developments of the 21st century,
communication and information technologies in particular. Economic pundits like
Thomas Friedman (2005) and Jeffrey Sachs (2005) represent well these ideas when
calling for the end of poverty through the diffusion of Western technologies (the result of
barrier-free markets) (understood also as a promotion of Globalization). These ideas also
resonate well with Ecological Modernization theory in their unfettered belief in the
promise of new technologies to solve the social and ecological crisis.
On the other side stand those who argue that North-South technological transfers
are not a value-neutral enterprise, but much to the contrary these are understood to be a
mechanism for colonization (Giarracca 2007; Lander 2000b; Santos 2009; Shiva 1991).
For example, Vandana Shiva saw the Green Revolution in India not as a means to
Progress but as a "techno-political strategy" to bring about peace and quell dissent
through to the creation of food abundance (Shiva 1991). These authors argue that this
type of science and technology, this "techno-science" as they term it, which is presented
as objective, neutral, and universal, is rather part and parcel of the historically-rooted
neoliberal development project (Giarracca 2007; Lander 2000a) and therefore reflect the
interests of the institutions that produce them (Gould 2009), including pacifying restive
populations (Shiva 1991). In this manner, techno-science becomes both a tool and a
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discourse, an epistemology intrinsically linked to neoliberal values (Lander 2000a;
Santos 2009). Its goal is the appropriation and control of nature, by promoting limitless
growth through the exploitation of natural resources (Giarracca 2007). This is a repeated
pattern, a new form of colonialism (Giarracca 2007; Lander 2000b; Santos 2009; Shiva
1991). Or, as David Harvey (2005b) put it, the continuity of Marx's process of primitive
accumulation, capital's "accumulation by dispossession".
There is therefore a strong political and ideological component in North-South
technological transfers. The IFIs call to "modernize" agriculture in Latin America is not
void of power relations where nation-states, transnational corporations, and multi-lateral
agencies have worked in conjunction to promote neoliberal-style development with the
aid of science and technology. Later in this chapter I return to these issues, to discuss how
contestation against GMOs has targeted primarily this objective/neutral discourse of
science and technology and thus placed the struggle over control of natural resources. But
before that I will describe in detail the discourses and arguments from GM supporters and
detractors as a basis for further discussing these issues.

2.3

MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GMOS
This short section describes the main arguments and debates for and against GM

biotechnology. As it should be evident by now, there is more to GM biotechnology than
the technology itself. Contrasting the different framings of the technology given by
supporters and detractors helps to further elucidate this point and opens up the question of
why these different framings matter (a question I deal with in the next section).
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Arguments in Favor of GM Biotechnology
Main arguments in favor of GM biotechnology can be summarized under five points:
1. Science is Progress. The notion that technological innovation will bring about
Progress and Development in and of itself. This is related to what I have
described above, in relation to the "modernization" of agricultural techniques.
2. Economic Benefits. Agricultural biotechnology promises increased yields and
profits to farmers. This new technology is presented as particularly beneficial to
smallholders and peasants in poor countries recognized as those who can benefit
most from GM crop adoption (Qaim 2009).
3. Environmental Protection/Sustainability. Ag biotech promises a reduction in
the quantity of chemical pesticides and herbicides released to the environment. Bt
crops do not require pesticide spraying as the crop is genetically altered to be
insect-resistant. No-tillage methods used in conjunction with RR GM seeds means
a reduction of the soil-degrading consequences of plowing; plowing breaks the
soil structure, no-tilling reduces soil erosion by maintaining soil moisture and
nutrients.16
4. Feeding the world. The Malthusian argument is the most widely used to promote
GM crops, which promise to feed a growing population in a world of diminishing
resources. GM crops are presented as the solution to hunger and poverty through
yield increases (produce more with less).
5. Solution to crisis. GM crops are presented as the solution to the world's most
pressing crises: food, clothing, energy, and climate. According to the industry,
16

Monsanto, “Biotechnology contributes to significant decrease in plowing”
http://www.monsanto.com/biotech-gmo/asp/topic.asp?id=ConservationTillage
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new GM traits will be able to tolerate draught, flooding, extreme heat and other
extreme climate conditions. Biofuels hold the promise of a cleaner and renewable
source of energy.

These are a few examples of how GM promoters present these issues:
•

Monsanto's corporate brochure:

People around the world depend on farmers for their most basic needs. But
limited natural resources, increasingly unpredictable weather conditions, and a
rapidly growing population pose serious challenges to farmers. These global
challenges are complex and there are no easy answers. But one thing is clear:
agricultural innovation holds a key solution.17
•

ISAAA, The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech
Applications:

Food, feed, fiber, and fuel for the world’s 800 million people who suffer from
hunger and poverty – this is the formidable task for many countries, development
agencies, and other interest groups. Of the many strategies that have been
forwarded to address the issues of global poverty and environmental degradation,
crop biotechnology is seen as a viable contribution to the solution.18
Arguments Against GM Biotechnology
Main arguments against GM biotechnology can be summarized under the
following points:
1. Corporate concentration: Critics point at the horizontal and vertical
integration of the agri-food system and its consequent corporate concentration
(Heffernan 2000). In 2009, only three companies Monsanto, DuPont

17

Monsanto. Corporate Brochure, page 11.
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Documents/Monsanto_Corporate_Brochure.pdf
Accessed 11/15/12
18
ISAAA Mission. http://www.isaaa.org/inbrief/default.asp. Accessed 11/15/12.
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(Pioneer), and Syngenta controlled 53% of the global commercial seed market
(ETC Group 2011). Monsanto is the world’s largest seed company and fourth
largest pesticide company (ETC Group 2011). Four TNCs, named the "ABCD
group" –ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfuss–, account for 75-90% of the
global grain trade.19
2. Peasant displacement and rural poverty. Critics argue that the introduction
of agro-industrial techniques and GM crops have radically transformed rural
life, increasing peasant displacement and rural poverty (Giarracca and Pérez
C. 2001; Kay 2004; Kay 2008; Mooij, Bryceson, and Kay 2000). Authors thus
claim that GM biotech is not a pro-poor technology as the industry promotes
(Glover 2010; Schnurr 2012). Expensive patents and oppressive contracts are
one of the main causes for farmer poverty (and suicide, when farmers can't
repay their debts, see Patel 2008). Farmers' poverty and displacement also
facilitates land consolidation.
3. Threat to local cultures and knowledges. The forced introduction of foreign
knowledge and technologies dismisses local knowledge(s) as invalid
(Giarracca 2007; Lander 2000b; Santos 2009; Shiva 1991). Traditionally
farming is more than a food-producing activity; it is the locus of peoples'
culture. The introduction of agro-industrial practices thus threatens cultural
diversity. As represented by the motto of the international peasant movement
Vía Campesina, the struggle for the seed is also the struggle for peoples'
dignity and sovereignty.
19

The Guardian, "The global food crisis: ABCD of food – how the multinationals
dominate trade", June 2, 2011.
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4. Food insecurity. Despite increased global food production, the number of
hungry people keeps rising. According to FAO, nearly 870 million, or one in
eight people around the world were suffering from chronic undernourishment
in 2010-2012.20 This suggests that the problem of hunger is a matter of
distribution rather than of production, as supporters argue. Amartya Sen
(1981) was among the first to link famines to unequal access to resources and
poverty.
5. Impact on human health. Critics argue that GMO crops pose real and
potential (not-yet-tested) health hazards. Roundup glyphosate has been shown
to produce endocrine (hormone) disruption, DNA damage, cancer, birth
defects, and neurological disorders (1er. Encuentro Nacional de Medicxs de
Pueblos Fumigados 2010; Comisión Provincial de Investigación de
Contaminantes del Agua April 2010; Paganelli et al. 2010). The consequences
of eating foods made with GM crops have not been sufficiently tested (Freese
and Schubert 2004; Small Planet Institute 2012). An FDA report contains
warnings about the "unique hazards" of GE foods, as they may contain
"unexpected toxins, carcinogens, or allergens" (Moore Lappé 2011).
6. Impact on the environment. Despite supporters' claims, pesticide use has
increased, in particular of Roundup glyphosate. No-tillage practices are
beneficial but positive results have been offset by increased agro-chemical
use.21 The use of Bt crops has impacted on other non-target insects, reducing
populations of bees and the monarch butterfly. Agro-industrial practices are
20
21

http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/161819/icode/; accessed March 20, 2012
No-tillage methods are also widely used in agro-ecology.
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considered one of the main contributors of CO2 emissions and, thus, to global
warming and climate change. Critics also warn of cross-pollination and genetransfer between GM and non-GM crops (see Antoniou, Robinson, and Fagan
2012)
7. Not a solution but a "techno-fix". GM biotechnology is presented as a
technological solution to global crisis. Critics argue that these are not real
solutions but techno-fixes, partial and momentary, 'patch' solutions. Most
important, critics argue that these technofixes come to 'fix' problems already
created by the agro-industry: for example, Bt corn was developed to address
the problem of corn borer infestation in large-scale corn monocultures in the
United States (Buttel, in Marsden 2008).
8. Inadequate science. Critics argue that GMOs have not been held to standard
testing and regulation before being released to the environment and being
approved for human consumption (Antoniou, Robinson, and Fagan 2012;
Freese and Schubert 2004; Small Planet Institute 2012)

A Short Discussion on These Two Perspectives
It is important to point out that these two perspectives have things in common:
First of all, both sides claim to be helping out the environment and the poor. Second, they
dismiss each other on the grounds of "science". Both sides bring up the notion of
sound/unsound science to support their own view and dismiss the other. GM supporters
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argue that biotech is positive because it is the consequence of scientific research22 and
dismiss critics' concerns as not "sufficiently tested", or "without sufficient scientific
evidence." Supporters also dismiss critics as luddites, as people fearful of progress. Fear
and scare are, according to supporters, the means used by anti-GM people to set
populations against GMOs. According to GM supporters, these obscure methods will not
stand when faced to the light of science.23
Critics also rely on the scientific argument to defend their position. For example,
a recent report on GMOs released by Earth Open Source proposes to examine, based on
"scientific evidence," the claims made by biotech supporters about GM crop safety and
efficacy (Antoniou, Robinson, and Fagan 2012). The report then contrasts the "myths"
brought forward by GM supporters to the "truths" revealed by scientific research. That
the sound/unsound science argument can be equally brought forward by both pro- and
anti-GM people radically questions the notion of an objective and neutral science
(Schnaiberg 1977; Wright 1992). Yet, as I show in this dissertation, this is among the
most common and strongest claims to make a case for or against GM biotech.

2.4

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, QUIESCENCE, POWER
GM is a widely controversial technology that has been met with strong resistance

(Stone 2010). Long before GM crops were commercially available there were people
concerned about the safety, utility, and necessity of this new technology and thus
22

Even though this is a circular argument, it makes sense when there is a strong belief on
the intrinsic positive qualities of scientific research (as I have shown above).
23
This cartoon, created by the ISAAA, one of the leading promoters of GM crops,
graphically summarizes the arguments for GM and how critics are portrayed: "Mandy
and Fanny: The Future of Sustainable Agriculture." Available at
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/videos/mandy_fanny/default.asp
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organizing in response (Schurman and Munro 2003:111-112). In this section I first
review the cases and grounds for resistance and mobilization against GMOs around the
world and in Latin America in particular. Then, I look into social movement theory to
address two questions, why do movements emerge and why do they fail to emerge. I thus
explore quiescence and demobilization. In order to do so, I focus on the links between
power and collective action.

Resistance and Mobilization Against GMOs
Social resistance to genetically engineered crops arose long before the new
technology was released to the market in the mid-1990s (Schurman and Kelso 2003;
Schurman and Munro 2003; Tokar 2001). Ever since then resistance and mobilization
against GMOs around the world has only increased (Schurman and Munro 2010; Stone
2010). In this section I look at the most emblematic cases of anti-GM activism around the
world and in Latin America in particular. It is important to note that while movements
and campaigns have had (and still have) their moments of success, this is nothing like a
"won battle." Actually, despite major wins by the anti-GM movement, the agricultural
biotech industry stays strong, and has experienced a major recovery after 2005 boosted
by a growing demand for biofuels and the 2008 hike in global food prices. At the same
time, or probably due to this recovery, the anti-GM movement stays vibrant (Schurman
and Munro 2010).
Anti-GM activism covers a wide range of actors with a wide range of concerns:
farmers, scientists, environmentalists/ecologists, workers' unions, consumers; concerned
citizens around the world have contested the GM biotechnology industry on economic,
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environmental, social, cultural, political, and moral grounds (summarized above; see also
Magdoff and Tokar 2010; Otero 2008; Schurman and Kelso 2003; Schurman and Munro
2010; Scoones 2008). A key feature of the anti-GM movement is its transnational
character: global connections link anti-GM activists and debates through the internet,
email lists, and meetings across the world. As such, the movement has gained relevance
as part of the wider anti-globalization movement that came to the scene in Seattle in 1999
and has since then met and staged protests in a number of international events, from the
WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 to the yearly meetings of the World Social Forum
(Schurman and Munro 2003; Schurman and Munro 2010; Scoones 2008. See also Keck
and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow 2005b). This globalization of protests has helped to publicize
the movement at global level, bolstered by the growth of international anti-GM "stars,"
such as José Bové from France and Vandana Shiva from India, and the actions of other
international organizations, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Vía Campesina
(Scoones 2008).
The anti-GM movement has a wide agenda that aims to a "broadening of the
frame (...) beyond the technology itself" (Scoones 2008:326). As McAffee (2008:148)
argues "[d]isputes about agricultural biotechnology are linked to wider conflicts about the
cultural significance of food and farming, the consequences of trade liberalization and the
global restructuring of food systems, and the role of agriculture in development." With
this broader frame antibiotech activists have been able to bring these issues out into the
public sphere, transforming GM crops "from an elite technological development into a
highly contentious social problem" (Schurman and Munro 2010:xiii). Therefore,
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transforming science from an allegedly objective and apolitical issue into a political one
(Schurman and Munro 2010; Scoones 2008).
Despite its transnational character, the anti-GM movement is rooted in local
struggles, processes, and debates (Schurman and Munro 2010; Scoones 2008; Stone
2010). Mobilization practices are local and context-specific and rooted in specific debates
(Scoones 2008). For example, in France, small landholders organized under the Peasant
Confederation has focused on the potential risks of GMOs based on a cultural framework
of general distrust of industrial agriculture's instrumental rationality (Bonny 2003; Heller
2011). In Brazil, the Landless Workers Movement MST has inscribed the struggle against
GM crops as an aspect of a wider struggle for democracy and agrarian reform (Newell
2008; Scoones 2008).
In the Global North, anti-GM activism is particularly strong in France and the UK
(Bonny 2003; Doherty and Hayes 2012; Heller 2011; Schurman and Munro 2010). In the
European Union, as in New Zealand and Australia, anti-GM regulation has been
achieved, aimed mostly at protecting consumers from potential health risks of GM foods
(Marsden 2008). In the United States, there is some anti-GM activism (Pechlaner 2012;
Schurman and Munro 2010). Lately, the Occupy Food branch of the Occupy Wall Street
movement has brought farmers and consumers together on this issue and has staged a few
protests, for example, marching through the streets of New York City on December 4,
2011. In general however, the United States most resembles the case of Argentina, where
GM crop expansion and promotion are the rule and the public remains mostly unaware
and quiescent.
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In the Global South, India is one of the most emblematic cases of anti-GM
activism (Scoones 2008; Shiva 2000). In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are the
forefront of anti-biotech activism, but resistance has emerged in other countries as well,
such as in Peru and Ecuador (Newell 2008; Otero 2008; Scoones 2008).
Contestation and resistance against GMOs in Latin America is brought forward
mostly by rural and environmental movements and it has been framed within a wider
criticism of the neoliberal model of agricultural production (Otero 2008). Rural and
environmental movements in Latin America, as in the rest of the Global South, are
closely intertwined, up to the point that sometimes the categories collapse: They are the
peasants (who are also usually indigenous) the ones that mobilize around environmental
issues (Lewis 2009). Some examples are the rubber tappers and the MST in Brazil, the
"Water War" in Cochabamba, Bolivia, and the Mexican farmers' struggle to protect
native maize from cheap imported US corn under NAFTA. The origin of Southern
environmental movements is rooted in poor people's struggles to protect livelihoods,
compared to Northern movements where environmentalism began as the enterprise of
affluent people to protect recreational spaces24 (Lewis 2009). This is why they are also
known as an "environmentalism of the poor" (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997).
Anti-biotech activism in Latin America is thus inscribed within a wider struggle
to protect and defend livelihoods, in particular after the dispossession consequence of the
neoliberal programs implemented throughout. Thus new social movements have
emerged, to fight against the agro-industry and GM as well as to fight other extractive
and polluting activities, such as mining. These new social movements have at heart the

24

Yet closer to US environmental justice movements (Lewis 2009).
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struggle for local (vs. transnational) control of natural resource use and decision-making
(Giarracca 2007).

Social Movement Theory and Quiescence: Why Do Movements Emerge, Why Do
They Fail to Emerge?
Social movement and collective action theory of the last three decades has almost
exclusively focused on the issue of mobilization (Walder 2009): "Why do people
mobilize?" or, rephrased, "Why do movements emerge?" have been the main questions
raised by social movement scholars. Then, why do people mobilize? Klandermans (2001)
argues that these are the components that explain why social movements come into
being:
1. Grievances. There is a reason why people are discontent and they mobilize to
address that issue. Thus, people mobilize to struggle against all kinds of
injustices, from traditional issues such as class or religion, to “new” ones,
such as gender, ethnicity, ecology (This is Touraine’s New social movement
theory).
2. Resources. Not all aggrieved people decide to mobilize. Resource
mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977) focuses on explaining the
internal life/organizational aspects of a social movements, as it argues that
only those that have the resources to do so, such as time, money, expertise,
technical infrastructure, are the ones that effectively engage in collective
action.
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3. Political opportunity. Political opportunity theory (McAdam 1982; Tarrow
2005a) emphasizes the context of collective action. In contrast to resource
mobilization's focus on the internal aspects of social movement formation, this
perspective emphasizes the role played by the political environment, either by
facilitating or constraining collective action.
Resource mobilization and political opportunity theorists typically downplay the
role grievances have in accounting for collective action. Yet grievances are not
ubiquitous, as these theories suggest. Therefore, from a social psychology perspective,
another condition to social movement formation is:
4. Frames. The way people interpret their grievances is critical to participation.
Frames capture the culture dimension of movements and they serve both as
“persuasive devices” (to capture adherents) as well as “interpretive
frameworks” (Poletta and Ho 2006:190; Snow and Benford 1988).
While these theories are usually introduced as competing explanations to social
movement formation, I follow Klandermans’ approach of considering each of these
conditions not as exclusive but as complementary explanations. Taken together, these
conditions build a better explanatory framework (Klandermans 2001). Schurman and
Munro's (2010) analysis of anti-biotech activism also favors this complementary
approach, and in doing so they argue that, for a social movement to emerge it is necessary
that (1) a social problem exists, and (2) that there are opportunities for activism.
First, therefore, there has to be an issue or situation that is understood, perceived,
or framed as a social problem. It is not enough that a situation of inequality, threats to
health, or environmental damage exists objectively, not even that it is experienced
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directly and visibly to a group of people (Auyero and Swistun 2009; Gould 1993). As
social movement scholars have long argued, potential grievances are ubiquitous. Thus, as
Schurman and Munro (2010:xv) succinctly put it, "[f]or a given situation to be widely
understood as a social problem (i.e., as a problem that demands attention and
remediation), some group has to form an oppositional consciousness around it and
identify it as a problem. This requires an act of interpretation." (authors' italics). Framing
therefore is key. How supporters and detractors frame GM biotech shows how different
ways of interpreting the technology lead to different reactions; up to a point that there
might be no middle ground for discussion among these groups, as the debate is not about
the technology anymore but of different worldviews (Schurman and Munro 2010).
Second, for a movement to emerge, there have to exist opportunities for activism;
that includes, the availability of resources and a context (political, institutional, cultural)
that are conducive to the movements' success (Schurman and Munro 2010). Because of
the global, transnational, and corporate nature of the agro-industry and its tight links with
the nation-state, the structure of the global political economy is the background on which
anti-GM struggles take place (to account for this globalized context, Pellow (2007)
broadens MacAdam's (1982) notion of political opportunity into the political economic
opportunity structure).
The notion of framing for the construction of grievances is thus key for the
emergence of mobilization, for who would protest without a good reason to do so?
According to Schurman and Munro (2010:xvi), the act of framing is grounded on a
"cultural predisposition" each person carries, the "shared mental worlds that incline
people towards particular ways of thinking and seeing." Schurman and Munro's (2010)
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analysis on anti-GM activism is influenced by Alfred Schutz and Habermas' theories and
thus heavily focused on actors' interaction. In this dissertation I diverge from this micro
approach to explore the links between framing and the social structure. In doing so I rely
on traditional social movement and contentious politics theory. As Walder (2009:394)
argues, the wealth of research by social movement scholars has given a "false sense of
intellectual breadth, obscuring the enduring narrowness of the focus on mobilization."
Before the rise of these current approaches to the study of social movement organization
and collective action, the focus was on the relationship between social structure and
politics (Walder 2009).
The first studies in this tradition are rooted in Marx's class analysis and aim to
link social movement theory to politics, protest, and power (Walder 2009). Paige's (1975)
study on agrarian revolutions is a clear example of this tradition.25 In this work, Paige
(1975) argues that agrarian movements in the 20th century arose as rural class struggles
(cultivators vs. non-cultivators) around land control. Land issues and agrarian reform
were at the core of peasant struggles in the 20th century (Moore 1966; Paige 1975; Wolf
[1969] 1999). In the 21st century, neoliberalism has transformed the "peasant" (see
Giarracca and Pérez C. 2001; Kay 2004; Kay 2008; Mooij, Bryceson, and Kay 2000) and
thus new movements have emerged, infused with new identity demands (Escobar and
Alvarez 1992). The issue of land, however, is still unresolved; neoliberalism and
globalization imply new forms of dispossession: land grabs, water grabs, etc. The fight
over the seed (to maintain agriculture GM free) of rural and environmental movements in
Latin America is infused with these issues; it has at its core the struggle over control of

25

See also Moore 1966, Skocpol 1979, Wolf [1969] 1999.
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natural resources (Giarracca 2007, Teubal 2009). Current agrarian/rural struggles in Latin
America therefore target the model of industrial agriculture and the transnational
corporations that promote it (Teubal 2009). These “new agrarian social movements” have
emerged, in places like Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador, to fight for
those still unresolved issues but now under new conditions (Teubal 2009). In this context,
social movement theory cannot be delinked from politics, protest, and power. In
particular, it helps to broaden social movement theory's exclusive focus on mobilization
(Walder 2009), a strong limitation when the focus of study is, as it is here, lack of
mobilization and quiescence.
Framing can be understood as the missing link between the mobilization and the
politics/structural traditions in social movement and collective action theory. As Walder
(2009:406) argues, framing, the subjective dimension of mobilization, leads back "to the
question of the social structural circumstances that make certain interpretative frames,
collective identities, or emotions salient to potential participants in a movement." To this,
Walder (2009:406) adds, "the idea that individuals' social experience (including but by no
means limited to economic interests) affects their receptivity to different ideas, or frames,
through which they understand their world is inherent in the very idea of framing. This is
the core question that ideas about framing raise in pursuing the question of a movement's
political orientation: What social circumstances determine the receptivity of one frame
over another?" Now this question could be broadened to ask, what social
circumstances/social structure create or make possible the existence of one frame over
another? What if/when if frames conducive to mobilization and protest fail to arise? The
most obvious result is quiescence.
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Quiescence and Power: The Missing Link in Social Movement and Collective Action
Theory
The question of quiescence is a very important question for social movement
theory and yet one that has been little explored (Edelman 2001; Gaventa 1980; Lapegna
2011). Social research on collective action's narrow focus on mobilization (Walder 2009)
has as its main consequence an even narrower focus on the visible aspects of
mobilization: where and why social movements emerge, who participates in them, what
strategies and repertoires do they use. This dissertation questions this “positivist” view of
social movement theory as it brings the issue of lack of participation to the same level of
importance as the study of collective action (See Burdick, in Edelman 2001:311).
The study of quiescence is not without problems, not least because it is not easy to
distinguish quiescence from consensus. However, that people do not protest does not
mean that there are no grievances, for (1) grievances are ubiquitous and (2) that even
when grievances are right out there, visible to the naked eye, people may not protest (see
Auyero and Swistun 2009; Gould 1993). Therefore, the fact that there are no apparent or
aired grievances (and thus quiescence) does not imply consensus or a shared sense of
justice. The question then becomes, why and how, in cases of quiescence, are grievances
not framed as such? As Walder (2009) implies, it has to do with the social structure.
Lukes (2005) gave a related answer: it has to do with the workings of power.
Steven Lukes, in a small book first published in 1974, entitled Power: A Radical
View, sketched what he conceptualized as the "third dimension" of power, that further
dimension of power that "prevent[s] people, to whatever degree, from having grievances
by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept
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their role in the existing order of things" (Lukes 2005:28). Lukes' proposal was "to think
about power broadly rather than narrowly –in three dimensions rather than one or two"
(Lukes 2005:1). The One-Dimensional view of power, the notion of power of the
'pluralists,'26 focuses on observable behavior in decision-making over which there is
actual and observable conflict. This (overt) conflict is between subjective interests, seen
as policy preferences, and revealed by political participation (Lukes 2005:16-19; 29). The
Two-Dimensional view is a qualified critique of the behavioral focus of the first
dimension, proposing that, by contrast, there is another face of power, arguing that "to the
extent that a person or group –consciously or unconsciously– creates or reinforces
barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group [also] has power"
(Bachrach and Baratz, qtd. in Lukes 2005:20). Thus, authors within this view argue that
both decision-making and nondecision-making are to be examined in any analysis of
power (Lukes 2005:22); non-decision making being "a means by which demands for
change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be
suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access
to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in
the decision-implementing stage of the policy process" (Bachrach and Baratz, qtd. in
Lukes 2005:23). Thus, in this view, "it is crucially important to identify potential issues
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Lukes' Power: A Radical View was part of an ongoing debate about power,
powerlessness, and domination among American political scientists and sociologists in
the 1950s and 60s. At the heart of the debate where the arguments raised by C. Wright
Mills in The Power Elite (1956) and Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure: A
Study of Decision Makers (1953) (Lukes 2005:1). The One-Dimensional view is often
called the 'pluralist' view of power, main authors being Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby and
Raymond Wolfinger (Lukes 2005:15). The view of the pluralists' critics Lukes' calls the
Two-Dimensional view, this critique raised mostly by Peter Bachrach and Morton S.
Baratz in 'The Two Faces of Power' (1962).
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which nondecision-making prevents from being actual" (Lukes 2005:23). This view
therefore expands the discussion of power by bringing in the notion of mobilization of
bias into the discussion of power (Lukes 2005:20).
Lukes (2005) agrees that it is crucial to identify potential issues that are
suffocated by nondecision-making. However, he critiques this view on the basis that, as
the one-dimensional view, it continues to focus on actual, observable conflict, whether it
is overt or covert (Lukes 2005:23). By contrast, Lukes argues that lack of actual,
observable conflict does not imply consensus, raising the point that conflict could
actually be potential or latent. This is the third face or dimension of power, which is the
form of power that secures consent to domination of willing subjects (Lukes 2005:109).
Therefore, "averting both conflict and grievance through the securing of consent" (Lukes
2005:111). This is, in Lukes' (2005:28) terms, the most "invasive and insidious form of
power."
The concept of a third dimension of power makes possible to conceptualize and
analyze how potential issues are kept out of politics, even in the absence of actual,
observable conflict. Lukes suggests that researchers should look for the potential for
conflict (having in mind that this potential might never be actualized); and, in particular,
for latent conflict, "which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those
exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude" (Lukes 2005:28; author's
italics). To this Lukes adds that people's real interests may never be expressed and they
may even remain unconscious. Many questions thus arise: What are these 'real interests'
that are different from people's declared/avowed interests? How do we, as researchers
and outsiders, know better than the subjects of study so that we know what their real
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interests are even when those remain unconscious and unavailable to them? Moreover,
we should also ask about the interests of those exercising power without taking them for
granted, so that we can properly contrast the interests of the powerful to those of the
powerless.
The question of 'real interests' as something that we, as researchers and outsiders,
can ascertain has been critiqued as condescending and patronizing (see Lukes 2005:114148 for counterarguments). If people's interests are "many, conflicting, and of different
kinds" (Lukes 2005:147), how could I, as an outsider, claim to know better, for example,
that people's avowed religious or moral interests conflict with their 'real' or best economic
interest? Or any interests of another kind? There is certainly the risk of imputing to the
subject of study our own interests and values. On the other hand, however hard, the task
is not utterly impossible. As Lukes suggests, the stated 'real' interests are not a definite set
that works all across, but rather a function of the "explanatory purpose, framework, and
methods" of each particular study (Lukes 2005:148). For this dissertation case study, I
had also a 'checklist' at hand, which included a list of grievances and issues raised by
members of anti-GM social movements (listed earlier in this chapter) as well as a list of
potential issues that could be constructed as grievances (issues that result from the
expansion of GM soy monocropping in Argentina, described on the next chapter). That
checklist I took with me to compare and contrast to my subjects' declared interests. I must
say that, at times, it was not easy (or even possible) for me to ascertain that potential for
conflict. For example, one item in my "potential grievances" list was losing access to
fresh foods, as GM soy replaces fruits and vegetables grown locally. And while this is a
grievance raised by peasants in the North, it was not an issue for most rural inhabitants in
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the Pampas, for whom the fruits and vegetables that are part of their diet are either bought
in a grocery store or grown in small huertas in their own backyards.
At other times, however, it was impossible not to think of a contradiction, as
when people described how airplanes spray agrochemicals over the farms bordering
towns and thus over their homes and workplaces.27 Is employment a best interest to
wellbeing? Some people trade employment for health (in particular it seems to be the
case among the powerless, see Crenson 1971; Gaventa 1980; Lukes 2005). However, at
baseline, I intuitively agree with Lukes (2005) and Crenson (1971) in that it seems a good
argument to hypothesize that people would have an interest in not to be poisoned.28 In the
body of this dissertation I delve further into the issue of agrochemical spraying and
grievance-making, and, most importantly, on grievance-suffocation. As I argue in chapter
6, among the women in particular, illness and health emerged as those underlying,
unexpressed grievances that Lukes (2005) indicates as potential source of conflict.
It is important to note that the most common critique of the notion of the
researcher as an external agent that can tell 'real' interests from declared interests are
those related to criticisms to the Marxist notion of 'false consciousness' (see Lukes
2005:144-148 for counterarguments). False consciousness, in Marxist analysis, is the
result of class power: the ideas of the powerless are those of the ruling class (Marx and
Engels [1845] 1998). These ideas of the ruling class constitute a 'dominant ideology,'
which appropriated by the working class as their own inhibits the development of a
revolutionary consciousness (Abercrombie and Turner 1978). As stated above, I follow
27

I delve further into these examples in chapters 5 and 6.
It is not that for these people health is not an interest or value. On the contrary, research
shows that the powerless are structurally forced into trading health for their livelihood
(see Crenson 1971, Gaventa 1980, Gould 1993).
28
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Lukes (2005) in noting that people's interests –and identities– are not monolithic but
rather multiple and conflicted, and not confined by class position (Lukes 2005:145). The
mechanism, explored by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology and further developed
by Antonio Gramsci (1972) with his concept of 'hegemony' is, nonetheless, at the root of
the notion of the third dimension of power: a mechanism of power that shapes desires and
beliefs to secure compliance to domination (Lukes 2005).
Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony addresses the question of how and why
willing subjects comply with domination (for Gramsci in particular, with capitalist
exploitation). Away from orthodox Marxist explanations, Gramsci (1972) emphasizes the
cultural and ideological aspect of domination, arguing that through institutions such as
the school, the press, and the church, the traditions, values, beliefs, and mores of the
powerful are transmitted to the powerless who internalize those as their own, producing
consent. To Gramsci, as to Lukes, creating cultural, ideological, and political consent is
key to an effective exercise of power (understood as the maintenance of the status quo).
In chapter 4, I look into the interests of the powerful which combined create a hegemonic
discourse of GM soy production in Argentina (in relation to the technological package
and as the preferred agro-export commodity suited for Argentina's comparative
advantage). I argue that those that control natural resources and agricultural production in
Argentina, the agribusinesses and the state, share common economic interests but also a
particular positive framing of GM biotechnology which is the shared hegemonic
discourse on the GM soy model in Argentina.
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One Last Note on Quiescence
Gramsci (1972) notes that quiescence does not always imply willing consent, a
point also entailed in the second dimension of power (Lukes 2005:21). Hegemony is
certainly not infallible. Counter-hegemonies are possible and co-exist with hegemonic
forms (Gramsci 1972). Beyond consent, power has many forms to maintain quiescence
and the status quo: force, coercion, and violence are the most effective when consent
cannot be gained by peaceful means (Gramsci 1972). It is important to emphasize, thus,
that the three dimensions of power co-exist and function together to generate quiescence
(Gaventa 1980).
Moreover, it is also the case that some seemingly quiescent are subtly resisting in
such ways that the appearance of submission is, in fact, a strategy for survival (Scott
1985). It is also the case that others willingly comply because they get something in
return for quiescence, i.e., wives that get their status and welfare through husbands
(Lukes 2005:10, 138; Tilly 1991). I do not want to imply that people are 'dupes' and
quiescence and consent is all there is. Therefore, my last point underlines the fact that
power always meets resistance and that both quiescence and rebellion, in visible and
subtle ways, coexist (Lukes 2005:150-151).
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CHAPTER 3. GM SOY IN ARGENTINA29

This chapter provides a background for analysis. Therefore, here I look at the
context of adoption and expansion of GM soy in Argentina. First, I describe the extent of
the expansion of the monocultures of GM soy in Argentina. Then, I explore the historical
context of GM soy adoption in Argentina, focusing in particular on the neoliberal
restructuring of the 1990s, which provided the necessary political, economic, and legal
framework for the introduction of GM seeds in Argentina. In 2001, a major crisis hit,
which marked a drastic reorientation of the political economy towards the left, which
prompted the emergence of the Kirchners' administrations and their National and Popular
model as an alternative to neoliberalism (still in place today). I analyze how the
government has dealt with the consequences of the 2001 crisis and the heritage of the
neoliberal 1990s: the GM soy-based Non-Traditional Agro-Export (NTAE) model. I
argue that despite major changes the Kirchners' administrations have in fact not
dismantled the mode of production set in place by the previous neoliberal administration.
Much to the contrary, as I show throughout this dissertation, both directly and indirectly
the Kirchners' administrations have created favorable conditions for the expansion of GM
soy. The last section on this chapter focuses on the socio-environmental impact of GM
soy adoption and expansion in Argentina. I conclude by assessing GM soy production as
a model of development based on agro-export production, and I argue that the negative
socio-ecological consequences of GM soy production make the model unsustainable.

29

This chapter is based on a peer-reviewed article now in press.
Leguizamón A. "Modifying Argentina: GM Soy and Socio-Environmental Change."
Geoforum. Article In Press 2013. DOI:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.04.001
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This last section lays the ground to discuss the main question this dissertation addresses:
if the negative consequences of GM soy production are so widespread, why don't people
react and protest? The following chapter addresses quiescence in the Pampas.

3.1.

ADOPTION AND EXPANSION OF GM SOY IN ARGENTINA
The adoption of the technological package of GM soy took place first in the

Pampas, Argentina's historic core of agro-export production. Covering the center
provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, Córdoba, and La Pampa, the Pampas is
an ecoregion especially suited for farming and cattle ranching, a vast flatland of highly
productive land (see Figure 1). Over 80% of GM soy production in Argentina takes place
in this Pampas region (MINAGRI-Same as Fig. 1). In the last few years, production has
expanded beyond this core, into the northern provinces of Chaco, Santiago del Estero,
and Salta.
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Figure 1. Map of Argentina, Pampas Ecoregion, and Area of GM Soy Production

Source: Author, based on data from the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and
Fishery (MINAGRI).
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By the time the technological package of GM soy enters the Argentine Pampas in
1996, farmers had already been planting soy and experimenting with the adoption of new
agrarian technologies (Barsky and Gelman 2001). Argentine farmers started to grow soy
in the Pampas in the summer of 1970. In this first growing season (1969/70), production
accounted for a mere 30.5 hectares that yielded meager results: 26.8 tons produced30 (see
Figure 2). By the end of the 1970s (season 1977/78), there is the first boom in soy
production after the adoption of new agrarian technologies brought by the Green
Revolution: hybrid seeds, mechanization, fertilizers, and herbicides (Barsky and Gelman
2001). The adoption and intensification of agro-industrial techniques, which replaces
labor by fuel and energy intensive machinery and chemical inputs, results in increased
production (but not yields necessarily) as they allow expanding over a bigger area as well
as to plant more seeds/plants per acreage, increasing total final output (Schnaiberg 1980).
For the 1977/78 season, the area planted with soybeans increased from a few hundred
hectares to over a million (from 442.5 ha in 1975/76 to 1.2m ha in 1977/78) and
production soared: 2.5 million tons of soybeans were harvested by the end of the summer
of 1978.
During the eighties and nineties, until the introduction of the new GM RR soy
variety, production grew steadily, adding an average of 267,000 hectares a year, reaching
six million hectares by 1995/96. For the 1996/97 season, the first year the new Roundup
Ready variety was available, the average area increase rate doubled in just one season: In
the summer of 1996/97, almost 670 thousand hectares planted with soybeans were added

30

All data on soy production in this section comes from the Argentine Ministry of
Agriculture, Livestock and Fishery. http://www.siia.gov.ar/index.php/series-portema/agricultura. Last accessed October 27, 2013.
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to production, to reach 6.67million ha. Just like the Green Revolution in the seventies,
labor saving/replacing technological innovation made possible production in much higher
scales (Schnaiberg 1980). Since the introduction of GM soy, an average of almost a
million hectares were added to production every year (900,799 ha, average between
1998/99 and 2011/12), to cover 18.7 million ha by the planting season of 2011/2012.

Figure 2. Soy Planted (in Hectares) and Production (in Tons), Annually.

Source: Argentine Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishery

As the area planted with soybeans increased so has production (see Figure 2).
From the few dozen tons produced during the early seventies, the massive increase in
area planted in the season 1977/78 yielded a soybean bounty: 2.5 million tons were
harvested that season. Since then, soybean production has grown yearly, running apace
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with increasing land under cultivation, reaching 20 million tons in 1999, 30 in 2001, and
40 million tons in 2005. The 50 million mark was passed for the 2009/2010 season,
production reaching 52.7 million tons. For the 2011/2012 season, production was down
to 40 million tons, a reduction that is consequence of the damaging effects of this year's
drought.31
As production soars, so do exports. GM soybeans produced in the Argentine
countryside are not meant for domestic consumption but for export, China being its main
destination. In 2010, 83% of soybean production was shipped to China as feedstuff for
their livestock sector.32 The 'soy complex,' as the package of soy-derived products for
export is termed (including beans, oil, and pellets), accounts for 70% of the country's
total agricultural revenue.33 Considering that agricultural exports represent over half of
total exports in Argentina,34 the weight of soy production in Argentina's economy is
enormous.

3.2

CONTEXT OF GM SOY ADOPTION IN ARGENTINA
The introduction of the GM biotech package and neoliberalism have gone hand in

hand in Latin America as in many nations of the Global South; but nowhere to the extent
as it has in Argentina (Otero 2008). In the 1990s, Argentina fully embraced neoliberalism
and a model of development based on Non-Traditional Agro-Export production (NTAE).
31

USDA, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates. WASDE #505- April 10,
2012. http://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/latest.pdf
32
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) - Exports > Oilseeds > Soybeans. Total annual
exports, by country, in thousand tons. http://www.minagri.gob.ar
33
SOCIEDAD RURAL, INDICADORES AGRICOLAS http://www.ruralarg.org.ar/
(data for 2010/11).
34
(50.7%) WTO, Country Profile: Argentina (data until Oct 2011)http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/AR_e.htm
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The neoliberal economic restructuring gave the necessary institutional and ideological
framework for the introduction of GM seeds in Argentina.
In 1991, President Carlos Menem and Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo
signed the Deregulation Decree as part of their Convertibility Plan to end hyperinflation
and promote growth. The Convertibility Plan gave the final neoliberal twist to Argentine
political economy, as it ended all regulations that protected domestic economic activity:
such as the import and export sectors of goods, services, and capital; foreign direct
investment; and transportation (Carranza 2005; Ferrer 2004). It was the end of the ISI
development paradigm. This decree also wiped out, overnight, all boards that had
regulated agricultural activities since 1930 (Barsky and Gelman 2001; Teubal 2008). In
1996 the Argentine government approved the commercial use of Monsanto's Roundup
Ready® (RR) soybeans, engineered to be resistant to Monsanto's bestselling herbicide, the
glyphosate Roundup®. The Convertibility Plan became the backbone of Argentina's
neoliberal era: The Convertibility Law was the core of the Plan, which pegged the
Argentine peso to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate of one-to-one (Ps1:1US$). In a
context where foreign currency was kept artificially low, there were no import taxes, and
a weak legal framework for GM seed use was in place, it became enticing to switch
production to GM soy (Pengue 2005).
GM soy production comes in a 'technological package' comprised of the 'notillage' or direct seeding machinery, the transgenic soybean seeds, and the weed-control
agrochemical, Roundup glyphosate. The adoption of the package promised dramatic cost
reductions, for it requires less inputs and less labor than conventional crop growing. GM
seeds, patented and owned by corporations, are typically a matter of contention for
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farmers (Shiva 2000). Patented seeds are expensive and, under contract, cannot be saved
for the next growing season, as is the tradition in agriculture.35 Interestingly enough,
Argentine farmers do save seeds and customarily do not pay technology fees of the GM
biotech crops they plant. Argentine farmers are protected under the International Union
of New Varieties of Plant Agreements 78, so farmers can –and do–plant their own saved
seeds (Pengue 2005). There is also in place a black market for GM soybean seeds,
generally bought in unlabeled white sacks, which farmers refer to as bolsa blanca. The
significant loss from technology fees for Monsanto's patented RR soybeans is, as
expected, a source of dispute between the agribusiness and the Argentine government36
(Newell, 2009). For farmers, the result is that seeds are not an expensive component of
the technological package. All together, the adoption of the package represented a
dramatic cost reduction, as imported glyphosate was cheaper than other agro-chemicals in
use, seeds could be saved, and the no-tillage method reduced the price of labor and fossil
fuel use (Bisang 2003). According to producers, the package "simplified" production, as
glyphosate replaced a gamut of more expensive agrochemicals and fields needed to be
sprayed less often, thus reducing the number of times that machines need to enter the
field, also reducing fuel and labor. Efficiency –understood as a reduction of costs and
time that results in increased profits– is thus achieved. Growing GM soy thus became the
cheaper and most profitable option, more than any other crop. Bisang (2003:437)

35

The commodification of GM seeds has been possible thanks to legislation that
prohibits farmers from saving patented seeds and thus forces them to buy seeds every
farming season (See Kloppenburg 2005).
36
This situation is currently under heated debate, as Monsanto is in negotiations with the
Argentine government to revise the Seed Law in exchange for releasing its newest GM
soy variety, Intacta RR2 Pro. More details on this on chapter 4.
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estimates the switch to the technological package of GM soy represented a 15% profit
increase compared to the use of conventional techniques in soy-maize rotation.

Current Context: The Kirchners' Administrations
The neoliberal model implemented in the 1990s collapsed by the end of 2001,
leaving behind a shattered country: Over half of Argentines were living in poverty,
amongst the highest rates of inequality in history, and immense amounts of despair in a
context of institutional, political, and economic crisis (for an in-depth explanation of the
2001 crisis, see Carranza 2005; Teubal 2011). A massive external debt was one of the
main consequences of the neoliberal structural adjustment program of the 1990s and,
later on, one of the main catalysts of the 2001 crisis (Teubal 2011). By the end of 2001,
external debt rose to 144 million US dollars, accounting for 43.4% of GNP (Teubal
2011:79).
After a year of a transition government, Néstor Kirchner was elected president in
2003 with a leftist platform and a strong anti-neoliberal discourse. Commanding
shoulder-to-shoulder with his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner –who succeeded him
in 2007 and was reelected until 2015–, the presidential couple has set in place what they
have termed as a "National and Popular" model. The Kirchners' National-Popular model,
which Ms. Fernández professedly furthers ever since Mr. Kirchner's death in October
2010, aligns with –and is part of– the turn to the left in Latin America.37
The National-Popular model that the Kirchners' administration proposes contrasts
with the hands-off, shrink-the-state mentality of the neoliberal 1990s. The new model is
37

On the rise of the Left and the emergence of National-Popular regimes in Latin
American, see Castañeda 2006, Vilas 2006).
58

rooted in strong government intervention, based on the principle that it is the
government's role to promote economic growth and redistribute it to target poverty and
promote social inclusion. Now in place for a decade, the Kirchners' model has been
successful in establishing and funding a national network of social plans and programs as
well as projects dedicated to infrastructure development.
To bring the state back in, as the Kirchners' have done, massive amounts of funds
are necessary. The key question a government in crisis faces is how to amass the
necessary funds to kick-start the economy. Taking on debt is always a possibility, but not
for post-2001 Argentina, which had already defaulted on its external loans.38 After the
2001 crash, the transition government–President Duhalde and Minister of Economy
Lavagna–took a series of high-impact measures to deal with the crisis: to default on
Argentina's debt and to end the Convertibility Law, the peso's decade long 1-to-1 peg to
the US dollar. By 2004, after the peso's devaluation, Argentina's external debt went up to
over US$191 million, accounting for 112% of GNP (Teubal 2011:79).
A comprehensive debt restructuring was an extremely important piece in the story
of Argentina's revival. After Néstor Kirchner's debt exchange in 2005, external debt had
dropped to US$ 126,6 million, 74% of GNP (Teubal 2011:79). The other key piece of the
revival story was –and is– the GM soy-based revenue. Once out of the crisis, GM soy
exports were hailed as the country's savior, the single source of fresh flows of foreign
currency (Newell 2009a; Teubal 2006; Teubal 2008). Duhalde and Lavagna's transition
government had devaluated the peso (Ps3-4:1US$). It had also reinstated export taxes

38

It was, in fact, a partial default: Argentina defaulted on its external private debt but
continued to pay its debt to the IMF and other international financial organizations (see
Teubal 2011).
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established by President Perón in mid-20th century (Barsky and Gelman 2001). Now
with more pesos for every dollar and high commodity prices, the State's ability to retain a
fraction of total exports meant millions of pesos to the dry state coffers. Mr. Kirchner
inherited these economic measures at an exceptional historic moment, where
international commercial and financial conditions were beneficial to Argentina's agroexport model. Real GDP, which had bottomed in early 2002, rebounded to grow by an
average of 8.5% annually over the subsequent six years.39 Even through the global
financial crisis of 2008 Argentina's economy remained stable, due largely to agricultural
exports. Increasing soy exports and a very successful debt restructuring had translated in
a surplus in the balance of payment. With this surplus available, Kirchner was able to
return to a model of state intervention, investing in infrastructure and social spending,
without enacting major structural reform (Svampa 2008).
Néstor Kirchner's administration (2004-2007) heavily promoted the expansion of
the agro-export development model based on GM soy monocropping. A 10-year
Development Plan, planning towards 2015, places agricultural GM biotechnology at the
core of Argentina's development strategy. The goal of this Plan is to promote "long-term
development" by promoting an intensive use of imported science and technology applied
to agricultural production–Argentina's "comparative advantage" (SAGPyA 2004). The
new GM biotechnologies are the key to development as they promise to exploit
Argentina's potential, to increase productivity of agricultural output.
Cristina Fernández's administrations (2007-2011; reelected for a second term until
2015) represent a continuity of Mr. Kirchner's model (or even its "deepening" or
39

Average GDP annual percentage growth rate 2003-2008. World Bank Indicators, GDP
Growth (annual %). http://data.worldbank.org/. Accessed 8/16/12.
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intensification, which has been Ms. Fernández's slogan since Néstor's death). Thus, the
agro-export development model based on GM soy monocropping under Ms. Fernández
government continues to expand. The agricultural Strategic Plan 2010-2016, known as
PEA2, is as another example of the continuity of the model as it focuses on increased
production through technological innovation, i.e., agro-industrial practices. Once again,
the Plan also distinguishes Argentina's unique capabilities to produce food, a globally
demanded product.40
The present global context is particularly beneficial to Argentina's GM soy based
agro-export model. An increase in global food demand based primarily in China and
India, increasing financial speculation, and crops diverted to agrofuels created, by 2008,
the perfect storm, food scarcity, hunger riots, and a spike in commodity prices (Magdoff
and Tokar 2010). In the midst of this crisis, in Argentina, government and producers were
ecstatic; soy production was a gold mine. The government decided that these
extraordinary conditions necessitated extraordinary measures. In March 2008, Ms.
Fernández signed a decree to lift the government’s share in export revenue, increasing
existing soy export taxes from 30% to a floating rate tied to international prices (at higher
commodity prices, the higher the export tax). In response, soy producers, big and small,
hit the streets, backed by a very significant share of the rural and urban population
discontented with the presidential couple. A three-month strike became known as el
conflicto del campo, the conflict with the countryside, which is considered by some to be
the most important agrarian conflict in Argentine history (Barsky and Dávila 2008).41

40

PEA2, Plan Estratégico Agroalimentario y Agroindustrial Participativo y Federal,
2010-2016. www.minagri.gob.ar/site/areas/PEA2/index.php
41
I delve further into the 2008 conflicto del campo in chapter 4.
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This attempt to raise export taxes exemplifies the Kirchners' approach towards GM soy
production in Argentina: It is not about regulating the activity but about the allocation of
surplus, as it is soy-derived revenue that makes it possible to sustain the national-popular
model without abandoning neoliberal agri-business development (Richardson 2009).
The Kirchners' administration has also indirectly promoted and encouraged GM
soy expansion through actions and policies that were originally presented to promote
wealth redistribution and to secure food for domestic consumption, as part of the general
national-popular orientation. For example, price caps and export quotas to specific
agrarian products–in particular, wheat, meat and milk– have been set to secure domestic
food demand, in particular in response to the 2008 global food crisis. This measure, while
celebrated by many, has had the unintended effect of pushing more growers towards GM
soy. The moratorium sounds "right," as it serves to protect domestic needs (in particular
in the face of a global food crisis, see Bello 2009; McMichael 2010). However, as the
measure was not paralleled with others measures that would encourage alternative food
production, such as credits or tax breaks for small growers, it brought the unintended
consequence of actually expanding the GM soy model.
As rural producers organize production on the basis of profitability, if growing
soy is an option (i.e., if the depth of soil, humidity, and nutrients are optimal) they will
likely choose soy over other crops or cattle, at least for as long as current conditions
remain, in particular high international prices and no caps for exports, neither in price or
quotas. Producers from the Pampas southwest, where environmental conditions are not
optimal to grow GM soy, complain of being "stuck" with wheat growing, which has price
and export caps, and are envious of the "lucky" ones that can grow soy. This is the
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southern frontier of the GM soy expansion (see Figure 1). This border is drawn by
environmental limits and not by rural producers' preference for other crops. Nowadays, a
new GM soy variety is being developed that will allow planting soy south of this border,
into the Patagonia region; a development certainly linked to Chinese land grabs in the Río
Negro province.42 Considering patterns of adoption of agricultural technologies it is
likely that, if the new variety works, southern producers will switch to GM soy as well.
As it is profitable to switch production, many more producers abandon their
traditional crops to plant GM soybeans. Cattle ranchers have also followed the trend.
Beef price caps and export quotas made ranchers wonder whether to continue with
Argentina's most emblematic activity, cattle grazing, or to free up land to grow soy. The
drought of summer 2008 killed many animals and that expedited the decision. For those
still undecided, federal credits to build feedlots gave them the further push. Nowadays the
number of cows across the country is growing after it bottomed out in 2008. However,
these are mostly feedlot-raised animals, which carry their own socio-ecological
consequences: increased use of hormones and antibiotics, health issues related to feedlotraised beef consumption, and degraded environmental quality, as feedlots pollute air,
water, and soil (Schlosser 2002). Animal enclosure, typical in the US, was not common
in Argentina until very recently although it is rapidly reaching all animals grown for
human consumption, cows, chickens, and hogs, freeing land for agricultural use. Dairy
farms have fallen under the same trend and regions specializing in dairy products, such as
south of Córdoba province, now are only abandoned mills and water tanks, and rusty,
42

In October 2010, a Chinese state-owned agribusiness, Beidahuang, and the government
of the Río Negro province, in the Patagonia region, signed a 20-year lease over 320,000
hectares to produce GM staple crops aimed for the Chinese market (Lopez-Gamundi and
Hanks 2011).
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toppled fences, if they are not all together gone to make room for GM soy production.
Similar stories of traditional activities, such as milking, cattle grazing, wheat growing, or
horticulture, being replaced by large scale mechanized GM soy production crop up as one
travels across the Argentine countryside. In consequence, there is now less available food
for domestic consumption and it is of lesser quality (Teubal 2008).
In sum, the many policies taken to allegedly protect domestic food consumption
have actually produced food insecurity. Argentina, historically the Granary of the World
and still today a net-food exporter, has lost its food sovereignty, the ability to feed its own
(Teubal 2008). Moreover all these changes have freed up land for soy, setting favorable
conditions for the expansion of large-scale mechanized production. Small farmers and
campesinos are at a huge disadvantage, as they do not receive any direct help in the form
of subsidies, credit, or machinery. Many small and medium producers from the Pampas
have unwillingly switched to soy, just because it is the only crop that gives enough profit
to afford the next growing season. Because of economic hardship, some have been forced
to rent or sell their plots and thus exit farming altogether. The fact that the government
taxes producers of any size a flat export tax clearly benefits the bigger producers (a claim
brought over and over since el conflicto del campo in 2008) as they have lower costs and
higher profits.
As I further develop in chapters 4 and 5, the Kirchners' administration also
promotes and encourages GM soy production by manufacturing quiescence in the face of
negative consequences of production (Leguizamón 2011; Newell 2009a). Social spending
in the form of conditional cash transfers, while important and necessary to relieve
poverty, have a demobilizing effect (Piven and Cloward 1971). For example, in the
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northern Chaco province, social funds started being distributed right at the time when
people started to lose access to the forest as a means of subsistence. Thus, instead of
fueling protest –as would be expected in comparison to similar cases in the Global South,
where poor people have organized when in risk of losing access to their means of
livelihood (Dwivedi 2001)–, government cash has substituted for the lost income, easing
the strain. Moreover, in typical Peronista-style, welfare is often distributed in a
clientelistic manner, thus further increasing demobilization and people’s dependence on
the State (about Peronista-style clientelism, see Auyero 2001; for another example of
demobilization and patronage in a northern province, Formosa, see Lapegna 2011).
Governments at town- and province-level also depend on federal soy-based
revenue and thus become trapped in quiescence. After the 2008 conflicto del campo, Ms.
Fernández signed a decree to create the Fondo Solidario de la Soja, the Solidary Soy
Fund.43 The rural strike had placed soy production on every TV channel and almost
overnight GM soy monocropping and its consequences became a public issue. The
creation of the Solidary Soy Fund became a very concrete way to show the general
population how they also benefited from soy production and exports (as well as a strategy
to quell dissent). The Fund establishes the distribution of soy export taxes from the
federal to the province and town governments (thus the Nation "co-participates" local
governments in the soy-based revenue). For local governments, in particular small rural
towns, soy-derived money is a very significant part of their budget (either as direct
income as Fund co-participation or through the federal government, in the form of
subsidies for social programs or social infrastructure investment). Hence, the local
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Fondo Federal Solidario, Decreto 206/2009.
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governments are also tied to –or embedded in– GM soy production, as soy revenue is
needed to pave dirt roads, bring clean water, build sewers, and to maintain or renovate the
main plaza, schools, and hospitals; as well as to directly sustain a part of the population,
by handing out monthly payments –as part of cash transfer programs– or new homes–as
part of housing projects (programas de vivienda social). Consequently, it becomes very
difficult for local governments to support or encourage alternative types of agricultural
production, for it means risking a very significant percentage of their meager budgets as
well as votes. The complicity of indebted local governments is therefore another
important dimension of GM soy expansion in Argentina.
In sum, a specific political-economic and environmental context provided the
perfect framework for adoption and expansion of the new GM biotechnology in
Argentina. The result has been that the GM soy model has become a 'boom': continuous
expansion of production, record harvests, and record profits from agro-exports have been
a constant, harvest after harvest, year after year.44 However, with the expansion of the
GM soy monocultures other issues have come to the front, in particular questions about
the model's impact on socio-ecological dynamics. This is what I address in the next
section.
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"La soja impulsó un récord de las exportaciones," Clarín, May 31, 2004; " La soja
alcanzó el precio más alto en dos años y medio," La Nación, November 7, 2006; "La soja
no tiene freno: llegó a los $ 900," La Nación, December 27, 2007; " La soja volverá a ser
la reina en la campaña agrícola 2010/11," Clarín, August 30, 2010; "La soja continúa en
pleno ascenso, " La Nación, April 21, 2012.
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3.3

SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF GM SOY PRODUCTION
The introduction of the GM biotech package in a context of neoliberal

restructuring has radically altered socio-environmental dynamics and social relations in
Argentina and around the world (Otero 2008). The transition from a labor-intensive type
of agricultural production towards one that is machine-, chemical-, and fossil fueldependent, has dramatically transformed rural life: Energy and petrochemicals displace
labor and increase environmental degradation (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008;
Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). In the Argentine Pampas, there is a
history of mechanization of the countryside and its consequent labor displacement that
dates far back, to the mid-1940s. In his foundational work on Argentine rural life,
American sociologist C. Taylor (1948) devotes an appendix on the "progress of
mechanization in the Argentine countryside" and the whole tone of the book celebrates
how "modern" and technified the Argentine countryside is, a type closer to the American
farmer's model and far from the campesino of the rest of Latin America. In the 1970s,
with the Green Revolution, Argentine farmers readily innovated and adopted the newly
available agrarian technologies: hybrid seeds and agro-chemicals (Barsky and Gelman
2001). By the time GM seeds entered the Argentine seed market, rural displacement in
the Pampas was already a well-established trend: rural population in 1970 accounted for
4.85 million people, or 20.2% of total population (a low number already, compared to
43.6% for the rest of the Latin American region).45 By 1980, the rural population had
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All data for percentages of rural population in Argentina and Latin America, from
CEPAL/ECLAC (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).
Database: CEPALSTAT - Estadísticas e Indicadores Sociales, Poblaciónhttp://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas- Accessed on
10/29/2011.
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lowered to 17.1% (4.81m) and, by 1995, accounted for only 12.6% of total population
(4.37m people). Since the transition towards GM soy monocropping this trend has sped
up, further reducing rural populations: in 2010, only 2.79 million people, 6.9% of total
Argentine population, lived in the countryside.
This latest trend in rural depopulation can be largely attributed to the expansion of
GM soy production. The technological package requires little labor, and as machines get
bigger, they can cover more ground in less time (meaning less people employed to drive
them). Due to environmental conditions only a limited amount of equipment, and
therefore labor, is needed to accomplish agricultural tasks all throughout the country.
Argentina spreads latitudinally in the southern hemisphere; harvesting season (which
requires the most expensive machinery) takes place early in the year in the north and then
gradually moves south. Tractors and combines travel down south doing the same work
over and over, all across the country. Moreover, temperate weather conditions allow for
'windows' to perform tasks, say planting, spraying and harvesting. Thus again, allowing
for the same machine to work on many adjacent fields before continuing their trip south.
Rural contractors, a type of rural actor that has grown in numbers with the GM agrarian
transformation, are the ones hired to perform services, mostly pest control and harvesting
(Lódola 2008). Contractors typically have no control over the land; they only own the
machinery and do the labor. "Efficiency" thus results: as machines become more
expensive, it is not "efficient" for producers to pay for them to only use them once and
then have them parked the rest of the season. Contractors are "efficient" because they
invest their capital in the machinery only, capital that is exploited to its maximum as it is
at work almost all year round. Rural labor, thus, becomes specialized and concentrated.

68

As machines get bigger and more technologically advanced, specialized
knowledge is necessary to operate them. Moreover, production planning happens in
advance and it also requires specialized skills. Rural skills and knowledge, traditionally
transmitted within the family or community, are now transmitted through universities.
Agronomists and engineers with MAs in agribusiness now plan and follow production
from afar, from the offices of the agribusinesses, with the help of communication and
information technologies, such as computers, cellphones, and satellites. Visits to site–to
the field–are seldom in order to gather necessary data, samples of soil and crops, which
are analyzed back at the agribusiness' office. One person can overlook several thousand
hectares. In an interview, an agronomist reported covering over 5,000 ha in a season
when working for a large agribusiness, which he oversaw driving by himself from
Santiago del Estero to central Buenos Aires.46
Therefore, as GM soy production replaces other agrarian activities that are more
labor intensive, such as horticulture, milking, and cattle grazing and slaughtering, there
are fewer available jobs for rural inhabitants. As a consequence, either because there are
fewer rural jobs available or because rural work is not tied to the field anymore, many
rural families migrate to the closest biggest town or city, where there are jobs and
children are closer to schools and hospitals.
Rural depopulation goes hand in hand with a decrease in the number of farms as
well as with increased farm size and concentration of landholdings (Gras 2009a; Gras
and Hernández 2009a; Gras 2012; Teubal 2006). According to the 2008 rural national
46

Interview with agronomist (ingeniero agrónomo), former agribusiness employee (pool
de siembra), Buenos Aires, March 2011. Most of the agronomists employed to do this job
are young graduates (mostly men) under short contracts (the months that take the
inspection tour).
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census, in the Pampas region there has been a reduction of 24,405 farms between 2002
and 2008, an 18% decrease in farm numbers.47 Set in comparison with data from the
1988 rural census, the decrease is even steeper: a loss of 78,900 farms between 1988 and
2008, which is a plunge of 41.7% in just two decades. In the northern provinces there is a
similar trend in the reduction of farm numbers, almost a 15% drop between 2002 and
2008 (a loss of 7,166 farms), and 20.6% in the two decade-period 1988-2008 (a loss of
10,657 farms).48 Farm size has also increased. Gras and Hernández (2009a:24) calculate
that between 1988 and 2002 median farm size has increased by 25%, going up to 587
hectares.49 Larger farms ranging between 1,000-2,500ha have increased their relative
weight by 8.5%. The largest farms, with 10,000ha or more, represent a small fraction of
total farms (0.9%) but control almost 36% of landholdings (Gras and Hernández 2009a:
24). This trend of landholding concentration is the most significant and the hardest to
assess with available data. Increasingly so, small landholders lease their farms to bigger
producers, as it is now more profitable and less risky to rent out the land than engage in
production themselves. The area operated under a rent-tenure system accounted for 52%
in 2002 (Gras and Hernández 2009a: 24). That figure has kept increasing, and Gras
(2012:12) estimates that currently 70% of all land under cultivation is leased.
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Rural National Census, Censo Nacional Agropecuario (CNA) 1998, 2002, and 2008.
Data for 2008 is preliminary. "Censo Nacional Agropecuario 2008: resultados
provisorios" http://www.indec.mecon.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/11/cna08_10_09.pdf "Pampas region" includes the provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, Córdoba
and La Pampa. "North" includes Chaco, Santiago del Estero, and Salta.
48
Ibid.
49
Authors calculate from data from Rural National Census, Censo Nacional
Agropecuario (CNA) 1998 and 2002. Similar data from CNA 2008 has not yet been made
available.
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GM soy production in Argentina is mostly concentrated by agribusinesses (Gras
and Hernández 2009a; Gras 2012; Newell 2009a; Teubal 2006; Teubal 2008; Teubal and
Rodríguez 2002). Some agribusinesses operate with their own capital, including land
ownership, but most pool capital from external investors and operate under short-term
contracts. These types of agribusinesses are known in Argentina as pools de siembra,
"sowing pools." Pools de siembra are investment groups that combine financial investors
with a managerial core that rents land, labor, and machinery to produce at a large scale
and often includes stock investment in the commodity market (Bustamante and
Maldonado 2009). Some pools are small (i.e., control a few hundred hectares) but some
have grown to control hundreds of thousands of hectares and have become powerful
actors in the trend of technological innovation (Gras and Hernández 2009b; Gras 2012;
Hernández 2007). Los Grobo, El Tejar, and Adecoagro, from magnate George Soros, are
iconic examples of bigger pools. For example, a pool de siembra like Los Grobo controls
240,000 ha,50 most of it operated under lease (Gras, 2012:11). There are no official
statistics that account for land leasing contracts, thus landholding concentration by the
different pools is difficult to assess (Bustamante and Maldonado 2009). Relying on
qualitative techniques and data from websites, Gras (2012:8) estimates that in Argentina
1.5 million ha. are controlled by the top 10 agribusinesses, and they are expanding
production in neighboring countries of the South Cone. For example, El Tejar produces
GM soy in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia.51 The technological package of GM
RR soy has, in many ways, made possible the existence of these sowing pools, since in
order to make the activity profitable it is necessary to produce over huge extensions of
50
51

www.losgrobo.com.ar; accessed 1/6/12
http://www.eltejar.com, accessed 4/23/12
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land. The combination of no-tillage machinery and the GM RR seeds allows for the
expansion of production. Also, the bigger the pool becomes, the more leverage they have
to negotiate cheaper prices for inputs, thus allowing for increased profits, which then
allows them to produce at an ever-increasing scale. The treadmill of production is thus at
work, as the logic of profit requires increased production achieved through constant
technological innovation (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg 1980;
Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). In this way, Argentine agriculture resembles that of other
large GM biotech adopters, such as the United States, as the number of farms and farmers
shrinks, farm-scale increases, and they are largely controlled by agribusinesses (Magdoff,
Foster, and Buttel 2000; Magdoff and Tokar 2010).
It is important to emphasize the significance of the loss of local control, as extralocal managers, consortia, contractors, and workers dominate production. Rootedness in
place was the hallmark from agriculture from its very beginning. Yet, with increasing
distance between those that work and control the land to the land itself, many conflicting
issues arise, most crucially the ability to be removed from the negative consequences of
production (see also Clapp 2014, Gould 2006, Leguizamón 2012). As I discuss in detail
in chapters 4 and 5, this is a key to quiescence.
In this constant outgrowing of production, in the last few years the agricultural
frontier has expanded outside of the Pampas region, into the northern provinces of Chaco,
Santiago del Estero, and Salta (see Figure 1). Here is where the monocultures of GM soy
have taken their heaviest toll (Pengue 2005). These northern provinces sustain a very
different ecosystem than the Pampas: Here, el monte, the forest, is the predominant
ecosystem, which is rapidly being torn down by bulldozing and fire to clear land for
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mechanized large-scale production. The expansion of the agricultural frontier threatens
highly sensitive biodiverse ecoregions, including the Yungas, the Great Chaco, and the
Mesopotamian forest (Pengue 2005). It also threatens the livelihood of many northern
rural inhabitants, who are mostly indigenous and peasant campesinos. With the expansion
of GM soy production, land in the northern provinces has suddenly become very
valuable. For example, a farm in Santiago del Estero that is suitable and ready for
extensive agricultural production, in particular for GM soy cultivation, could be sold, in
2011, for US$7,000/ha, up from US$150-200/ha in 2001-2002.52
With this increased valorization of the land, historically absentee landowners are
now back to claim the land with the goal of clearing the forest and renting or selling it for
agricultural production. But to their surprise, at their return they find out that there are
entire families living on what they claim is their property. It is not unlikely that these are
the families of "forgotten" ex-workers, men who in the past had been employed as
lumbermen but when the landowner fled and the job was over, the lumbermen remained
there, and over time brought up their own families. These families claim the land as theirs
based on the Ley Veinteañal, a law that concedes property rights to families that have
lived on the same land for 20 years or more. Many families also claim land based on their
ancestral origin, as native peoples, such as Wichís, Tobas, and Mocovíes.
El monte, the forest, is a vital resource to campesino and indigenous families:
managed as a commons, the forest provides wood for coal for home cooking or sale and
pasture for domestic animals, mostly goats. The forest also provides most of household
income, from coal sale to direct employment. Men would typically find work as
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Interview with licensed rural estate broker, Santiago del Estero, August 2011.
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hacheros, loggers for timber sold to build furniture, posts for wiring fields to fence cattle,
and rail foundations. As demand for wood falls, as wooden rail foundations are replaced
by concrete and cattle are enclosed in feedlots, while at the same time profit margins for
soy grow, switching from forestry to agriculture becomes the most enticing and jobs for
loggers disappear at the pace of the dwindling forest. Nowadays, men and women are
typically hired to gather the roots remaining after the forest has been bulldozed or burnt
down, to prepare land for extensive industrial agriculture. This is an unsustainable and
disheartening job, as it soon ends when there is no more forest to clear out, the very same
forest that is their source of life.
In the land rush for soy, violence is escalating. Members of the Movimiento
Campesino de Santiago del Estero (MOCASE), part of the international peasant
movement Vía Campesina, denounce that campesino and indigenous families are under
constant threat and assault, as paramilitary-like forces bulldoze their homes, threaten
death to entire families, and murder their leaders.53 While violence against indigenous
and peasant families for land control has a long history in these northern provinces–
violence that prompts the emergence of the MOCASE as the strongest and most visible of
campesino movements in Argentina– the expansion of GM soy in the North has certainly
sped up the cycle of violence related to land grabs.54
El monte, the northern forest, is the largest forest ecosystem and the largest
biomass reservoir in Argentina and the extra-tropical South America (Gasparri, Grau, and
Manghi 2008). The clearing of the monte to make room for large-scale agro-export
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Interview with members of Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero-Vía
Campesina (MOCASE-VC), Santiago del Estero, August 2011.
54
I further discuss the many forms violence takes in the North in chapter 5.
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production, in particular GM soy, has prompted wide-scale deforestation at a very rapid
rate (Gasparri, Grau, and Manghi 2008; Paolasso, Krapovickas, and Gasparri 2012;
Pengue 2005). Deforestation in the northern provinces is a process that started long
before the expansion of the agricultural frontier of GM soy, a fact brought up by
defenders of the technology to ease criticism on the spread of the new technology (Trigo
2011). Authors agree, however, that the rate of deforestation has accelerated with the
introduction of GM soy (Gasparri, Grau, and Manghi 2008; Grau, Gasparri, and Aide
2005; Paolasso, Krapovickas, and Gasparri 2012; Pengue 2005). A government report on
deforestation in Argentina also points at the expansion of the monocultures of GM soy as
the main accelerator of deforestation and forest degradation in the last decades, and
claims that this is the strongest process of deforestation in Argentine history (USDEF,
2004:5). Between 1998 and 2008, 1,691,878 hectares of native forests have been lost in
the northern provinces of Salta, Santiago del Estero, Chaco, and Jujuy (USDEF,
2008:10).55 Even despite the recently passed Ley de Bosques in 2007, the Forest Law that
aims at containing the clearing of the native forest, deforestation continues, and at rapid
pace (USDEF, 2008:10).
While forest clearing in the North is taking place right at this very moment, the
Pampas have long been cleared out, long ago emptied out of local populations and its
biodiversity. The clearing of the native landscape of the Pampas dates from far back, with
the introduction of cattle by the Spanish during colonial times, and later expanding with
the progressive transformation of the Pampas into the preferred site for agro-export
55

This report maps the process of deforestation in the Northern provinces. The map can
be downloaded at
http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/archivos/web/UMSEF/File/Mapas/deforestacion0708_ley26331_130x90.jpg
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production (Matteucci 2000). These transformations happened so long ago there are no
clear records on how the Pampas originally looked like (Matteucci 2000). Yet, compared
to the current GM-soy model, the historical model of agro-export production implied a
sustainable use of the land: a livestock-agriculture rotation allowed the soil to rest and
recover some of its nutrients and properties (Matteucci 2000). On the contrary, the
monocultures of GM soy have implied an exacerbation of the negative ecological impacts
of agro-industrial production in this region (Matteucci 2000; Pengue 2009).
The environmental impact of large scale GM soy monocropping is being felt all
throughout the country, in the North as in the Pampas. As monocrops expand natural
habitats disappear, thus endangering plant and animal biodiversity (Martinez-Ghersa
2011; Pengue 2005; Pengue 2009). Large scale mechanized GM soy monocropping in the
Pampas has also resulted in nutrient depletion (phosphorus and nitrogen), soil erosion,
and soil structure degradation (Martinez-Ghersa 2011; Pengue 2005; Pengue 2009).
Agro-chemical spraying, necessary to artificially control pests and weeds that
grow under monocultures, is another important source of socio-ecological disruption.
Proponents of the GM biotechnology highlight the environmental benefits related to notillage (Trigo et al. 2002). As described in the previous section, at the time of adoption of
GM biotechnology, a reduction in the number of agrochemicals used was an important
piece in the decision of adoption. However, over time, pest resistance and soil depletion
have demanded increasing doses of agrochemicals (Binimelis, Pengue, and Monterroso
2009; Martinez-Ghersa 2011). The emergence of glyphosate-resistant weeds, like
johnsongrass, has been met with the introduction of novel varieties of GM crops that
tolerate increasing doses of herbicide, thus intensifying both agrochemical use as well as
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GM crop adoption, a phenomenon that Binimelis et al. (2009) conceptualize as a
"transgenic treadmill."
With the emergence of glyphosate-resistant "superweeds," producers have
resorted to increasingly higher doses and more toxic formulations, including some with
globally banned agro-chemicals, such as atrazine, endosulfan, and 2,4-D (Binimelis,
Pengue, and Monterroso 2009; Pengue 2005). In labs, studies have shown that in
vertebrate embryos glyphosate and Roundup formulations are endocrine disruptors,
meaning that they interfere with normal hormone and enzyme functioning, impeding
normal development and causing malformations (Paganelli et al. 2010). A report by
Argentine physicians links increasing cases of cancer, miscarriages, and birth defects in
towns nearby fields sprayed with agro-chemicals, glyphosate in particular (1er. Encuentro
Nacional de Medicxs de Pueblos Fumigados 2010). Similar findings are presented in a
report commissioned by the provincial government of Chaco (Comisión Provincial de
Investigación de Contaminantes del Agua April 2010).
As fields increase in size, glyphosate spraying is often performed with airplanes,
which makes fumigations less controllable. In interviews, rural inhabitants denounce
being sprayed over their heads and homes, over their schools and hospitals. In response,
some community organizing has taken place in the form of citizen and neighbor
assemblies in several towns across the country to protest against agro-toxics–as they term
agro-chemicals–, and to demand stringent regulations for agrochemical use (Berger and
Ortega 2010; GRR, Grupo de Reflexión Rural 2009). It is worth noting that protest and
mobilization in response to the effects of glyphosate has also been contained by violent
means, as assembly meetings are violently disrupted and people are intimidated from
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attending.56 As I further argue in chapters 5 and 6, the health impacts of agrochemical
spraying are now the most contested aspect around GM soy production in Argentina.
In sum, the GM soy-based agrarian transformation has implied radical changes in
socio-ecological dynamics in Argentina: increased inequality due to concentration of
landholdings and agribusinesses, rural displacement through a violent politics of
dispossession, and health hazards due to agrochemical exposure add to the disruptions at
the ecosystem level, including deforestation, loss of biodiversity, emergence of
glyphosate-resistant superweeds, nutrient depletion, and air pollution. As such, why is it
that in the face of this massive agrarian transformation Argentines do not react and
protest? Why are they quiescent? Some reasons have already been introduced in here, I
develop them further in the following chapters.
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One of the most notorious of these violent events was the "interrupted" visit of Andrés
Carrasco–a scientist that has tested the health effects of Roundup fumigations and one of
the leading anti-glyphosate/GM soy-voices in Argentina–to La Leonesa, Chaco, in
August 7, 2010. Carrasco had been invited by the neighbor assembly to discuss the
environmental and health effects of glyphosate spraying, in a town that had organized to
protest against fumigations in adjacent rice fields. Right before the meeting, Carrasco and
his colleagues were violently attacked by a group of people identified as public (town
hall) employees and employees from the rice firm (Aranda, Darío, "Censura y Presiones,"
Página/12, August 17, 2010).
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CHAPTER 4. QUIESCENCE
We do the best agriculture in the world.
Leo, agronomist, rural teacher, zona núcleo.

It's a hot and sunny day of summer in December 2009. We're in the field, Leo and
I, standing right in the zona núcleo, the heart of Argentina's soy production. It's my first
interview on the ground, the day I officially meet the queen of the story: the little soy
plant. Leo is an agronomist employed as a teacher at the local agro-technical high school,
in a small rural town in the northeast of Buenos Aires province. Those days, he's also my
main informant and, unofficially, my Agronomy 101 teacher. Where we are standing, at
the crossroads of four lots, we are surrounded: soy grows in all four farms. I cannot tell
because the plants haven't grown enough yet, it's only a couple weeks past the planting
season. Leo shows me how to tell it is soy from the incipient sprouts and the work of the
no-tilling machine. Right there, –the naive eagerness of the novice–, I am open about my
research question: I openly question GMOs and the expansion of GM soy monocultures,
and ask why quiescence, why is there no mobilization in the face of such a massive
agrarian transformation. In reply I get a puzzled glance and a candid answer: "Why for?
We do the best agriculture in the world!" From here on, this would be the most common
theme that will come up in my fieldwork.
As I continued with my fieldwork I learnt, first of all, to keep my research
question for myself, and second, that the issue was more widespread and profound than
what I expected: not only is there nothing wrong with GM, it is the best thing to do. Leo's
positive approach towards the GM based agro-industry in Argentina is the shared
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perspective among rural soy producers and their employees. The results are at glance.
Back in the field in February 2011, when soy plants have a fair size to be distinguished
from other crops, soy is all there is to see. Travelling across the zona núcleo of Buenos
Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe, covering several hundred miles on main highways and side
dirt roads from the top of bus decks, Ford trucks, passenger cars, and grain cargo trucks,
out of the window soy is all I see: homogenous rows of the bright green plant, about eight
inches tall, thin stems, round leaves. It is a sea of soy. It feels as if GM soybeans have
taken over the Argentine countryside.
This expansion of GM soy in Argentina is celebrated as a boom. As I show in this
chapter, GM based agriculture is framed almost solely in terms of benefits. Yes, there are
grievances and some contestation emerging, as I show in detail in the following chapter,
in particular coming from indigenous and campesino movements in the North of the
country and by citizens' assemblies organizing around the health impact of glyphosate
spraying. For soy producers however, grievances do not come up in relation to GM or to
soy expansion but, most on the contrary, on the obstacles that limit soy production and
technological innovation: the Kirchners administrations' interventionist policies in
particular. This celebratory approach towards GM stands in radical contrast to the
experience of other countries of the Global South, where, as described in chapter 2, the
introduction of GM has been vehemently challenged and opposed. The aim of this
chapter is to address this issue.
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4.1.

POWER & (BIO)HEGEMONY
As introduced in chapter 2, technological change is not random or self-

reproducing, neither objective nor neutral, but rather it has a social basis (Gould 2009;
Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). The aim of this chapter is to look at the
power relations that form the social basis for technological change in relation to GM
biotech adoption and expansion in Argentina and analyze how these relate to the causes
of consensus and conflict. In order to identify which actors and institutions are in power
to guide technological change, we should find out (1) Who has control over natural
resources/agricultural production in Argentina? and (2) Who reaps the benefits of this
agrarian transformation? (Schnaiberg 1980). In this case, the main institutions of
appropriation are the state and large agribusinesses (national and transnational). These
powerful institutions have worked in conjunction, in an alliance of interests, to secure
hegemonic support for the GM soy model as a key accumulation strategy (Newell
2009a). Newell (2009a) conceptualizes this as "bio-hegemony."
Bio-hegemony, in Newell’s words, refers to
the alignment of material, institutional and discursive power in a way which
sustains a coalition of forces which benefit from the prevailing model of
agricultural development. (....) This requires the successful projection of particular
interests as general interests such that the benefits and value of agricultural
biotechnology acquire the status of common sense and go largely unquestioned.
(Newell 2009a:38)
It is important to emphasize that this is a coalition of forces, an alliance between
corporations and the state. More specifically, bio-hegemony "has been produced and
sustained by an alliance of interests which includes powerful agribusiness producers and
traders (such as Cargill), export-oriented elements of national Argentine capital (such as
Bio Sidus, Relmo, and Don Mario), multinational biotechnology firms (such as Syngenta,
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Dow, and Monsanto), large commercial banks, and supportive elements within the
Argentine state itself." (Newell 2009a:35).
The focus of Newell’s piece is on the role of agribusiness in sustaining biohegemony in Argentina. Hence, he investigates corporate strategies to produce and
sustain ‘bio-hegemony’, i.e., to secure power over the desirability of an agro-export
model based on GM soy production in Argentina (Newell 2009a). In this dissertation I
build on Newell’s work to consider the role of the state in producing and sustaining ‘biohegemony.’ I thus expand on Newell's conclusions by providing further evidence that it is
this alliance of powerful actors and institutions –an alliance of economic and political
power– that creates quiescence and consent: It is the alliance which gives the GM model
its strength and makes quiescence so thick. As I show later, it was in the momentary
break of this alliance, during the Conflicto del Campo in March 2008, when challenges to
this model emerged. While this break was only temporary (and in a way superficial, only
at the level of discourse, as the government continued to provide material and
institutional support), it opened a window of opportunity for contestation to emerge
(McAdam 1982).
Therefore, this chapter builds on the previous ones as I further show how
powerful organizations and institutions support and promote GM biotechnology as a key
element for Argentina’s model of socio-economic development. In particular, in this
chapter I look at how quiescence implies consent: a fervent support for GM biotech by
those in control of agricultural production and a mild, yet still effective, support by rural
inhabitants. In here I thus show how GM biotechnology is framed solely in terms of
benefits and how this framing becomes the hegemonic discourse of the GM soy model. In
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theoretical terms, in this chapter I explore the links between framing and power. The goal
of this chapter is thus to show how the third dimension of power is at work to create
quiescence and consent (Lukes 2005).
But before I turn to the framings of GM biotech, I will discuss some mechanisms
and strategies employed by the corporate-state alliance to promote the GM soy model in
Argentina, the recipe for a swift adoption of GMOs.

Mechanisms and Strategies of Power: A Recipe for Swift Adoption
Back in 1996, without much controversy, GMOs were approved for commercial
use in Argentina; an outstanding fact, considering that to this day, over 15 years later, less
than 30 countries in the world have approved the technology (James 2012). Even in
Brazil and Paraguay, now two large GM soy producers, it took many years for GM
biotechnology legislation to be passed, embroiled in a long legal battle and strong public
resistance (and after the fact that non-GM soy was contaminated by Argentine GM
soybeans smuggled through the border)57. For many reasons, some already described in
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For years, and despite the legal moratorium to plant GM seeds in Brazil, GM soybeans
were contrabanded from Argentina through Paraguay into Brazil (Jepson, Brannstrom,
and Stancato de Souza 2008, Newell 2009b). While the traffic of seeds was illegal, it was
a common and widely recognized practice; these smuggled soy seeds are popularly
known as soja Maradona, named after the famous Argentine soccer player. By 2003, and
again, despite the moratorium, Maradona soybeans accounted for between 70 to 95% of
all soy production in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazilian southern state and frontier with
Argentina, also the territory of the MST (Jepson, Brannstrom, and Stancato de Souza
2008:219). The unavailability of non-GM seeds resulted in the de facto approval of GM
soybeans, as farmers could not chose otherwise but to plant GM seeds, despite their
preference for non-GM (personal communication with Vicente Marques, Federal
Agrarian Expert at the Brazilian National Institute of Agrarian Colonization and Reform
(INCRA), 11/16/09). That the biotechnology firms did not intervene to stop this illegal
flow of seeds can be understood as a useful –and successful– market strategy to enter the
Brazilian and Paraguayan markets (Newell 2009b:266).
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previous chapters, Argentina was the perfect port of entry of GMOs in South America.
Among those, it is important to emphasize the neoliberal/globalization context and
program, Argentina's history of mechanization of the countryside, its agro-export past,
and, as I show in this chapter, a cultural preparation, a mindset ready to receive GMOs
with open arms. In this context, powerful actors and institutions used various mechanisms
to promote and support a model of socio-economic development based on GM soy for
export, as well as to suppress public participation that could represent a challenge to the
model.
In order to understand the swift adoption of GM biotech in Argentina it is
important to emphasize that there was a context that was amenable for GM to thrive: As
described in chapter 3, during the neoliberal 1990s, an institutional and regulatory
framework was set in place to promote GMOs as a technological means to increase
agricultural production –the NTAEs model. How GM seeds were approved for
production and commercial use in Argentina is a rather controversial and murky business
(Verbitsky 2009). Monsanto’s RR soy was approved in the summer of 1996 in record
time, less than three months after the application was presented for approval. In this
application, the safety, quality, and efficacy of GM biotechnology is justified based
solely on Monsanto’s tests and reports; reports that in the rush of presentation were not
even translated into Spanish (Verbitsky 2009). Verbitsky (2009) claims that at this time
members of the Argentine Institute of Plant Health and Quality –Iascav, Instituto
Argentino de Sanidad y Calidad Vegetal–, questioned RR soy approval on the basis of
health and environmental concerns and requested further testing before approval. None of
these requests were heard, and on March 25, 1996, Felipe Solá, the then head of the
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Secretary of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (Secretaría de Agricultura, Pesca y
Alimentación) signed the resolution number 167 that approves glyphosate tolerant GM
soybeans and derivatives for production and commercial use in Argentina. At this time,
Mr. Solá did not even have the legal right to sign this resolution; this permission would
come three days later (Verbitsky 2009).
The relationship between Monsanto and the Argentine government has been close
(Newell 2009a). At the time of RR seeds approval, Monsanto’s report on the “Safety,
Compositional, and Nutritional Aspects of Glyphosate-tolerant Soybeans” was the only
test and proof for the safety of GM seeds (Verbitsky 2009). The resolution that approved
GM in Argentina was based on a mirror policy to the US – that of 'substantial
equivalence'–, instead of the precautionary principle used in the EU58 (see Kloppenburg
2005). Direct involvement in reviewing and designing commercial applications and
biotech related policy, corporate lobbying, and even the exchange of personnel (the
'revolving door' of business and politics) are a reality in Argentina (as in the US) and
show the close connections between corporations and the state, as well as the pressure
large transnational corporations can exert over governments (Newell 2009a).
On other issues, however, the relation between Monsanto and the Argentine
government has been tight, in particular in relation to property rights (Newell 2009a).
GM seeds, patented and owned by corporations, are typically a matter of contention for
farmers (Shiva 2000). Patented seeds are expensive and, under contract, cannot be saved
for the next growing season, as it is tradition in agriculture. Argentine farmers, however,
are protected under UPOV 78 (1978 Convention of the Union for the Protection of New
58

Which was, in the US, the result of significant corporate lobbying (see Kloppenburg
2005).
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Varieties of Plants) so farmers can legitimately plant their own saved seeds59
(Chudnovsky 2006; Pengue 2005; Qaim 2005). Moreover, Argentine farmers who plant
RR seeds are not compelled to sign a contract with Monsanto, as it is customary in other
countries, such as the United States (Pierri and Abramovsky 2009; Qaim and Traxler
2005). There is also a black market for GM soybean seeds, generally bought in unlabeled
white sacks, which farmers refer to as bolsa blanca (Chudnovsky 2006; Pengue 2005;
Qaim and Traxler 2005). It is estimated that only 25% of seeds planted are "certified"
(where a small technology fee is paid); the remaining are either saved seeds or seeds
bought in unlabeled bolsa blanca.60 The lack of patent contracts is key to understand
farmers' high levels of acceptance of the new technology and low levels of initial
resistance in Argentina in contrast to other nations of the Global South.
For Monsanto, the significant loss from technology fees for patented RR soybeans
is, as might be expected, a source of dispute between the agribusiness and the Argentine
government (Newell 2009a). It is important to note however, that Monsanto starts the
battle over this issue only after 2001, when RR soy was well established in Argentina
and, thanks to Argentine farmers, also in neighbor countries Brazil, Paraguay, and
Bolivia, where Argentine RR soy was smuggled through the borders despite GM crops
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Glyphosate-tolerant soybeans were first released commercially in Argentina under
license of the multinational agribusiness Nidera (which had access to Monsanto's RR
gene through the acquisition of Asgrow Argentina). At this time, Nidera did not apply for
patent-rights for RR soy because Monsanto, not Nidera, had developed the RR gene. By
the time Monsanto sought to revalidate the patent, the petition was rejected on the
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2006, Qaim and Traxler, 2005).
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"Monsanto ya se aseguró el cobro de las regalías por su nueva súper soja," Clarín,
August 22, 2012.
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being illegal in these countries.61 Critics argue that 'keeping quiet' during this initial
period was a good strategy for Monsanto to enter the South American market –a market
otherwise closed to GMOs (Newell 2009b; Pierri and Abramovsky 2009; Teubal 2006).
The situation on property rights in Argentina is currently under debate, and likely
to change very soon, so that farmers may have to start paying for patented seeds and
forfeit their right to uso propio, their right protected under UPOV 78 to save seeds.
Monsanto’s newest GM soy variety IntactaTM RR2TM Pro (a stacked trait Bt-RR) was
approved for commercial use in Argentina in August 2012 and it is expected for release
in the next growing season 2013/2014.62 This announcement was made jointly by the
heads of Monsanto Argentina and of the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture, Minister
Norberto Yahuar, Secretary Lorenzo Basso, and Sub-Secretary Oscar Solís.63 Monsanto
had been holding back the new RR2 variety from the Argentine market because of the
patent issue. Lately, however, negotiations between Monsanto and the Argentine
government have sped up, culminating in the presentation of Intacta RR2 soybeans last
August, where Mr. Yahuar, the Minister of Agriculture, announced the imminent passing
of a new Seed Law that addresses Monsanto's demands.64 To this day this law has not
been passed; yet it is important to highlight what is at stake: If RR2 soybeans are released
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soja," La Nación, September 1, 2012.
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on Monsanto's terms, (terms that have the explicit support of the Argentine government,
as exemplified by the presence and words of high representatives of the Argentine
Ministry of Agriculture in the presentation of the new GM variety), this will mean drastic
changes in seed use and commercialization in Argentina. Monsanto has already struck
private agreements with some Argentine soy producers, who have agreed to pay a royalty
fee for the new GM seeds (and if they don't, and if crops tested at the time of sale are
shown to contain the patented gene, farmers will have to pay royalties at a higher price –
meaning, royalties plus a fine).65
Most important it is that at this meeting the Minister of Agriculture promised
changes to the Seed Law, which will end farmers’ right to save seeds. This shows, as
with the passing of 1996 GM regulation, a corporate-state alliance working for a
legislation that promotes GM biotechnology (and protects corporate rights over farmers'
rights). A new Seed Law is thus welcomed by members of agribusinesses and
organizations that will benefit directly from this development, the seed industry
(Monsanto, Syngenta, Dow; seed sellers like Don Mario and Nidera) and groups and
associations that promote new agrarian technologies, such as the Asociación de
Semilleros Argentinos (ASA) and the Asociación Argentina de Productores en Siembra
Directa (AAPRESID).66 On the other side, the Seed Law is highly controversial among
members of rural organizations like the Argentine Agrarian Federation, Federación
Agraria Argentina (FAA) that represents small and mid-sized farmers. To the proposed
Seed Law, the FAA specifically rejects the end of uso propio, farmers' right to save seed
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Op. cit.
"La nueva ley de semillas sacudió todo el espectro rural," La Nación, Sept. 29, 2012.
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for replanting.67 This shows the extent of consensus over GM biotechnology across rural
sectors, from large to small agrarian producers: Contestation is over access to the
technology (concern arises because they won't be able to afford it) and not about the
technology itself.68 This stands directly opposite to concerns raised by the National
Movement of Indigenous Peasants, Movimiento Nacional Campesino Indígena (MNCI),
which rejects the Seed Law on the grounds that the right to save seed represents peoples'
right to food sovereignty and autonomy and to protect biodiversity.69 This is a common
claim raised by anti-GM peasant movements in the Global South, who reject the
technology itself, and not access to it, on the basis that that protecting the seed represents
protecting life (Shiva 2000).70
The use of discursive means to present GM biotechnology as a positive and
necessary development is a key strategy to create consensus over the new agrarian
technologies (Gramsci 1972; Lukes 2005; Newell 2009a). In his speech at Monsanto's
Intacta RR2 event, the Minister of Agriculture praised GM biotech, arguing that these
new technologies will benefit Argentina and the world, celebrating GM biotech as key to
increase food security in an increasingly challenging world, struck by climate change,
droughts, energy scarcity, and a growing population.71 These words seem to be taken
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"Argentina: La nueva ley de semillas no pasó de año," December 19, 2012.
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squarely from Monsanto's corporate brochure72 and show the alignment of the pro-GM
corporate-state discourse. The media resonated in the celebratory mood: Monsanto's RR2
is not just soy but the new súper soja, "super soy," the crop "of the future."73
PR and the media are the most effective and widely used corporate strategies to
create consent (Beder 2002; Stauber and Rampton 1995). What is said to the public and,
just as important, what is hidden from public opinion, serves the purpose of promoting a
particular opinion among civil society; it serves the purpose of influencing the public and
of building hegemony, the second and third dimensions of power (Lukes 2005). In
Argentina, the agribusiness sector has close links to the media, which also shows high
levels of corporate concentration. Grupo Clarín is at the lead, the largest media
conglomerate in Argentina and one of the largest in the Spanish-speaking world.74
Established in 1999, the activities of Grupo Clarín stretch over print news (most
important, of Diario Clarín, the newspaper with the highest circulation in Argentina),
Internet access and cable TV, and radio and television sectors. Grupo Clarín owns one of
the two leading broadcast television channels in Argentina, ARTEAR/Canal Trece, as
well as the country's leading all-news channel, Todo Noticias, popularly known as TN.75
Usual sponsors of TV shows on TN news channel are Monsanto, Dow AgroSciences,

Available at
http://www.minagri.gob.ar/site/institucional/prensa/index.php?edit_accion=noticia&id_in
fo=120822171448
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Monsanto. Corporate Brochure. Available at
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Documents/Monsanto_Corporate_Brochure.pdf
Accessed 11/15/12 . See also Chapter 2, Arguments in Favor of GM Biotechnology.
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seed sellers like Nidera, and organizations that represent agro-export-related interests,
like CIARA, Cámara de la Industria Aceitera de la República Argentina.
Clarín, together with La Nación, the newspaper with the second highest
circulation in Argentina, organize Expoagro, one the most important and largest annual
agricultural fairs in the country. As described in Expoagro's website: "the latest
developments, innovations and tendencies for agricultural machinery and productive
systems can be seen at Expoagro."76 This is one of the main hubs for dissemination of
new agricultural technologies and practices in Argentina: among its exhibitors are the
leading research companies for biotechnology and agro-chemistry along with financial
institutions, insurance companies, communication groups, commercial and industrial
chambers, and academic institutions.77 During the year, all across the country, smaller
versions of Expoagro take place around the country. Groups like AACREA (Asociación
Argentina de Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola) and AAPRESID
(Asociación Argentina de Productores en Siembra Directa) are at the lead in organizing
these espacios de capacitación, training and learning environments, as producers describe
them, spaces in which to learn and share experiences about new agrarian technologies
and methods. These meetings have the support of pro-GM NGOs and think tanks, like
Argenbio, as well as government-funded research institutions, like INTA (Instituto
Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria). These institutions cooperate to create and
promote what producers refer to as the "new paradigm," or "the agribusiness paradigm"
of agriculture: agricultural production aimed to increase profitability through constant
technological innovation. The concept of Knowledge (a mix of managerial capabilities
76
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and latest science & technology) is what is at the core of this paradigm. This new
paradigm expands across the countryside in all these meetings and in the rooms of public
(government-funded) universities, where Agronegocios, Agribusinesses, is now part of
the curriculum and the Masters degrees at national public universities. Outreach efforts
include INTA extensionistas handing out GM seeds to farmers.
The role of the media in creating consent is most important (Gramsci 1972;
Herman and Chomsky 2002; Lukes 2005). Clarín and La Nación, the two most widely
read newspapers in Argentina, have been strategic actors in the creation and
dissemination of the new paradigm and thus, of creating support for the GM soy model
(Newell 2009a). In these newspapers, Argentina's transition to GM soy is depicted as a
well-rounded success, described in terms of continuous expansion of production, record
harvests, and record profits.78 Héctor Huergo, main columnist in Clarín newspaper and
director and main editor of Clarín Rural, the rural magazine of the newspaper, is
recognized as one of the main mentors and promoters of the GM based agro-industrial
model in Argentina.79 From his regular op-ed at Diario Clarín, Huergo praises GM
biotechnology and the model’s success, extolling "Only biotechnology can save the
world" or "Soy, 21st century manna."80
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"La soja impulsó un récord de las exportaciones," Clarín, May 31, 2004; " La soja
alcanzó el precio más alto en dos años y medio," La Nación, November 7, 2006; "La soja
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The media has taken as well to promote a campaign on soy as a miracle food.
This started during the 2001 crisis. Then, for the first time in Argentine history, hunger
became an issue. Hungry kids with watery eyes and overblown bellies, pictured barefoot
in dusty roads, filled daily news with polemic headlines: “Is this Somalia?” Argentines
were struck and outraged to learn about the existence of hunger in the midst of an
agrarian country, or was not Argentina the Breadbasket of the World? And while the
expansion of the monocultures of GM soy are directly to blame for Argentina’s loss of
food sovereignty (Teubal 2008), in the news soybeans were being described as porotos
maravillosos, marvelous beans that will solve the problem of hunger.81 Soy-related news
sprouted, portraying this crop as the best replacement for meat consumption because of
its high protein value and cheaper price (important benefits in a context of high poverty).
Soy-based recipes and advertisements of free cooking workshops aimed at training
Argentines on how to include soy and soy-based products into their diets appeared often
in the news.82 Cultural values enter into a contradiction here, and are potentially a source
of conflict: Beef is a main staple of Argentine diet and culture, and Argentines pride
themselves of having the best beef in the world. There is still an ongoing campaign to
extoll the benefits of soy over meat consumption. These arguments usually rely on
‘scientific evidence’ that allegedly prove the health-related benefits of soy consumption
(vs. eating meat).83
Just as important as analyzing how the powerful portray GM biotech is to
question what is hidden from public view, what is not in the media agenda. Certainly
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only a limited number of events can make it to the news; it is technically and logically
impossible to describe everything that happens all the time everywhere. Which events
become 'news' is decided by those that control information channels (see Herman and
Chomsky 2002; McChesney 2000; Schiller 1973; Stauber and Rampton 1995). Taking
controversial, or potentially controversial, events out of public view serves the purpose of
suppressing public participation (because, as introduced in Chapter 2, who would
mobilize without a grievance?). In Argentina, negative consequences of GM soy
monocultures and other topics that could be considered anti-GM are conspicuously
absent from the media. And this applies to both corporate and state media channels: As
one activist told me: No aparece ni en 6,7,8 ni en TN, there is no discussion over these
issues neither in 6,7,8, the propaganda TV news show of the Kirchners' administration,
neither in TN, Grupo Clarín's corporate news channel. It goes to show that despite the
embittered legal and discursive battle the Kirchners' administrations and Grupo Clarín
are embroiled in,84 both corporations and the state share in the construction of a discourse
that promotes GM soy as a key accumulation strategy (Newell 2009a).
The most visible consequence of the invisibility of GM soy expansion as a social
problem is quiescence. Over 90 per cent of Argentine population is urban,85 their main
source of information about the countryside is what they read in the papers or watch on
TV. To them, food grows in supermarkets. In Argentina, GM foods are not labeled and
the debate over the health consequences of eating GMOs is circumscribed to small circles
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(some academics, activists). Soy, despite the news campaign to make it 'food', is yet not a
staple in Argentine meals. Still, just as in the US, most people don't know that they eat
GMOs when drinking soda or feeding formula to their children. Most Argentines don't
know that the soy being grown in their country is transgenic, and if they do know, they
have very little knowledge of what transgenic or GM means. Early on in my research,
when describing my research topic to my city-based friends and family, I would often
receive puzzled glances and high pitched replies: "What??! Transgenic?!?
REALLY!?!?!" To which, to my positive reply, would follow a resigned "And so...
What's that then?" However, as I describe later in this chapter, after the Conflicto del
Campo, the agrarian revolt over export taxes in March 2008, GM soy suddenly entered
public consciousness: GM soy production was then all over the media, in a struggle
between those that portrayed the social and environmental degradation of GM soy
monocultures vs. the hegemonic success discourse of the soy boom. This became a
window of opportunity and now the number of people I encounter that are aware of this
issue is much larger than in the beginning of my research. Yet awareness is not as sizable
as on other related topics on natural resource extraction, which have been much more
widely portrayed in the media: mining in particular. Among activists, a common plight
on soy and agribusinesses is that "most people don't know" (which again can be followed
by a "they don't want them to know.")
Beyond the media, another very effective strategy to suppress public participation
is outright violence, the first dimension of power (Lukes 2005). From assembly meetings
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on anti-fumigation being disrupted and participants being intimated86 to campesinoleaders being murdered,87 the cycle of violence to silence contestation speeds up with the
expansion of GM soy. I discuss this aspect of power in the following chapter. In what
follows, I give further details and examples on strategies and mechanisms of the second
and third dimensions of power, in particular in relation to the framing of GM
biotechnology by rural producers and inhabitants.

4.2

BENEFITS OF THE TECHNOLOGY #1: PROFITS
The main explanation for quiescence around GMOs is consensus over the

economic benefits of technological innovation and the GM soy agro-export model.
Political and economic power, the state and corporate agribusinesses, share in the
material gains of this model (see Chapter 3, Newell 2009a). Therefore, there is
quiescence because the powerful profit from it. Indirectly, as I show later, the powerless
benefit as well. In the field, the main reason I got overall, across all rural sectors/actors,
to the question on what basis is production organized, was rentabilidad, profitability.
Growing soy is good business. As Coronil (1997) would argue, there is a material reality
that can't be escaped. It is profitable for farmers to produce soy, more profitable (and less
risky) than growing any other crop. It is also profitable for the state and the
agribusinesses. In the last chapter I showed with figures how profitable soy production is,
for farmers, agribusiness, and the state. The aim of this chapter is to analyze this positive
framing of GM biotech in terms of profitability.
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Campesina (MOCASE-VC), Santiago del Estero, August 2011.
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Growing Greens: Nature as a Source for Profit
In Argentina, GM has not been constructed as a grievance because benefits appear
to outweigh negative consequences. The main benefit singled out by interviewees is
economic profit. It is in these terms that rural producers in the Argentine Pampas
organize production and the adoption of new agrarian technologies: mayor rendimiento,
mayor eficiencia y productividad, reducción de costos, to increase yields, efficiency and
productivity, and to reduce costs. The main goal is to increase output and reduce costs
and time in order to increase profits. Technological innovation is a means to an end: the
end being to increase profits. Germán, a medium sized (650 ha) farmer in the southeast of
Buenos Aires province, summarizes this mentality:88
A: Then, the decision over the adoption of new technology is based on...
G: (interrupts) On a cost-benefit issue.
A: There is always this approach…
G: Yes. It's like... It's the raison d'être of the entrepreneur (empresario). That
the company (empresa) is sustainable, economic... Sustainability means that it
endures over time but also that it makes money (que perdure en el tiempo
pero también que gane plata).
This commentary exemplifies the most common pattern I've encountered in my
fieldwork: The parameter for decision, on what crops are grown and what technologies
are incorporated, is entrepreneurial, business-like, profit-oriented. This parameter is
openly discussed in interviews with a sense of pride, by interviewees that either profit or
receive a wage income from agricultural production (rural workers/employees). Germán's
commentary above thus summarizes a shared framing on agricultural production that has
two components: (1) El campo es una empresa: El campo becomes a concept that
encompasses much more than the countryside, the farm, or the plot of land, it is the
88
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producing activity, an enterprise, a business, a company, a firm; and (2) the person
responsible for el campo is not a farmer but a producer, productor, and an empresario, an
entrepreneur. These changes in mentality/framings of agriculture are linked to profound
changes in the organization of agrarian production and the rural social structure of
Argentina, changes already described in Chapter 3, characterized by the transformation of
rural actors (the emergence of productores-empresarios, pools de siembra/sowing pools,
and contractors) and the displacement of rural populations, the emptying of the
countryside.
Large-scale soy production is mostly performed by contractors. Rural contractors
typically own machinery but no land. They are hired under contract by productoresempresarios (or a group of producers or investors, like the pool de siembra), to perform
the task of production. Contractors travel with their machines from town to town, from
province to province, planting, spraying, and harvesting one field and then moving onto
the next one. Further down the line towards contracting and sub-contracting, in which the
distance increases between the one that controls resources, the one that performs the
cultivating task, and nature, are production contractors (contratistas de producción, or
tanteros).
Production contractors own neither land nor machinery but they rent both, hiring
other contractors to perform agricultural tasks. Their value-added resides in their knowhow in terms of organizing production. Because of the highly technical specificities of
using the technological package in extensive areas, agricultural production in the Pampas
rests mostly in the hands of "experts." Knowledge of the farm is not passed down
generationally but in universities: those in charge of managing production in the Pampas
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aren't farmers anymore, not even big landowners, but engineers or masters in business
administration, and they self-identify as "entrepreneurs." Just like modernization theorists
expected (Mumford [1934] 1963), the role (and value) of labor in agrarian production in
the Pampas has transitioned from the physical activity towards organizing production, a
managerial task.
Pools de siembra, or sowing pools, are investment groups that combine financial
investors with a managerial core that rents land, labor, and machinery to produce at a
large scale and often includes stock investment in the commodity market (Bustamante
and Maldonado 2009). Agricultural production through agribusinesses organized as pools
de siembra is at the forefront of agrarian activity in Argentina nowadays. Pools have
emerged to bring in resources after the 2001 crisis and they are unique in that they bring
into agricultural activities actors that were not previously involved in agricultural
production –and need not be involved or even knowledgeable about it now (Bustamante
and Maldonado 2009). GM soy production in the Pampas is a highly profitable activity,
interviewees reporting that it gives a much higher interest rate than savings accounts or
other investment avenues. Thus, agriculture turns into any other corporate activity where
accountability is only to stockholders and decisions about production are purely based on
profitability (see Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel 2000; Magdoff and Tokar 2010).
As described in Chapter 3, the neoliberal economic restructuring of the 1990s has
radically transformed rural social relations in Argentina. New rural actors have emerged,
who relate differently to the means of production. Ownership of land, capital, and labor
has become less significant as determinant of class relations. With the introduction of the
GM biotech package, now "knowledge" is claimed as the essential means for agricultural
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production. "Entrepreneurs," not farmers, not even big landowners, control agricultural
production in Argentina nowadays. These rural actors are embedded in the process and at
the forefront of technological innovation in the Pampas (Gras 2009b; Gras 2012;
Hernandez 2009).
Capitalist entrepreneurship and technological innovation go hand in hand. In
contrast to campesinos that live off agriculture (as income and as food), who reported that
agrarian practices are tied to culture and tradition,89 farmers from the Pampas region
identify themselves with constant technological innovation. They speak of adopting
tecnología de punta, of "being on the cutting edge technologically," with a sense of
enlightened pride, and claim to be at the forefront of technological world developments
that have transformed agricultural production. GM soy production is their banner, the
best example of how, in Argentina, "we do the best agriculture in the world."
Interestingly enough, rural workers (employees of large farms) share this perspective. For
example, in an interview with Antonio, a recently retired lifetime employee of a large
producer (60,000 ha, rent & own, Buenos Aires province), he repeatedly praised his
employers as productores muy de punta and Argentine agriculture as being, again, as de
punta, the latest of the latest, top of the top. This repeated description of agriculture as de
punta, of being on the technological cutting edge, equates, in a unacknowledged and
naturalized manner, technological innovation with qualitative improvements (the more
and the latest, the better): the unquestionable intrinsic positive qualities of technological
innovation (see Mander 1991).
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When discussing GM seeds in particular, another striking difference with
campesinos arise: where to campesinos in the North genetically modified seeds
symbolize the fundamental violence against culture and life, in the Pampas GM RR
soybeans are "just another tool", una herramienta más. There is apparently no symbolism
attached to GM seeds, as they are considered merely another input (insumo) needed for
production, and interviewees did not ever find it controversial to discuss seeds' GM
features.90 On the contrary, most times it felt like it was 'just the same' or even irrelevant
to discuss GM use in particular (again, as it is just another input). Nonetheless, if GM
was discussed within the general topic of agrarian technological innovation, and in
particular when discussing the technological package (no-tilling machine + RR seed +
glyphosate), then seeds became "improved seeds," mejores semillas or semillas
mejoradas, part of a círculo virtuoso, a "virtuous cycle" (the no-tillage method, siembra
directa, always praised as the really revolutionary agricultural technological innovation
because it improves soil conservation and thus promotes sustainability). This shows again
that there is in fact a not so subtle symbolism in relation to GM, that of the intrinsic
positive qualities of technological innovation.
The adoption of GM biotechnology and its positive framing in relation to
benefits/profits can be clearly understood against this background. Agriculture is
perceived as a money producing activity, a stark contrast to claims brought forward by
anti-GM activists for whom agriculture is a food producing activity. Technological
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spraying. More on this on the following chapters.
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innovation in the Argentine countryside grows inedible greens, the dollars received in
exchange for GM soy exports.

Todos Vivimos del Campo: We All Live Off the Countryside
The strength of the GM soy model lies on the real and perceived belief that
directly and indirectly everyone benefits materially from agricultural production. Thus,
the well-trodden phrase: Todos vivimos del campo, We all live off the countryside.
In the rural towns I visited in the Pampas region, when I asked, Y de qué vive la
gente del pueblo?, "How do people here make a living?", the first answer I mostly got
was a clear cut Del campo, "Off the countryside." Further inquiry into this answer
brought up the nuances of this common reply.91
First of all, there are those who profit directly from agricultural production and
live in a rural town nearby the farm (meaning less than 120 miles away, farms that can be
visited in a half-a-day round-trip). There is, for example, Federico, CEO and owner of an
agribusiness that grows 11,500 ha (rent & own) in the provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe,
and Buenos Aires, and who lives in town, where his business is located.92 There is also
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Some would venture to answer, En el campo, "at the farm", which struck me as unreal
the further I traveled to find anyone who actually got dirty with soil or sunburnt for
spending time at the field. With further inquiry to provide details on where and how this
general third person la gente, "people" or la mayoría, "most" work "at the farm," en el
campo, most would reorient their answer to the meaning of "off the countryside," thus
explaining that 'people' are either employed in the service sector or are opening their own
stores (with income from renting out their land), compared to being directly involved in
agricultural production. Bringing this contradiction/puzzle up to my interviewees almost
invariably brought up a reminiscence of the past, a recent past, when they could recall
specific names of people they knew who were directly employed in a farm nearby.
92
Interview, Buenos Aires, February 2012.
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Pedro, landowner and farmer, who directly oversees production of his 1,200 ha farm.93
Pedro and his wife live in their farm right out of town, in a fancy chalet that stands at the
top of a slope, amidst his farmed land, so that from the comfort of the living room,
through a glass wall, we have a panoramic view of the soy field, which starts growing
about 100 feet away. From the view of the living room, Pedro proudly displays and
treasures his bounty. Myself, however, while trying to make sense of this, trying my best
to appreciate it objectively, a clear contradiction kept popping up in my head: Why would
I, in my sane mind, want to have my own backyard sprayed with agro-chemicals??94 Yet,
in many of these rural towns, the newly affluent have chosen to stay in town, building
huge, expensive houses side by side their farms. This is especially the case for farms that
are right at the entrance of the town, or only a few minutes car ride away. This is
significant, because compared to farms that are far from town, in here both soy producers
participate actively in the life of the town and the rest of town get to see this display of
wealth often. In this way, it can be understood that despite the seeming contradiction, the
chalets and the soy farms are a sign of wealth and high status for people in town. This
comes to show, on the one side, how rather than a grievance GM soy production is
associated with benefits, a positive sign of high status. On the other side, it also comes to
show the widespread unawareness of the health effects of agrochemical spraying
(thoroughly described in chapter 5).
Besides those who both work and profit from agricultural production, there are
those who profit directly from agricultural production but do not engage in production
themselves: These are people who own land and rent it out for others to produce. Some of
93
94

Interview, Buenos Aires, February 2012.
See NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) literature (Walsh, Warland, and Smith 1993).
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them have never been involved in agriculture, inheritors of a family farm who work in
something else, like Sergio, who works as a lawyer.95 Sergio's children, future inheritors
of the family farm, have recently moved to the capital for their undergraduate studies in
advertising and graphic design. They know little or nothing about agricultural production,
except that it pays for their studies. Others who profit directly from agricultural
production but do not engage in production themselves have always been farmers
(chacareros), but have chosen to exit agriculture because they "couldn't afford to
compete." Small landowners reported that it is more profitable to rent out the land than to
engage in production themselves. With this extra income, many have chosen to open
small stores as an investment and also as way to find something to do (ocuparse en algo),
as by working at the store they make themselves busy and useful. In some small rural
towns I've visited, this has resulted in a seemingly absurd town development, as in a town
consisting of 40 blocks there is a grocery store or drugstore (kiosco) in every other block,
which are then usually empty, for supply clearly overruns demand. Other people who
profit from renting out land, however, especially young families with kids growing in
small rural towns, have chosen to migrate to bigger rural towns, which have now become
small rural cities, as they have all (or most of) the amenities of city life. Common
concerns, from mothers in particular, arise from isolation and the lack of services in rural
towns. Typically kids living in small rural towns have daily hours-long commute to
school. Dirt roads get impassable in rainy days, making transportation harder or
impossible, isolating the town. Mothers are also concerned of the possibility of a medical
emergency, and thus worry on how long it would take to rush a sick kid to the closest
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Interview, Córdoba, February 2012.
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hospital. City amenities like schools and hospitals, as well other services such as
electricity, gas, clean water, sewers, and paved streets are enticing as they make everyday
life "easier" compared to the hardships of rural life.
Agricultural production also provides direct and indirect employment to rural
inhabitants (in particular in larger rural towns, pop. ~15,000). For example, Federico's
agribusiness employs agronomists (who plan and supervise production), contractors (who
perform the agricultural tasks), as well as women employed as secretaries (and I assume,
others as cleaning service as well). More jobs are available through ag-related sectors: for
example, grain truck carriers (transportistas), seeds and machinery sale, at the
agrochemical plant, and at the offices of grain traders/exporters. All large rural towns
have representatives of grain traders such as Cargill and LDC Louis Dreyfuss
commodities, seed sellers like Nidera, and agricultural machinery. The signs and flags of
these business' offices and John Deere tractors and Ford and Hilux trucks parked outside
welcome you when entering through the main artery into town.
It is indirectly, thus, how truly "everyone lives off the countryside", thanks to the
growth of the service economy fueled by a growth of soy-related income: from renting to
employment in the offices of the agriculture and ag-related sector and other sectors that
benefit from increased local consumption, from supermarkets, retail stores, and, in
particular, construction. Real estate is a sector that has particularly benefitted from the
soy boom (as property investments are considered one of the most reliable means of
saving, understandable in a country beset by sudden currency devaluations and bank
system meltdowns). As I have described in chapter 3, the government also adds to this
soy-derived income that flows into rural towns through the Solidary Soy Fund (which
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adds to the local township budget) and by handing out monthly subsidies of federal cash
transfer programs.
In conclusion, GM soy production brings money and jobs to rural communities. If
the business of GM soy production closes down, whole towns will collapse. This is not a
context conducive to mobilization (Crenson 1971; Gaventa 1980; Gould 1993; Gould
1991). Of course, as discussed in chapter 2, the economic argument does not necessarily
need to trump social and environmental wellbeing; yet in this case, it does. I look further
into the issues of social visibility and awareness of socio-environmental degradation
consequences of GM soy production in the following chapters.

4.3

BENEFITS OF THE TECHNOLOGY #2: PROGRESS / MODERNITY
Beyond –or rather, in connection with– the material benefits of GM soy

production, supporters of GM biotech adduce another significant benefit of the new
technology: its ability to bring about Development, Progress, and Modernity. This belief
in techno-science, an objective and neutral technology whose success is measured in its
ability to control nature, is not new but rather part and parcel of Argentine cultural
identity. In this section I argue that there is a cultural preparation that is key to
understanding quiescence. The introductory section of this chapter focused on current
strategies and mechanisms used by agribusiness and the state to create and maintain
consent. Yet, research suggests that similar efforts to create a hegemonic discourse in
other countries have failed (such as in Mexico, see Poitras 2008). Then, a new question
arises: How could this hegemonic discourse take hold in Argentina? I argue that it took
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hold and grew roots in Argentine identity and mindset. In this section I show how
Argentines were culturally ready to receive GM biotechnology with open arms.

Cultural preparation. Argentineanness = Modernness
Argentines have a very particular perception of nature, ingrained in their very
identity as a Nation. Conceived in the 19th century by a group of intellectuals known as
the Generation of 1837, Argentine national identity was born modern (Benítez-Rojo
1996; Larraín 2004). Their ideals of modernity fit within the ‘modernization’ paradigm
described in chapter 2. Within this paradigm, science and technology have a very special
role to play, as they serve human needs to control and modify the natural environment
(Mumford [1934] 1963). The exploitation of natural resources in its most effective and
productive way –measured in terms of quantitative growth and higher profitability–, it’s a
main goal of modernizing programs (and, as described above, the main goal of Argentine
GM soy producers). Argentine national identity was conceived modern in this sense, and
thus deeply anti-nature, pro-science and technology, and Buenos Aires-centric. I argue
that because this modernization paradigm are the glasses through which Argentines
perceive their relationship to nature, they were culturally ready to perceive the
biotechnology of GM seeds in a positive light.
In what follows, I trace parallels in perceptions of and approaches to nature in
Argentina in the 19th century and today. I look into the essays of the Generation of 1837,
in particular at Domingo F. Sarmiento’s Facundo and Juan Bautista Alberdi’s Bases,96 as
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D. F. Sarmiento, Facundo o Civilización y Barbarie en las Pampas Argentinas,
written in 1845. J. B. Alberdi, Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Organización Política
de la República Argentina, published in 1852.
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authors agree that these are seminal texts of Argentine national identity (Shumway 1991;
Sorensen 1996). Then, jumping to the 21st century, I look at how this 19th century
discourse is still today part and parcel of the Argentine mindset/cultural framework (in
particular of GM soy producers). The main goal is to show that the pro-GM discourse
does not arise ‘naturally’ but rather that it is a construct of power, a hegemonic discourse
created by a powerful elite to create consent and quiescence as it resonates with deeply
held values in Argentine society (Gramsci 1972; Lukes 2005).

The Root of It All: Conceiving Argentine Identity, Becoming Modern
Soon after Argentina gained independence from Spanish rule in 1816, the criollo
ruling elite set to the task of creating a country where there was none. Argentina had to be
created from uniting scattered pieces: a port city, Buenos Aires, head of the exViceroyalty, home of the criollo elite and linked to Europe through commerce; a few
other smaller cities in the interior provinces that had been important during the
viceroyalty as trading spots (like Santiago del Estero and Córdoba); the Pampas, the vast
grasslands owned by wealthy big landowners (hacendados), scarcely inhabited by cows,
some rural, mixed-race population and some indigenous groups that every so often, in
malones, took over the property of the hacendados; some towns and rural villages in the
interior provinces, producing for domestic consumption; and the rest, a huge land,
unknown, unexplored, unlimited97 (Rock 1987). And among all those pieces, no sense of
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This is from the perspective of the elites in Buenos Aires, of course. Several
indigenous groups (like the Patagones and Mapuches in the south, the Guaraníes in the
north, etc.) inhabited Argentine territory and they knew it very well. Francisco Moreno’s
Viaje a la Patagonia Austral, written during his scientific expedition to Patagonia in the
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unity, no sense of shared history or future, no shared myths of peoplehood (Shumway
1991: 2). Defining nationness, creating a national identity, became a task that had to be
crafted almost from scratch (Benítez-Rojo 1996; Shumway 1991). Similar efforts were
taking place continent-wide, throughout the newly independent Latin American nations
(Benítez-Rojo 1996).
The Generation of 1837 was a group of young intellectuals that took upon
themselves the task of creating “guiding fictions,” 98 the myths of national identity that
were essential to unite the country (Shumway 1991). Esteban Echeverría (1805-1851),
Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) and Domingo F. Sarmiento (1811-1888) were the
members of this group that contributed the most to the enterprise of creating a national
identity, to define Argentinianness (Benítez-Rojo 1996; Halperín Donghi 1994;
Shumway 1991; Sorensen 1996). All of them skillful writers, they used novels and essays
as their “strategy” to create a national identity after independence (Benítez-Rojo
1996:417).
Highly educated in the European values and ideas of the epoch, these authors
were deeply embedded in the mood of the Enlightenment, looking north from the South
Cone, admiring the revolutionary feats of France and England and the development of the
newly independent British colony, the United States. Their ideals were modeled after the
ideals of the French Enlightenment, of Positivism, and of British Liberalism. Rousseau,
late 1800s, is an excellent account on how well the indigenous peoples knew their
territory.
98
For Shumway, guiding fictions are like myths, stories that make up national
identities. For example, in the United States, the idea of America as a ‘melting pot’ or
the ‘American way of life.’ As Shumway (1991:xi) explains: “The guiding fictions of
nations cannot be proven, and indeed are often fabrications as artificial as literary
fictions. Yet they are necessary to give individuals a sense of nation, peoplehood,
collective identity, and national purpose.”
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St. Simon, Comte, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo were the authors they admired.
Progress, industrialization, free trade, their cherished beliefs. Modernity the ultimate
goal99 (Pigna 2009; Shumway 1991). This modernization-is-progress culture was shared
by the elites of the newly independent countries throughout Latin America (Burns 1980).
The project of nation building arose from these ideals: Argentinianness and
modernness became then inextricably linked (Benítez-Rojo 1996; Larraín 2004;
Shumway 1991). Making Argentina modern, bringing in civilization was the task.
According to the Men of ’37, many obstacles were impeding Argentina’s path into
joining the modern nations of the world. 100 What were the problems –los males– of
Argentina? These intellectuals identified three: (1) la tierra, the “land”: the vast,
unknown, “uninhabited” plains of the Pampas, the “desert,”101 where the rural masses
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The Generation of 1837 will come up with a very special type of Modernity though,
one adapted to the realities of Argentina as a peripheral nation, as a poor country that
depends on the exploitation of nature for foreign income (Coronil 1997). The result thus,
was not an exact copy of European modernity; it was neither autochtonous nor imposed
from the outside in its entirety, but rather a “mixture” or a “hybrid” (García Canclini
1990, Larraín 2000). Some authors refer to this version of Latin American modernity as
subordinate or peripheral (Sarlo 1988).
100
To understand the mentality of the Men of ’37 it is important to understand their
historical context: In the 1840s, Argentina was divided in two factions: the Unitarios,
liberals who wanted to have a centralized government seated in Buenos Aires, and the
Federales, conservatives who wanted a decentralized government (and thus, more power
to the provinces). At this time, power was with the Federales, and Juan Manuel de Rosas,
the caudillo of the province of Buenos Aires was the de facto ruler of the country. Rosas
was an hacendado and had strong popular support from the rural masses (see Luna 2005,
Pigna 2009, Rock 1987). The Men of ’37 and Rosas were deeply opposed and thus many
of them wrote from exile, until the end of Rosas rule, in 1852.
101
Despite being one of the most fertile lands in the world and of actually being inhabited
by many, these authors referred to the Pampas as the “desert.” Facundo opens up saying:
"The disease from which the Argentine Republic suffers is its own expanse: the desert
wilderness surrounds it on all sides and insinuates into its bowels; solitude, a barren land
with no human habitation, in general are the unquestionable borders between one
province and another. There, immensity is everywhere: immense plains, immense forests,
immense rivers, the horizon always unclear, always confused with the earth amid swift110

lived; (2) the Spanish tradition, catholic and backward, the religion of the masses and the
conservatives; and (3), la raza, the “races”: the indians,102 the gauchos,103 the ethnically
mixed poor that lived in the countryside (Pigna 2009; Shumway 1991).
To the barbarism of the Pampas and of rural livelihoods, the Men of ’37 opposed
the civilization of the city of Buenos Aires and Europe. They had a dichotomous view of
Argentine society where the countryside (the Pampas) represented the source of all ills in
Argentina and the city (Buenos Aires/Europe), the prescription, the model of what
Argentina should become. It was Sarmiento, in his essay Facundo, the one that simplified
the ideas of the group in a formula: Civilización o Barbarie, Civilization or Barbarism.
This dichotomy became the motto of the Generation of 1837, and, later, the most basic
way in which Argentines understand their country (Sorensen 1996). It became one of
Argentina’s most enduring guiding fictions (Shumway 1991). With this dichotomy was
also born an enduring polemic that permeates Latin American thinking and writing from
the 19th century to today (Swanson 2003).
Sarmiento’s essay, written in 1845, is called Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism
in the Argentine Pampas.104 As summarized in Table 1, an analysis of this book reveals
that the dichotomy civilization versus barbarism105 implies:

moving clouds and tenuous mists, which do not allow the point where the world ends and
the sky begins to be marked in a far-off perspective." (Translation by Kathleen Ross,
Sarmiento 2004: 45-46).
102
The indigenous peoples, who in Spanish are called “indios” because when Columbus
arrived to the Americas he thought he had made it to India.
103
The gaucho is the rural inhabitant of the Argentine pampas. Some authors define
gaucho as peasant; thus, he would be a version of the Latin American campesino
(Ludmer 1996, Shumway 1991). At this time, they were mostly mestizos, mixed-race, the
sons of Indian mothers and conquistador fathers. They were landless and usually vagrant,
living on and off small rural jobs (Ludmer 1996).
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Table 1. Civilization vs. Barbarism in Sarmiento's Facundo
Civilization
Man-modified environment
City
Buenos Aires
Urban
Modern
Rational
“intelligence”
Science
Great Britain / France / USA
Protestantism
City-dweller
European-descent
Man
Industrious
Agriculture
Efficient
Constant
Predictable
Reliable
Productive

Barbarism
Nature
Land (“Desert”)
Pampas
Rural
Traditional
Emotional
matter
Religion
Spain / the Americas
Catholicism
Gaucho
Indian/black/mixed race
Woman
Lazy
Cattle-raising
Inefficient
Erratic
Unpredictable
Unreliable
Unproductive

Source: Author, based on Sarmiento [1845] 1874.
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‘Facundo’ was Facundo Quiroga (1788-1835), caudillo of the province of La Rioja,
also known as El Tigre de los Llanos, the Tiger of the Plains.
105
This dichotomy resembles Tönnies’ classical sociology pair GemeinschaftGesellschaft; a dichotomy that is, as Sarmiento’s, immersed in the modernization
paradigm: The transition from traditional/feudal societies (Gemeinschaft) into
modern/capitalist society (Gesellschaft) is understood as a linear (evolutionary)
movement towards progress, modernity, and higher rationalization (Tönnies [1887]
1963). Even if the pair civilization/barbarism somewhat fits the categories modern
society/traditional society, there is a key difference among them: for Tönnies (and those
that follow him, like Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons), the Gemeinschaft is in the
past, it has been already superseded by industrial society (even if some rests remains),
this is why some of these authors (like Durkheim and Weber), appear a little nostalgic,
the romantic traces of a past lost. Compared to what has happened in Europe, in
Argentina ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’ coexist in time, and thus, there can’t be any
romanticism because nothing has been lost yet. For the Men of ’37, the barbarism that
arises from the Pampas is like the plague. Thus, it must be exterminated.
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Sarmiento, as the Men of '37, was influenced by the ideals of the Enlightenment
and the industrial revolution. Thus, he analyzes the "ills" or "diseases" of Argentina
within this mindset. "Barbarism" is what is wild, savage, yet untouched by human hand:
Land, Nature; and the indigenous peoples. "Civilization" is the example of northern
Europe and the future of the United States, the refined modals of the British, the high
culture of the Parisians, and the laboriousness of Protestant farmers in the United States.
In Facundo, the Pampas are a risky place to be and Sarmiento warns us about the
possibilities of getting caught by a snake, a tiger, or the "savage indians." He is also
fearful of vagaries of the weather, telling stories of thunderstorms in the middle of the
countryside. To the ugliness of rural life, he opposes the theaters and literary societies of
Buenos Aires.
Sarmiento blames the ‘land’ for all Argentine ills. But the problem is not the land
itself. It is the land untouched by human hand: the unproductive land.106 At the time of
Sarmiento’s writing, the Pampas was cattle-ranching territory. And while cattle derived
products were the source of most of Buenos Aires' foreign income (through Buenos
Aires’ Customs House), Sarmiento still perceives it as an unproductive activity. Why?
Because of his modernizing gaze. Efficiency is measured in quantitative terms and it
relates to the ability of controlling production in order to keep it steady and predictable.
Nature, untouched, is nothing like that: Cows, left to roam in the vast grasslands, graze at
106

Note how Sarmiento points at the potential productive capacity of the land, how the
Pampas are meant to be productive: “In the center, parallel zone, the Pampas and the
jungle dispute the land for a long while; the forest dominates in places, then breaks down
into sickly, spiny bushes; the jungle appears again thanks to some river that favors it,
until in the south the Pampas finally triumph and display their smooth, downy brow,
infinite, with no known limit, no noteworthy break. It is an image of the sea on land, the
land as it looks on the map, the land still waiting for a command to produce plants and all
kinds of seeds.” (Translation by Kathleen Ross, Op. Cit, p.46).
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will and they fatten –or not– depending on the quality of the grass, which depends on the
quality of the soil and on the amount of rain and sunshine that happened that season,
summers are better than winters. Compared to the factories in Great Britain, Sarmiento’s
Pampas are an unreliable business. Thanks to the scientific discovery of coal-based
energy (a source of energy that can be controlled and stored, and that serves as a source
of artificial lightening) and the development of a very special machine, the clock, every
working day at the factory starts and ends the same hour, rain or shine, sunrise at 6 or at 9
am. Technology and science help to disassociate production from nature; and this quest
for the control of nature is, for Sarmiento and the whole modernization paradigm, the
highest goal in human life (Mumford [1934] 1963).
Juan Bautista Alberdi, another of the Men of ‘37, was mostly responsible for
developing the main program to civilize Argentina. Its main tenets, aimed to target those
previously diagnosed ills, were (1) promote immigration from Northern Europe, and (2)
free trade, based on comparative advantage (Alberdi [1852] 1957). Argentina was not to
become England, factories were not meant to sprout from the Pampas; that was not her
role in the concert of nations. Argentina’s comparative advantage, like other nations of
the Global South, is to export nature (Coronil 1997). Thus, the focus became how to
make the countryside productive, in modern terms. Alberdi recommended to move away
from cattle ranching and specialize in agriculture, which is capital and labor intensive. If,
Alberdi continues, the Argentine government does not own enough funds to invest in
adequate technology, then, he goes, “let others do it.” Alberdi recommended to abolish
all protective tariffs and to open the country to foreign investments, loans, and
partnerships to jump up the process of technological transformation. In sum, for Alberdi,
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the solution to Argentine ills would “involve some sort of appeal to Europe and the US,
through imitation, immigration, investment, or imported technology” (Shumway
1991:156).
The ideals and projects envisioned in the essays of the Generation of 1837
became a reality soon after. In the 1880s, the liberal ruling elite known as the Generation
of 1880s, consolidates the Nation; a Nation modeled after the ideals of the Men of ’37:
through the creation of a national system of public education by Sarmiento himself, and
setting up a model of economic development based on Alberdi’s program (Sorensen
1996: 99, 103).
Thus starts the process of modernization of the Pampas through promoting
European immigration and allowing foreign direct investment (FDI) for infrastructure
and technology transfers.107 British intervention, through loans, credits, and direct
investment, as well as new (foreign) technological developments became essential for the
development of the agro-export model of the 19th century (Barsky and Gelman 2001;
Pigna 2009). Railroads and new ports paid by the British, as well as the refrigerated ships
for meat, linked production in the Pampas to the European markets. New planting and
harvesting machinery are introduced from the U.S., Great Britain, and France. Also new
breeding techniques and new ‘improved’ breeds of cattle are introduced at this time
(Barsky and Gelman 2001). This time (1880-1914) is the height of the agro-export
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Conquering the territory was also part of the modernizing program. To achieve this,
the government starts a series of campaigns to exterminate the indigenous groups that
lived in the “desert” (like President Roca’s Conquista del Desierto campaign in 1879).
There are here clear parallels with the history of the United States, in the ideology of
"manifest destiny" and making the Western "wasteland" productive by clearing the native
peoples and large animals. Pigna (2009: 368) makes a very good point on how
developments in technology were key to taming the Argentine Pampas: Remington rifles!
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model, and when the myth of Argentina as the “Breadbasket/Granary of the world” –
Argentina, Granero del Mundo– is created (Pigna 2009). At this time, Argentina exported
meat and cowhide mostly to Great Britain, an agro-export model that had its boom in the
late 19th century (Pigna 2009; Rock 1987). Argentina’s per capita income was then
among the highest in the world and it was likened to other also newly independent
countries –in particular to Australia, Canada, and the United States– in terms of its
potential to join the rich nations of the world.108 The Argentine countryside, finally
mechanized, was producing vast amounts of food and foreign income. Huge waves of
European immigration populated Argentine cities and their children become Sarmiento’s
version of Argentine citizens, thanks to the newly developed free, public, and secular
education system. The model became an apparent success; and thus a myth was created,
it was Argentina’s belle époque.
Today, two centuries after independence, the ideas and the ‘belle époque-myth’ of
the 19th century are well alive in Argentine minds; a “guiding fiction” (Shumway 1991)
that came out often in interviews when discussing agricultural production: This time,
with Germán,109 we’re talking about Argentina’s history of agrarian innovation, and
there’s a pride in how we, Argentines, were at the lead in the 1930s, the first world
developers of a cosechadora autopropulsada, the combine harvester:
G: (...) At that time we were more advanced than Europe!
A: And then, what happened after that? [meaning, how did we lose that status?]
G: Well... After that comes decay (la decadencia). We were the "Granary of the
World" in the 30's, we were at par in everything, in GDP, with Australia,
108

Despite its apparent success, this model collapsed soon thereafter, due to a decrease in
global demand during the First World War and the Great Depression, among other
reasons (see Pigna 2009; Rock 1987).
109
Interview, Buenos Aires, July 2011.
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Canada... And then, that is, we declined as a country (nos vinimos abajo) and
Australia and Canadá are what they are today. (...) [Although] The reality of the
agricultural sector, as far as I understand, is different from what happened in the
rest of the country. While the country is not at the top in global terms (el país no
es punta a nivel mundial), the agricultural sector is. (Germán is unequivocal in his
affirmation). Today, [in terms of] the technologies employed and the level of
technological innovation, we are at word-class (estamos a primer nivel del
mundo).
The contrast of what Argentina was, that period when the country was at par of
other rich nations is held as a folk tale, as a “guiding fiction” (Shumway 1991)
particularly strong when set in contrast with the state of “crisis” Argentina has been ever
since (what Germán refers to as decay, Decadence, as the despair of the promise and
potential not fulfilled: Argentina did not end up being like Australia or Canada, but a
poor country like the rest of Latin America). At the same time, however, the adoption of
GM biotechnology and the soy export boom represent a glimpse of hope: the return of
Argentina to that place where it was, its rightful claim to its role as the Granary of the
World, and at par with the ‘developed’ world: a primer nivel del mundo, highest world
level, top of the top: de punta, at the technological cutting edge. It is in this mindset that
Argentines frame GM soy production, a mindset that has proven to be the most
convenient cultural framework for the introduction, adoption, and use of the
biotechnology of GMOs.

Taming Nature, 21st Century Style: Biotechnology and GM Soy
In the 19th century, a conception of Argentina as a Nation is created: Argentina
was meant to be an agro-export nation. The rationalization of the countryside, through
increased mechanization, will permit Argentina to tap into its comparative advantage,
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agricultural production. Taming the barbarism of the Pampas will bring about economic
and social development; thus, progress and civilization. Therefore, the ideal of Argentina
becomes to be an agrarian nation, but without farmers. Rural life is downgraded as
backwards, as a primitive stage in human development. Progress, civilization, highculture resides in the cities, especially in Buenos Aires, as it is linked to Europe through
its port. Thus, a very specific conception of nature emerges, one where Nature is opposed
to Progress and thus in need to be superseded; and a very specific model of development,
based on the exploitation of natural resources through continuous technological
innovation. These two ideals soon after become consolidated in the idea of Nation and
thus ingrained in Argentines’ minds.110
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It is important to point out that this modern mentality does not emerge uncontested: A
reaction towards the ‘modern’ mentality emerges right afterwards as a “competing” myth
of nationhood, where the elements of barbarism are elevated and aggrandized and placed
at the core of national identity (Shumway 1991: 299). “Argentine identity” is not one, but
two: Nationalism, or populism, becomes the reaction against the liberal-Europeanized
19th century elite, and throughout the century and until now its discourse still resonates in
Argentine life (Shumway 1991: chapters 9-10). In the mid 20th century, President Juan
Domingo Perón and his party, Peronismo, articulated best the nationalist/populist
discourse. In terms of agriculture, during the Perón-administration, agriculture was
thought of as a specialization to be transcended, as industrialization was promoted
through government intervention (this is in the context of the World War II and its
aftermath, and the popularity of Keynes' ideas). In terms of the Peronista discourse, those
against the new model of development, those who believed in the ‘modern’ agro-export
program, became imperialistas, oligarcas, vendepatrias, the big landowners being one of
the targets of those epithets. And so while there is a real break in terms of Argentina’s
orientation, looking inwards rather than outwards, in terms of perceptions towards
technological development and nature, some basic features relevant to my argument still
remain: The populism of Perón is primarily an urban and industrial movement (see
Conniff 1982). The national government promoted industrial development in suburban
Buenos Aires, which encouraged massive internal migrations from the provinces,
emptying even more the rural landscape. Development and Progress are still measured in
terms of increased productivity –measured as ‘economic growth’–, which require
constant technical innovations and, thus, increasing natural resource extraction (as fuel
and chemicals) and of polluting activities (as waste of industrial activity) (Gould, Pellow,
and Schnaiberg 2008, Schnaiberg 1980, Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Therefore, under
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In the 21st century, the model for Argentine development returns to its roots
planted two centuries earlier, as if the discourse and the model of the 19th were revamped
to fit contemporary global neoliberal ideology. The United States, through Washington
institutions and Chicago schools, replaces Europe as the geographic source of values and
ideals. Free market and comparative advantage, now with corporations, not states,
leading the process, become a renewed version of liberalism (see chapter 2). In the 1990s,
Menem’s administration starts a process of deep neoliberal restructuring with the goal of
converting Argentina into "a modern capitalist country by repeating mid-nineteenthcentury liberal economic policy and attracting foreign direct investment, [aiming to
repeat] the agrarian export boom of the belle époque." (Carranza 2005:68).
And thus, the process that started in the 19th century of taming the Pampas, of
mechanizing the countryside to increase agricultural production for the export market,
takes a further twist. Since the neoliberal 1990s starts the process towards agro-industrial
production for export, but now with two key new variables: transnational corporations
and the biotechnology of GM seeds (see chapters 2 & 3). Within the modernizing
paradigm, the biotechnology of GM seeds becomes one of the latest technological
developments towards complete control of nature. Once scientists were able to decode
the DNA of plants, the code of life became open for modification. Nowadays, crops
reproduce in labs, not in farms anymore; and they are homogenous and standard, in taste,
shape, size, and ripening times, necessary qualities to allow for mechanization
(Kloppenburg 2005:177).
close scrutiny, under the populist Peronista government some patterns remain in terms of
perception towards technology and nature, which show that throughout the different
stages of Argentine economic development, there is consistency in terms of cultural
preparation towards biotechnology and GMOs.
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Mechanization and automation of the farm are the goal. As Mumford ([1934]
1963) claimed, the displacement of the worker by the machine was a necessary and
positive development: in displacing physical labor, machines will do all hard work for us
and, moreover, produce a superior product, one that is homogeneous and standardized.
The role of the new worker is to oversee and regulate the performance of the machine, to
be technicians and engineers, as well as to organize production, rather than perform the
task of production itself (Mumford [1934] 1963). The agro-industry is the farm converted
into a factory. As the market provides for machinery, fossil fuels, seeds, fertilizers,
herbicides, and pesticides, it is finally possible to have control over inputs that previously
depended upon nature. GM soy producers in the Argentine Pampas constantly mention
the need to reduce variability and uncertainty, which they link to nature and natural
cycles, such as weather, rainfall, and human labor.111 The best compliment in the field is:
Mirá qué prolijo, qué perfecto el surco, "Look how clean and well-ordered, how perfect
the furrow is," referring to the automated work of the no-tillage sowing machine. Beauty
resides in cleanliness and predictability, qualities expected in an enclosed environment
rather than in the middle of the countryside. Some farmers, when describing the notillage machine, referred to it as having precisión quirúrgica, surgical precision. The
analogy is revealing; there is probably no other place that is as controlled and aseptic than
an operating room.
It is important to point out that this mentality is shared by all GM soy producers
that I interviewed, regardless of the location of production. This is certainly a Pampas’
producer mentality, but this mentality is expanding with the agricultural frontier. Thus,
111

The other most important source of uncertainty for the producers is the Kirchners'
government. I discuss this further in following section, under grievances.
120

similar arguments were given by GM soy producers in Chaco and Santiago del Estero.
The contrast, however, is striking, because the Pampas were already flat and “deserted,”
ready for large-scale agro-industrial production. The North is the forest, the jungle. In soy
producers’ minds, topar el monte, bringing the forest down to make room for agricultural
production, is to “clean it up”, which at the same time means to bring light, as now you
can see through it (very Enlightenment-like –and Foucaldian: to see (where the gaze can
set) is to know, to know is to control (Foucault 1994))–the reenactment of Sarmiento’s
civilizing thought: to populate is to control and to make productive. See for example,
Carlos' description of what el Chaco was 30 years ago and now:112 Carlos is a selfidentified entrepreneur, a landowner who rents the "prepared" (topada) area of his
property (650 ha) for soy production in the Chaco province, an area known as the zona
núcleo de la soja del norte, the core (most productive area) of soy production in the
North.
C: When we were there, surrounded by the forest (en el medio de ese monte), they
were showing us the fields/plots [the ones that they were interested to buy]. But
then, 32 years ago, it's not the same as now, in the sense that now it's much more
populated (está mucho más poblado). Nowadays you see vast fields, cleared down
(topados), with soy. At that time there was nothing but the roads made by the
Colonization Institute, the rest was the forest (monte). Monte, monte, and monte.
And more monte, monte, and monte. So you would drive on those dust roads, and
there would be monte on your left and monte on your right. The view/eyesight
ended there, 10 meters [30 feet] away.
A: El monte is the forest, like the jungle then...
C: Yes. Trees [that are] ten, twelve meters high. Fifteen [50 feet high]. And it's
not that you see this tree and you can get down there. No. Down there is the
understory, the fachinal, the brush (el monte bajo).113 You can't go through there,
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Interview, Chaco, July 2011.
Understory = A layer of vegetation beneath the main canopy of a forest (Dictionary
entry). Fachinal is the name given to this biome, characterized by the presence of a
closed steppe (estepa cerrada) of tall and thick grasses and shrub imbrication.
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fachinal
113
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not even walking/on foot. 'Cause down there, there are the cardo gancho [a
thorny, cactus-like bush].114 To get in there, you need a machete.
The Colonization Institute of Chaco took then a very appropriate name: in charge
of "colonizing" the monte, making productive what is untamed, civilize it. Same is to
Carlos, who faced to the thickness of the monte, where you can't see through or walk
through, topar, to clear the monte down, means to bring light and to make it productive:
the light of civilization that agro-industrial production brings.
The dichotomy 'civilization vs. barbarism' crystallizes a main concern for
Argentina (and to other Latin American nations), since its early origins: how to
consolidate the nation in the face of the perceived threats and instabilities of nature
(Swanson 2003). The paradigm that arose and consolidated in Argentines' minds elevated
the "civilization" part of the dichotomy –order, modernity, progress– over the
"barbarism" of nature, which could be "tamed" and "modernized" through mechanization.
Ever since then, the notion of technological innovation as an all-benefits endeavor in the
quest for the control of nature became ingrained in Argentines' minds. This is, I argue,
the most propitious cultural context for the introduction of GM soy biotechnology in
Argentina. In other words, Argentines were culturally ready to perceive (and receive) the
technological package of GM soy with open arms. This is the historical and cultural
origin of the all-benefits discourse of technological innovation in general and of GM
biotechnology in particular in Argentina. It is, therefore, a key component to understand
quiescence.
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Cardo gancho is part of the bromelia serra plant family.
http://www.sib.gov.ar/ficha/PLANTAE*bromelia*serra
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In the last chapter and up to now, I have shown how the hegemonic discourse of
GM soy is all-benefits and no costs: In this mindset, the celebratory claims of
technological innovation are unquestionable (see Mander 1991). The aim of this
dissertation, however, is to question this very notion, by asking what are the costs of this
agrarian transformation, and how are those distributed. As Burns (1980) argues, the quest
for 19th century Progress in Latin America in fact created continent-wide Poverty. As I
show in the following chapters, GM soy is not all benefit but it has heavy costs for
society and the environment. For soy producers however, these are not of primordial
importance. The main grievance arising among rural producers does not come up with the
expansion of GM soy, but rather on its limitations. This is what I turn to in the following
and last section.

4.4

MAIN GRIEVANCE: A CONFLICT OVER PROFITS
As I have shown in this chapter, GM biotechnology is framed mainly in terms in

benefits. In this last section I focus on the main grievance constantly brought up by
interviewees: That is the government, the Kirchners' administrations.
All those I've interviewed, (but it was particularly emphasized by those that
coordinate the activities or are employees of pools de siembra) spoke of the need to
"reduce variability". GM is thus praised because it allows for increased control of
production (the taming of nature described above). Thus, minor grievances are related to
climate conditions, drought, excessive rain, etc. The main and major grievance is also
related to the need to "reduce variability" in what they perceive as a climate of political
instability and uncertainty: it is the Kirchners' administrations. This is the main source of
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uncertainty (and anger) brought up by producers and employees alike, wary that anytime,
overnight, the government may or may not set new tariffs, limits to exports, raise export
taxes, etc. The way that large pools de siembra have managed to reduce this 'political
variability' has been expanding production to other countries (therefore, under other
governments).115 This is the agribusiness' logic to reduce uncertainty, linked to the need
to maintain a steady production output.
This main grievance burst in mobilization in March 2008, after the announcement
made by president Cristina Fernández and then-minister of Economy Martín Losteau that
would raise export taxes on agricultural production (see Giarracca and Teubal 2010 for a
chronology of events). This measure, Resolution 125/08 announced on March 11, 2008,
implied a change in tax rates for agricultural exports, particularly impacting soy and
sunflower, wheat, corn, and their derived products, from a fixed rate to a sliding rate
pegged to commodity prices (at higher commodity prices, higher the tax rate). For soy
exports that meant a tax increase from about 33% to 44%.116 The announcement of this
tax hike was the "catalyst of an agrarian protest unprecedented in its magnitud in
Argentina" (Barsky and Dávila 2008:7, my translation). This protest came to be popularly
known as el Conflicto del Campo, the Countryside/Agrarian sector Conflict.
The Conflict lasted 129 days, from March 11 to July 18, 2008, ending with the
repealing of the Resolution 125 (and the resignation of the Minister of Economy). It was
led and organized by the four major national associations of rural producers: Sociedad
Rural Argentina (SRA), Federación Agraria Argentina (FAA), Confederaciones Rurales
115

Interview with pool de siembra consultant. Buenos Aires, January 2012. Interview
with employee agribusiness/pool de siembra, Buenos Aires, January 2012.
116
Thornton, Christy. “The winner in Argentina? Transgenic Soy” NACLA, August 29,
2008. https://nacla.org/node/4971
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Argentinas (CRA) and CONINAGRO (Confederación Intercooperativa Agropecuaria
Limitada). Despite their different allegiances and memberships, these four organizations
organized under one same umbrella organization, the Mesa de Enlace.117 During the
almost four months that the Conflict lasted, major national chaos arose: The repertoire of
the Mesa de Enlace involved blockading major national routes, interrupting the
circulation of goods and people, leading to major shortages in cities’ supermarkets (and
people's vacations on Easter weekend). There were also several mass rallies in Buenos
Aires and Rosario, the largest of Argentine cities. Urban sectors supported the Conflict,
filling up the plazas during the rallies, banging pots and pans, and carrying signs
declaring Yo estoy con el campo, "I am with the countryside/agrarian sector." This sign
became the banner of urban sectors disgruntled with the government, displayed in car
bumper stickers and window signs in shops and homes.
The strike took such unprecedented size as to hit world news.118 In Argentina, el
campo became then the only thing that people talked about in the streets and what was
covered by the media. Suddenly, e-ver-y-th-i-ng became an issue related to the agroexport producers, the strike, the export taxes, the Kirchners government, and the queen of
the story: soy. The strike then opened a window of opportunity to contest the expansion
of GM soy as, for once, there was an open discussion in the media on this topic (on the
papers and TV shows, both for, as always, but in particular, showing its negative effects)
and also as important, because the government confronted el campo. This represented a
117

It is important to note that the Mesa de Enlace did not encompass the interests of all
rural sectors: in particular of campesino and indigenous communities (Teubal and
Palmisano 2010). I will discuss their interests and grievances in the next chapter.
118
See, for example, “No end in sight for Argentine farmers' strike, CNN, March 27,
2008; “Argentine Farmers Vow to Press Strike Over Tax,” New York Times, March 27,
2008; “Argentine farm tax crisis worsens,” BBC News, March 27, 2008.
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break in the alliance I discussed at the opening of this chapter. As a struggle over a tax
hike, the break of the alliance was over profits, over the material gains of the GM soy
model (Richardson 2009; Svampa 2008). This was not contestation over the model itself,
or GM in particular. Still, the change in political climate had an impact on social
responses: It made the issue visible and thus opened a window of opportunity for social
protest (McAdam 1982). This is what I turn to on the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. CONTESTATION

As described in chapters 2 & 3, there are negative socio-environmental
consequences to GM soy production and some have framed those as grievances. Who are
these people and what do they demand? Moreover, why aren't these movements and
assemblies getting the voicing they deserve? These are the questions I address in this
chapter.

5.1

POWERLESSNESS
Who bears the costs of technological change and natural resource extraction? The

unequal distribution of social and environmental costs and benefits is tied to socioeconomic and political inequalities, and results in that generally the powerful reap most
the benefits at little or no cost whereas the powerless bear most costs without much
benefit (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Gould 2006; Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts
2009; Schnaiberg 1980). As argued in chapters 2 and 4, the powerful control natural
resources and also have decision-making power over technological developments. The
main problem is that generally power elites are the ones furthest removed from those
resources (nature) and the consequences of their decisions (Gould 2006; Gould 2010).
Neither Monsanto's CEO nor the Argentine president live by a soy farm, none of their
children are regularly sprayed by agrochemicals, none of their homes have been
bulldozed to make room for agricultural production. The decisions of the pro-GM soy
corporate-state alliance are taken from offices in luxury buildings in downtown Buenos
Aires, if not in the offices of corporations in other city capitals around the world. From
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there, they reap most of the political and economic benefit and bear none of the social
and ecological consequences.
Environmental justice (EJ) theory focuses on the distributional and spatial aspects
of access to environmental and social goods and bads,119 with a particular emphasis on
race/ethnicity and class (Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts 2009). Hence, EJ studies "conclude
that, in general, ethnic minorities, indigenous persons, people of color, and low-income
communities confront a higher burden of environmental exposure from air, water, and
soil pollution from industrialization, militarization, and consumer practices." (Mohai,
Pellow, and Roberts 2009:406). That is –again– because these groups typically have no
political or economic leverage over the resources that guide production or militarization
processes, thus they cannot really decide where the toxic waste facility will stand, neither
can they move out of the community when the incinerator is already at work. Power,
therefore, is at the root of the unequal distribution of social and environmental goods and
bads (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg 1980).
As described in chapter 3, it is in the north of Argentina where the expansion of
the agricultural frontier of GM soy has brought the harshest social and ecological
consequences. It is here also where we find record poverty levels, highest rural
populations, mostly indigenous, and the historically marginalized (see Domínguez 2009;
Lapegna 2011). This reality stands in striking contrast with the GM soy boom: It is
August 2011 and I'm interviewing the CEO of a local agro-export company in a rural
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Examples of environmental "goods" are: clean air, drinking water, access to green
spaces, living wages, proper housing, etc. Environmental "bads" are thus the opposite of
environmental goods, such as pollution, living close to toxic facilities, etc. This is thus a
broad consideration of the "environment," that goes beyond Nature (i.e., as a protected
National Park) to include all social living situations.
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town in Chaco, another town that has been "blessed" by the soy boom. The town's
transformation, all due to the soy bounty, is, in his own words, la Fiesta del Chaco,
"Chaco's Party".120 With soy, abundance has finally arrived to town. And for him, it
certainly has. Surrounding this office where we converse stand silos storing several
hundred thousand dollars in crops and a trucking fleet. Yet only ten blocks away it isn't a
party anymore. The poorest of the poor live here. In this town, a third of the population
lives on welfare.121 When I'm visiting, it's wintertime and it's 60°F (in summertime
temperatures typically rise to 130°F). This place is hot, dry, and arid. Poverty and
inequality strike my eyes:
This is a very, very sad party. Poverty is absolute. It's not like a slum, where
everyone is crowded; there's room here, open space. (...) People's homes, el
ranchito, stand alone in the middle of the plot, the plot is of trodden earth. No
grass. Grass is for the rich who can water and tend to it. Houses are tiny and they
fit families of 12 or 15. Many (most of them) are one-room houses, a box of
exposed brick, or stick and mud, and a tin or thatch roof, not larger than 3 by 3
[meters, 10 by 10 feet], with a wooden door and a tiny window; a really tiny
window on the side facing the front, a wooden aperture with no glass on it,
sometimes covered with cardboard, tin, or plastic (so sadly ironic, most times this
is waste material, formerly ad signs or packaging of ag products so that the
windows read Coca-Cola, or Roundup). There are also lying around the empty
jerrycans of agrochemicals that I was told were used to carry water. The bathroom
is a latrine and stands outside of the house, a few meters away, where only one
standing person fits. The "kitchen" is also outside, a fireplace or a mud oven, and
a table under the shade of a tree. Fills out the arid picture, the people sitting
outside, the kids playing, many barefoot, chickens, and scrawny dogs. (Fieldnotes,
Chaco, 8/1/11)
As I have described in chapter 3, rural populations are the ones most directly
affected by the negative consequences of GM soy expansion, either because they are
being displaced, losing their land, their job and their income source, or because they are
120

Interview, Chaco, August 2011.
Interview with local chief (jefe) of the Ministry of Social Development, Ministerio de
Acción Social, Chaco, August 2011.
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being sprayed with agrochemicals. Other neighbors living in cities' peripheries bordering
soy farms also suffer from pesticide spraying and have also organized. From these rural
and periurban populations, two types of anti-GM soy social movements have emerged:
(1) Anti-GM/neoliberalism: The movements of campesino and indigenous peoples,
mostly in the north of the country, who contest GM as part of a broader struggle against
neoliberal globalization; and (2) Anti-spraying: citizen assemblies, mostly in the Pampas
region, in defense of health and life, after the illnesses that have spread due to
agrochemical spraying. These are the main movements against GM soy in Argentina
nowadays. This chapter discusses these two types of movements, their main
characteristics briefly summarized in Table 2.122
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A short note: The campesino, indigenous, and mixed populations in the north of the
country are the ones most violently affected by GM soy expansion. While resistance has
emerged, it has to be emphasized that not all indigenous peoples are rebellious. In an
interview with members of a community of Mocovíes in Chaco, I was surprised and
saddened by their seeming resignation to their state of poverty, in a perpetual wait for the
government to help them out (Interview, Chaco, August 2011). In most of these towns
indigenous people live like outcasts, and town inhabitants look down upon them, calling
them indios vagos, "lazy indians who don't want to work and prefer to live out of
welfare." While other factors are important (which I cannot address in here as they do not
directly relate to my argument, i.e., a history of the colonization of the indigenous
populations in Argentina), it is important to note, once again, the role of social subsidies
and patronage on poor people's demobilization in the north of the country (see chapter 3,
Lapegna 2011).
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Table 2. Anti-GM Soy Social Movements in Argentina, Major Dimensions of
Variation

Anti-GM/neoliberalism
Main actors

Peasants and indigenous

Site of struggle North
(Ecoregion)

Anti-spraying
"Citizens," "Neighbors": Urban,
periurban, and rural inhabitants
not living off rural production
Pampas (some in the North, in
Chaco in particular)

Main
grievance

Forced and violent evictions. GM Health effects of agro-chemical
as part of a wider struggle against spraying
neoliberalism.

Main goal

That peasant families stay in their "Stop the spraying": Regulate
land. Control over land and the
agrochemical spraying
territory.

Scope

Local, with transnational
connections (Vía Campesina)

Local, with some regional and
national alliances

Mechanisms
of power to
suppress
dissent

Overt violence, including
murdering of leaders

(1) Making the powerless
accountable; (2) Covert and
overt (violent) threats and
extortion; (3) Co-optation; and
(4) Outright (institutionalized)
denial

5.2

COSTS & GRIEVANCES OF THE TECHNOLOGY #1: THE

NEOLIBERAL MODEL
Most of the campesino and indigenous families in Argentina live in the northwest
of the country, in the provinces of Chaco, Santiago del Estero, and Formosa (Domínguez
2009). Many of these families have organized to claim their right to the land, a claim that
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has grown louder and stronger with the expansion of GM soy into their territory
(Domínguez 2009). In their own words:
We live this, the encroachment of the frontier of the agribusiness, of soy, of GM
crops... [It is] a constant threat (una amenaza permanente) to the territories, to the
lands of campesino-indigenous communities, environmental pollution from the
products of the technological package that come with transgenic crops, the threat
to biodiversity, the loss of our seeds, the criminalization of our struggles to defend
the territory. (Interview with members of MOCASE-VC, the campesino
movement of Santiago del Estero, Santiago del Estero, August 2011.)
The demands of campesino and indigenous families against GM are inscribed
within a broader claim to their land and territory. It is a struggle for the control of natural
resources that takes place within the context of neoliberal globalization (Domínguez
2009; Giarracca 2007). The struggle for land goes along the emergence of the campesinoindigenous identity and the organization as a campesino-indigenous movement
(Domínguez 2009; Teubal 2009).
The Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero (MOCASE), the peasant
movement of Santiago del Estero, is the most important and exemplary peasant
movement in Argentina (Barbetta 2005; Domínguez 2009). Peasant organization in
Santiago del Estero starts in the late 1970s, in order to defend from forced evictions by
agribusinesses, the first implementations of neoliberal policies in Argentina (see Barbetta
2005). In this context, the struggle for land ownership is at the core of MOCASE's
struggle, a claim protected under the Ley veinteañal, a law that concedes property rights
to anyone that has lived and worked on a territory for 20 years or more (Barbetta
2005:424). In the 1990s, in the midst of Argentina's neoliberal restructuring, the peasant
movement in Santiago del Estero organizes as MOCASE. In 2003, the movement splits
into MOCASE/PSA, a faction closer to the government, and MOCASE-VC, allied with
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the transnational peasant movement Vía Campesina (Barbetta 2005; Domínguez 2009).
MOCASE-VC is now comprised of over 9,000 campesino and indigenous families in
Santiago del Estero. I met and interviewed some of their members at their headquarters in
the town of Quimilí, in Santiago del Estero, in August 2011.

La Lucha por la Tierra: The Struggle over Land
The main conflict that arises for indigenous and peasant populations in the north
is the expansion of the frontier of GM soy into their territories. As described in chapter 3,
the expansion of the frontier means desmontes, deforestation (the forest as home of
biodiversity, their means of living, the forest as a commons, and as part of their identity
and culture) as well as forced, violent, evictions. In the interview, MOCASE-VC
members told me about forced evictions: bulldozers bringing down homes, paramilitarylike forces threatening and even murdering compañeros; Cristian Ferreyra among
them.123 Therefore, their main goal is: Que las familias se queden en su tierra, "that
families stay in their land."
It is, overall, a struggle over land. A struggle that is framed as part of a wider
struggle, against the "extractivist model" of globalized capitalism. The struggle against
GM is not a specific goal, but part of the struggle, as they consider GM biotechnology as
"the tip of the iceberg," the mere "gear of an economic model."124 As such, they also
denounce and contest other aspects of this economic model based on natural resource
extraction besides agribusinesses incursions, such as mining. The struggle over natural
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"Asesinan a Cristian Ferreyra, miembro del Mocase Vía Campesina," Blog
MOCASE-VC; http://mocase-vc.blogspot.com/2011/11/asesinan-cristian-ferreyramiembro-del.html
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Interview MOCASE-VC, op. cit.
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resources is inscribed within the claim of their right to identity, dignity, and sovereignty:
Nos arrebatan la tierra y la identidad, "They take from us our land and our identity."125
In consequence, their actions commit to a different agrarian model than the one
proposed/imposed by agribusinesses: Agrarian practices based on culture and traditions,
agroecological methods that employ semillas criollas, non-GM native seeds, and the
pursue of several projects that create and promote a radically different way of production
and relationship between people and the environment: family agriculture (with an
emphasis on families staying in their land) and a network of goods' manufacturing and
commercialization organized as micro-emprendimientos comunitarios, community
micro-enterprises, owned and run by MOCASE-VC members, which include a factory of
regional products made of peasant production (jams, honey, dulce de leche, cheese, wool,
etc.), fair trade alternative distribution networks, and a focus on education: a radio and an
agroecology school, and a campesino university in the making.126

5.3

COSTS & GRIEVANCES OF THE TECHNOLOGY #2: GLYPHOSATE
The most widely used agrochemical in Argentina and around the world is the

herbicide glyphosate, used in conjunction with glyphosate-resistant GM soy (GRR,
Grupo de Reflexión Rural 2009:11). Monsanto developed glyphosate in the 1970s and
then commercialized it under the 'Roundup' trademark.127 Glyphosate is a broad-spectrum
herbicide used in conjunction with GM RR seeds and no-tillage machinery (the
'technological package'), preferred by farmers due to its simplicity in use (as it replaces a
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Interview MOCASE-VC, op. cit.
Op. cit.
127
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glyphosate
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gamut of agrochemicals) and its cheaper price.128 As shown in the figure below (Fig. 3),
the increase in the use of glyphosate has gone hand in hand with the expansion of notillage practices, an increase considered by GM supporters as "environmentally friendly"
as it has implied a reduction in more toxic herbicides, like atrazine (Trigo 2011:37).
Critics, however, claim that glyphosate poses a serious threat to public health and the
environment (see chapters 2 & 3). As described in chapter 3, despite an initial reduction
on the number of agrochemicals used, over time, due to an increase in the area under
production and the emergence of glyphosate-resistant weeds growing under
monocultures, the amount of glyphosate sprayed has massively increased (see Fig. 3). In
2010, close to 180 million liters (over 47.5 million gallons) of glyphosate were sprayed
over 22 million hectares of GM crops in Argentina (Trigo 2011: 35, 4; see Fig. 3).
Moreover, critics point out that glyphosate is used alongside other more toxic
agrochemicals, such as 2,4-D (a fungicide) and endosulfan (an insecticide) (GRR
2009:12).
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Interview with member of Colegio Agroquímicos de Córdoba. August 2011.
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In Argentina, glyphosate is classified under Class IV toxicity, where in a scale of I
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threat, Producto que normalmente no ofrece peligro, as the Roundup label for the

89'
Argentine market indicates.130 Label warnings also include a color stripe for product
safety handling and use, in a color code where red (Class I) means highly toxic and
requires extreme precaution (including a death warning represented by a skull and
crossbones sign), going through yellow, blue, and green as warning levels and toxicity
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"Acerca del glifosato." Monsanto. http://www.monsanto.com/global/ar/noticias-yopiniones/pages/acerca-del-glifosato.aspx.
130
Label for Roundup commercialized in Argentina (approved by SENASA)
http://www.monsanto.com/global/ar/productos/documents/roundup.pdf
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decrease. 131 For Roundup sold in Argentina, the label shows a green stripe with the word
CUIDADO, CAUTION, the minimum caution measures required for handling and use.132
According to SENASA, the National Service of Sanitation and Food Quality in charge
for agrochemical control use and regulation, Roundup glyphosate, if used as suggested –
i.e., under phytosanitary guidelines and the expert agronomist advice–, poses no threat to
living beings or the environment. As stated in the label approved by SENASA,133
Roundup is rapidly inactivated in contact with the ground and has no residual effect;
therefore, it implies low environmental risk: Roundup "does not accumulate in animal
tissue," it is "practically not toxic to birds," "virtually nontoxic to bees," "moderately
toxic to fish and aquatic organisms," "leaves no residue" in the soil, "pollution of water
streams is unlikely," etc.134
Much to the contrary, experts and lay people alike, in Argentina and around the
world, challenge Roundup's 'low toxicity' classification (Antoniou et al. 2011; Antoniou,
Robinson, and Fagan 2012; Arancibia 2013; Small Planet Institute 2012). Challenges
arise on several grounds, most significantly on the politics of regulation and of scientific
expertise. Critics ask, among other questions, how did Roundup get approved in the first
place? On what basis? Which scientific studies were taken into consideration and which
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CIAFA, Manual Fitosanitario (Phytosanitary Manual).
http://www.manualfitosanitario.com/informacion-lectura-marbete.php
132
Label for Roundup commercialized in Argentina. Op. cit.
133
Op. cit. My translation.
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As such, Roundup appears to be less harmful to people and the environment than
bleach or any other common household chemicals. Early on, soy supporters spoke about
glyphosate as totally harmless, up to the point of saying, "it's like water" or "I would give
it to drink to my own children." This early stage, of total denial of the negative effects of
glyphosate, while it is not totally over yet, it has given way to a new position of the prosoy people, that of the buenas prácticas, best practices (i.e., so that glyphosate is
harmless if used accordingly to procedure). I explain this further later on.
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ones were ignored? Which studies were funded for research and which ones were not? As
discussed in chapter 2, these questions go straight to the question of power and the social
basis of technological change.
In Argentina, SENASA is the national entity in charge of regulating agrochemical
use.135 SENASA first approved glyphosate in 1977, revalidating approval consecutively
in 1992 and 2011 (Arancibia 2013:5). The latest SENASA's agrochemical/phytosanitary
regulation was passed in June 2012, the Resolution 302/2012, which is based on World
Health Organization (WHO) and EPA standards (Pina 2012:17). Roundup glyphosate has
been certified and approved by SENASA as a "product that normally poses no threat"
also following WHO, EPA, and FAO standards.136 The key issue here is that SENASA
did not run its own studies on safety and impact of glyphosate use but rather based its
decision on what these other organizations have previously decided (Arancibia 2013).
This is a particularly questionable as WHO and EPA standards for Roundup are already
highly contested: Critics uphold scientific evidence that shows links between illnesses
and glyphosate spraying and claim that these studies have been systematically ignored
and denied by regulators137 (Antoniou et al. 2011; Arancibia 2013). The studies run by
the research teams of Séralini in France (Séralini et al. 2012) and Carrasco's in Argentina
(Paganelli et al. 2010) are among the most widely cited by critics (Antoniou et al. 2011;
Antoniou, Robinson, and Fagan 2012; Arancibia 2013; Small Planet Institute 2012).
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Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria. Its parallel institution in the
US is the FDA but, for agrochemical regulation, it is the EPA.
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"Acerca del glifosato." Monsanto. http://www.monsanto.com/global/ar/noticias-yopiniones/pages/acerca-del-glifosato.aspx.
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Among other reasons, because of lobbying pressures. (see also Kloppenburg 2005).
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Why does SENASA then choose to follow international standards and avoid
questioning glyphosate toxicity? To answer this question it is necessary to recall the
connection between glyphosate and GM soy, and in consequence and most important, the
workings of power behind GM soy expansion. Glyphosate is part and parcel of the
technological package of GM soy; therefore, support and promotion of GM
biotechnology and of glyphosate by the corporate-state power alliance go hand by hand.
The passing of regulation that approves Roundup as non-toxic allows for the
indiscriminate use of glyphosate (and the expansion of GM monocultures) while at the
same time builds in the all-benefits narrative of GM biotechnology that creates consensus
and quiescence (see chapter 4), as allegedly glyphosate in conjunction with no-tillage
creates a "virtuous cycle" and "environmental sustainability" (see Trigo 2011 above).
Moreover, it is important to highlight the significance of the agrochemical market for the
corporate sector: glyphosate and other agrochemicals is a highly lucrative business. In
2012, the agrochemical market in Argentina rose to $2.4 billion US dollars.138 Herbicides
represented the largest share of the market (64%) with glyphosate scoring the highest
sales, US$593 million (accounting for 61% of herbicide market and 39% of the total
agrochemical market). Monsanto, with Roundup, holds the largest share of the glyphosate
market in Argentina.139 This is most important as Monsanto does not have patent rights to
seeds in Argentina and thus does not profit directly from seed sales (see chapter 4).
Glyphosate came under close public scrutiny in the midst of the Conflicto del
Campo, the conflict over export taxes between soy producers and the government
138

All data on agrochemicals in this paragraph, from Cámara de Sanidad Agropecuaria y
Fertilizantes (CASAFE). Informe Mercado Argentino de Productos Fitosanitarios 2012.
Available at http://www.casafe.org/estadisticas_links.php; Accessed May 23, 2013.
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"Los cables utilizados," Página/12, March 9, 2011.
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described in chapter 4. Until then, the struggles of fumigated peoples remained mostly
unheard by national media coverage.140 In the momentary break of the pro-soy corporatestate alliance, the negative consequences of soy-monoculture expansion broke in the
media by the hand of glyphosate spraying. In January 2009, Página/12, the most popular
newspaper after the corporate-controlled Clarín and La Nación, started a series of highpitched articles focused on the ill effects of glyphosate, opening with a full frame front
page color picture showing an airplane spraying a farm, entitled, in huge captions,
"POISON."141 As a follow up, a few months later Página/12 published breakthrough
findings on glyphosate effects by a team of Argentine scientists at the Molecular
Embriology Lab at the University of Buenos Aires, led by Dr. Andrés Carrasco (Aranda
2009). This study, the first of its kind at local level, refuted Roundup's alleged low
toxicity as it found that glyphosate is toxic on embryos –even at lower doses than used in
agriculture–, producing malformations and neural, intestinal, and heart disorders
(Paganelli et al. 2010)
It is important to note that Página/12 is the pro-government newspaper, and so in
the midst of the campo-gobierno conflict over export taxes this sudden appearance in the
media of soy as a public problem can be seen, as Arancibia (2013) argues, as a threat to
soy producers. It certainly was, and the government strategy did not go unnoticed: it
fueled strong reaction by powerful groups, most significantly Monsanto and its ally, the
government of the United States. A USDA report leaked by Wikileaks warns of
140

As discussed in chapter 4, showing the use of discursive power to create consent by
suppressing public participation that could create dissent.
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The full title was La Mancha Venenosa, literally "The Poisonous Stain;" here also a
word play with a kids' game where the goal is to run away from the one that is the
mancha, who has to spread (spray) out his "poison" to the other kids. Thus, the one that
gets touched loses the game. Front Page, Página/12, January 12, 2009.
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Página/12, "the pro-government press (...) waging a campaign against the use of
glyphosate (...) which appears to be driven more by local politics than health
concerns."142 The USDA claims that Carrasco's findings are "unverified" and that in
general the "alleged study does not have scientific credibility;" and so proceeded, through
the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, to provide SENASA "information on studies
conducted on glyphosate."143 SENASA did not request these studies, run by Monsanto,
which are undoubtedly aimed at proving Carrasco wrong and endorsing Roundup's low
toxicity. The USDA main goal, nakedly exposed by this wikileak, is to protect Monsanto
and its "Moneymaking" Roundup from the Argentine government attacks. Thus exposing
as well corporate lobbying as a mechanism of power (see chapter 4).
Regulation over glyphosate spraying is highly contested and nowadays the most
visible and successful aspect of GM soy contestation in Argentina. The first ones to
organize against glyphosate spraying were a group of mothers living in the outskirts of
the capital city of Córdoba, in the neighborhood Ituzaingó Anexo. Their struggle is what I
turn to next.

The Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó Anexo, Córdoba
In our case, human rights have been violated so what we are demanding is for our
right to health, to life, and to a healthy environment, which is, if you think about
it, a right everyone should have, but we don't have it right now. The right to life is
untransferable, thus violating this right, which is a human right, harms all (hace
mal a todo); they have trampled on what's most sacred to people (han pisoteado
lo más sagrado de una persona). They've sprayed us from airplanes, they didn't
care about people, no one cared to say: Don't [spray there], there's a neighborhood
nearby... No, if people didn't come out, if we didn't come out to fight, they would
be still doing the same. They stopped because we fought. We organized first
142
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"Los cables utilizados." Op. cit.
Op. cit.
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because we had to defend from something that was harming us (defendernos de
algo que nos estaba dañando).
Mother of Barrio Ituzaingó, qtd. in Carrizo and Berger (2009:13), my translation.

The Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó Anexo were the first ones to denounce, protest,
and organize around glyphosate spraying in Argentina.144 Ituzaingó Anexo is a workingclass neighborhood in the industrial outskirts of the capital city of Córdoba, a
neighborhood surrounded by soy farms. The struggle of the Mothers starts in late 2001,
with noticing that many in their neighborhood were sick and dying. Then, in a
neighborhood of 5,000, the Mothers surveyed over 200 cases of cancer, as well as other
respiratory and skin diseases, miscarriages, and malformation in newborns (Carrizo and
Berger 2009; Carrizo and Berger 2012). Among the sick and dying, or rather in
particular, were their own children and family members. Sofía Gatica, one of the
founding members of the Mothers, lost her baby daughter in 2002 after a kidney failure.
Determined to find out "what killed her children," Gatica with other 16 working-class
mothers with no organizing experience founded the Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó, and
started the long road to prove the links between agrochemical spraying and the poisoning
of their community.145
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Interview with Cecilia Carrizo and Mauricio Berger, researchers at the Universidad
Nacional de Córdoba. Córdoba, August 2011.
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http://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/sofia-gatica. For her activism with the Mothers
of Barrio Ituzaingó, Sofía Gatica was later awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize,
the World's Largest Prize Honoring Grassroots Environmentalists (in Sept. 2012). This
story did not have much repercussion in mainstream Argentine media.
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The firsts steps the Mothers took were to talk to other neighbors,146 to find out if
others were going through the same and to raise awareness. Denouncing is the first step
they take: to denounce the spraying with agrochemicals over their neighborhood, the
spraying with agrotóxicos, agrotoxics, as they start to name them. Their repertoire/means
of protests includes blockading routes (piquetes) and rallies/marches downtown, bringing
their sick children with them to show everyone the very real negative effects of
agrochemical spraying on health, and meeting with other neighbors from communities
similarly affected, like from Monte Cristo and Colonia Caroya (also in the Córdoba
province). The Mothers also meet with members of the city council and the mayor, and
demand enforcement of local ordinances and regulations on agrochemical spraying. With
these actions, the Mothers' demands start to be heard and the issue starts to become
visible.147
At the same time, and core of their struggle, lied the hard task of showing the
links between the diseases and agrochemicals. The first lab results came out in 2002,
showing evidence of endosulfan in the water supply.148 The Mothers also start surveying
the neighborhood and mapping the sick, the map showing an unusually high number of
pathologies –such as anemia, lymphoma, leukemia, and cancer– clustered in only a few
blocks. This becomes el mapa de la muerte, "the map of death" (Berger and Ortega
2010:133). In response to the Mothers' claims, the provincial Ministry of Health sends
out a commission to carry out an epidemiological survey, which confirms the Mothers'
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But not with the neighbors that are rural employees, explains Berger (in interview,
op.cit.)
147
Interview with Carrizo and Berger, op.cit.
148
Besides agrochemical spraying, these studies also found pollutants resulting from
industrial waste (automobile plants) and PCB from the local electric power plant (Carrizo
and Berger 2009).
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findings. Yet, despite these results and of further testing commissioned by the Ministry of
Health of the Córdoba Province, which also prove the existence of agrochemical residues
in soil, water, and air, the Ministry's report from 2004 concludes that the amount of
pollutants are within normal levels (Berger and Ortega 2010, Carrizo and Berger 2009).
Hence, despite their findings, the authorities denied the existence of a relationship
between illnesses and agrochemical sprayings. Moreover, since the beginning, they put
the Mothers to show that agrochemicals conclusively damage health, placing the burden
of proof on them, on the powerless. Cecilia Carrizo and Mauricio Berger, researchers at
the National University of Córdoba, identify this early first stage of the Mothers' struggle
as "negatory", of total denial.149 Authorities halted all discussions based on the
demonstration of causality: Can studies conclusively and ultimately demonstrate a causal
relationship between cancer and glyphosate? From the start, the answer is no, as cancer
(or any human illness) is caused by multiple factors that cannot be controlled as in a lab
experiment.150 The question is why are the powerless forced to prove what harms them,
compared to the powerful having to prove their activities are utterly harmless? (see
Brown and Mikkelsen 1990; McCormick 2009). Carrizo and Berger conclude that while
this first stage of authorities' denial of the links between agrochemicals and illnesses is
not totally overcome yet, since Carrasco's findings were published in Página/12 (which
opened up media discussion and made the problem visible), there has been a shift in the
authorities' discourse, which is now based on the notion of "best practices," i.e.,
glyphosate is harmless if used according to specified procedure. This slight change in the
149

Interview with Carrizo and Berger, op. cit.
What has to be questioned therefore is not the "failure" of lab experiments but rather
the inability of labs to reproduce human living conditions (and thus the notion that
causality can be demonstrated with lab studies).
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hegemonic discourse is also the result of the Mothers' struggles and efforts to build what
Arancibia (2013:7) identifies as a "popular epidemiology," or "counter-hegemonic
epidemiological data" (see Brown and Mikkelsen 1990), which, in Arancibia's terms
(2013:7), "turned to be an innovative and powerful contentious performance" (Tilly
2008).
The struggles of the Mothers of Ituzaingó Anexo Neighborhood paved the
way for other fumigated/sprayed neighbors to organize in defense of health and life. The
campaign Stop the Spraying is born from these demands.

Paren de Fumigar, Stop Spraying
In 2006, in solidarity with the struggle of the Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó, a
Buenos Aires-based group of academics and activists named Grupo de Reflexión Rural
(GRR) organizes a campaign against agrochemical spraying151 (GRR, Grupo de
Reflexión Rural 2009). This campaign is known as Paren de Fumigar, Stop Spraying,
and it is summarized in the report Pueblos Fumigados, Sprayed Peoples/Towns,
published in 2009, which gathers the experiences and demands brought forward by
affected neighbors from the largest soy provinces in the Pampas region, Córdoba, Santa
Fe, and Buenos Aires (GRR 2009). With this campaign, GRR helped to organize and
make visible what neighbors have been suffering since early on (the introduction of GM)
but were scattered in their demand. GRR's campaign helped to survey the fumigated
towns and organize them under one umbrella, coordinating efforts and resources, and
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The campaign is coordinated by the Mothers of Ituzaingó Anexo in the Córdoba
province, by GRR in Buenos Aires, and by CeProNat (Centro de Protección a la
Naturaleza) in the province of Santa Fe.
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then helping to visibilize how large and spread out the problem was (and later on, to
spread the issue –as a social problem– to other towns).152 In 2008 there was a meeting, an
Encuentro, in Colonia Caroya, Córdoba, another sprayed soy town, which members of
Paren Córdoba identify as a key moment in the struggle, when the GRR-coordinated
campaign turned into a collective of different chapters, which, in each of the three
provinces takes a slightly different characteristics (including, in Santa Fe, a slight change
of name: Paren de Fumigarnos, Stop Spraying Us). While there are exchanges between
groups and assemblies (by email, list-serves, regular meetings) until now there is no
national network in place. There are, however, alliances with other groups organizing
around socio-environmental struggles under the Union of Citizen Assemblies (UAC)
umbrella.153
People organizing in Sprayed Towns are all over the country where soy fields
abound (however, not every soy town has seen contestation emerge, most have been
quiescent). Besides the Mothers in Córdoba's capital city, there are neighbors organizing
against glyphosate spraying in several rural towns in the provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe,
Entre Ríos, and Buenos Aires (GRR 2009). In the northeast of the country, protest has
been strong in the province of Chaco, in particular in the towns of La Leonesa and Las
Palmas, where a group of neighbors have organized to protest against glyphosate
spraying used in the adjacent rice fields.154
In contrast to peasant and campesino movements, members of Paren are not rural
workers or farmers, and even though many are rural inhabitants and live by a farm, they
152

Interview members Paren de Fumigar Córdoba; Córdoba, August 2011.
Op. cit.
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Interview with members of neighbors' environmental assembly in La Leonesa, Chaco,
August 2011.
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typically do not profit directly from rural production. In my interviews, I met teachers,
students, lawyers, medical doctors, housewives, and service-sector employees. They selfidentify as vecinos, plain neighbors, who are auto-convocados, self-organized in defense
of health and life, a strong statement aimed to distinguish themselves from political
parties or affiliations and to come out as unconcerned about any other interest but the
defense of their children's health.

La Lucha por la Salud y la Vida: The Struggle over Health and Life
Discussion at Paren assemblies is typically limited to agrochemical use and
spraying. Spraying is highly problematic, as farms stand usually right across the street
from where the town ends. Thus it happens often that producers fumigate within town
limits.155 It is truly striking to visit rural towns and to see people having a soy farm as
their backyard, but it happens often.156 Despite Roundup advocates' claims, spraying is
highly volatile and difficult to control, in particular when sprayed from airplanes.
Chemical clouds thus spread over the town when the wind blows towards the village.
Besides spraying, neighbors also point at agrochemical pollution that results from storing
(fumigated) grain in silos built inside town (the silos need to be ventilated to maintain dry
grain, thus when fans are on, chemical fumes arise) and of mosquitos, the machines used
for terrestrial fumigations, which contractors park inside town, leaking their poison into
town.
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Interview with members Paren Córdoba, Asamblea La Leonesa, rural inhabitants in
general (even those that do not identify fumigations as a real problem).
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As I described in the last chapter, it was even more striking to see how many newly
rich soy producers built fancy chalets by the soy farm, showing how little awareness
there is over glyphosate spraying.
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In their struggle to defend health and life, the main demand neighbor assemblies
have is to regulate agrochemical use. They thus look for ordinances and laws that could
protect them, regulating agrochemical use within town limits. The right to a healthy
environment is protected by the Constitution (article 41) and thus the basis of most
claims. There are also in place scattered municipal ordinances and provincial laws that
regulate the distance of fumigations (i.e. establishing how far from town fumigations can
begin, generally 500 meters for terrestrial spraying and 1500 meters –a bit less than a
mile–for aerial fumigations) and the requirement to keep a row of vegetation surrounding
the farm that works as a "curtain" for spraying. However, until now there is no law in
place that regulates agrochemical fumigations at the national level. Many of these
ordinances were already in place when the Mothers of Ituzaingó began their struggle.157
The main problem then, and now, is related to the enforcement of existing laws. This is
due to two important problems: One, to the inability of the competent authorities to fulfill
their duty, which is sometimes related to scarcity of resources (money to pay wages,
knowledgeable people); and two, to the unwillingness of producers to comply with the
law (which of course they can afford to do because they are not sanctioned in any way,
which hints at the complicity of the local institution in charge of law compliance).158
Specific events of fumigations that did not comply with the law were used by the
Mothers of Ituzaingó and Fumigated Neighbors as cases for the first trials against soy
farmers and fumigation contractors: In December 2009, the Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó
Anexo, in March 2010, in San Jorge (Santa Fe), and in June same year, in La Leonesa
and Las Palmas (Chaco), Sprayed Peoples won their case –banning agrochemical
157
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spraying within a distance and establishing criminal charges to offenders–, and thus
becoming icons of the struggle.159
It is important to emphasize that while limited in their demands, especially
compared to the radical claims of campesino and indigenous people, there is a strategy
behind them. In interviews, Paren members acknowledge to be highly aware that soy
producers are part of their community; and so, as one of them told me, "you can't just go
out saying, "Hey, you're killing me!" These are your neighbors!" This would generate a
level of conflict that a small rural town may not tolerate (particularly when the goal is not
a radical transformation but a negotiation of boundaries among neighbors).160 Moreover,
and also very important, they are highly aware that soy production has been a panacea for
the village. As another Paren member told me, "the neighbors see el campo as progress,
everyone is so confortable with soy production, they don't see anything wrong there. On
the contrary." How to make the problem visible is thus a hard task for activists, in
particular in towns that depend solely on agricultural production. According to Paren
members, the task is easier in places when there is another type of industry or production
in place, such as in Buenos Aires where there are factories, or in towns that live off
tourism, thus confirming other scholars' findings on how dependence on a single local
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While these trials' ruling/decision establish only local regulations (nothing at
provincial or national level), they have been an important and successful step in the
struggle as they set a precedent in subsequent similar cases (see Arancibia 2013).
160
Differences arise, however, when soy producers do not live in town. Thus, for
example, one Paren member told me of an event in a neighboring town, where the
producer escorted the contractor in charge of fumigations with paid guards/private
security, and in consequence asserted, "they (producers) could never do that in our town,
they live here." It seems as if the further the distance soy producers are from the farm,
the harshest the violence they are capable to employ to suppress mobilization. (In
Santiago del Estero they send paramilitary forces).
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industry is a deterrent/factor non conducive to mobilization (Crenson 1971; Gaventa
1980; Gould 1993; Gould 1991).

Power-Launched Counter-Offensive
Anti-fumigation struggles have been highly successful, in particular considering
that they are facing very powerful opponents. The main outcomes of these struggles have
been the building of epidemiological data that shows the links between illnesses and
fumigations, the passing of regulation that bans fumigations within town limits (for some
towns), and the creation of a national advocacy network of lay people and experts (see
Arancibia 2013). Their main success has been to make glyphosate visible, to make
agrochemical spraying a social problem. So that now, as I went out interviewing soy
producers, questions over glyphosate and fumigation inevitably brought up a tense
moment in the interview. On a broader level it brought up the discourse of 'best practices'
in the aim to modify the hegemonic discourse on the benefits of GM biotechnology.
That said, despite these successes, fumigations continue and people continue to be
sprayed with glyphosate, 2,4-D, atrazine, endosulfan, and other poisonous agrochemicals.
As praiseworthy and urgent their call is, the call to protect health and life, these groups
are not getting the voicing they deserve. This is because this is a highly unequal power
struggle. The powerful have not remained passive to anti-fumigation struggles, but rather
have used all means and strategies possible to silence them. I have identified the
following mechanisms of power to suppress dissent: (1) making the powerless
accountable; (2) covert and overt (violent) threats and extortion; (3) co-optation; and (4)
outright (institutionalized) denial.
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First, a very effective way to suppress contestation is to make the powerless
accountable: they are housewives and teachers, with sick children, the ones that have
been forced to show the links between the illnesses and fumigations (compared to
requesting that multinational corporations fully test the socio-environmental
consequences of the new technology). In their struggle, lay people had been forced to
become experts on the topic, having to learn, on their own, everything about
agrochemicals, PCB, dioxins, testing on embryos, and other chemical, biological, and
health aspects of fumigations, as well as on its legal aspects, about ordinances, laws, and
due process. This long learning process had to take place while waiting in town halls and
ministries for public employees to listen to their demands, rallying and spreading the
word in the community, while at the same time working and supporting the family,
financially and emotionally, even though some family members are sick or dead. These
intellectual, emotional, and physical demands are a heavy strain that bring many down
(see Brown and Mikkelsen 1990; Levine 1982).
Activists also claim to have undergone all kinds of threats, directed to them and to
their family members. The Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó claim that early in their struggle
they were dismissed as locas, as crazy, irrational women. This same strategy was used to
silence the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo (see Navarro 2001), and it is a common strategy of
power to silence women in cases of environmental health conflicts, as they are usually
the ones who start and lead these movements (see Krauss 1993; Levine 1982). The
Mothers have also been threatened and intimidated (Carrizo and Berger 2012). In La
Leonesa, Chaco, neighbor-activists also told me they have been threatened, i.e., with
losing their job, as well as their children being insulted in school. They also reported that
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some assembly meetings have been violently disrupted, and recall in particular the visit
of scientist Dr. Andrés Carrasco, in August 2010, whom they had invited to share with
the community his findings on the health effects of Roundup. Right before the meeting,
Carrasco and his colleagues were violently attacked by a group of people identified as
public (town hall) employees and employees from the rice firm.161 This violent attack
made it to the national media thanks to a video uploaded in YouTube and stories run in
the newspaper Página/12.162
Other means to silence aggrieved peoples have been trying to co-opt them, a
strategy widely used by the State. The Mothers claim to have been offered positions in
office (puestos políticos) to silence them.163 Most important and most widespread has
been the strategic allocation of Planes, the cash-transfer social subsidies, to create
quiescence, either by the promise of handing out or by threats of withdrawing, both of
which show the strategic use of subsidies by local politicians, as by rule welfare is based
on need and status (i.e., unemployment) and thus should not be earned or lost based on
the whim of local politicians. They are, however; and networks of patronage and
clientelism have been identified as the cause for demobilization and quiescence among
the poorest in the north of the country (Lapegna 2011).
Last but not least among the mechanisms of power to suffocate contestation has
been the putting out of a massive, widespread, denial campaign by the State and its
institutions (some times in alliance with corporations, but these weren't supposed to
protect citizens in the first place). CONICET, the National Scientific Research Council,
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Interview with members of neighbors' environmental assembly in La Leonesa, Chaco,
August 2011.
162
Aranda, Darío, "Censura y Presiones," Página/12, August 17, 2010
163
Interview Carrizo and Berger, Op. cit.
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at the time that Dr. Andrés Carrasco presented his study on glyphosate, came out publicly
to disqualify him and his findings, and he was close to being fired from his post
(Arancibia 2013; Aranda 2010; Verbitsky 2009). INTA, the National Institute of
Agrarian Technology, another state-funded institution, is one of the main promoters of
GM biotechnology and glyphosate (see chapter 4). As described above, SENASA, the
National Service of Sanitation and Food Quality in charge of agrochemical regulation,
classifies glyphosate as of lowest toxicity, without further proof and allegedly pressured
by Monsanto. Moreover, SENASA is also in charge of controlling and enforcing
agrochemical regulation that controls fumigations, a task that, after an audit by the
Auditoría General de la Nación, the Government Accountability Office, is shown that the
entity has completely failed to achieve.164 In an interview for the international news
network Al Jazeera, the Minister of Agriculture, Norberto Yahuar summarizes the
government official attitude towards the claims of sprayed peoples: Total denial. In his
own words:
We don't place our population at risk. Argentina has some of the world's most
stringent environmental safeguards thanks to strict restrictions on fertilizers and
pesticides.165
In 2009, in the midst of the Conflicto del Campo and the Página/12 stories on
glyphosate, President Cristina Fernández proudly announced the creation of a
Commission on Agrochemicals under the supervision of the Ministry of Health
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"Agrotóxicos y un informe “lapidario”: el SENASA, entre la labor deficiente y la
anarquía legislativa", El Auditor, February 27, 2013.
http://www.elauditor.info/posts/show/5502
165
"People & Power: Argentina's Bad Seeds," Al Jazeera, March 2013.
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2013/03/201331313434142322.
html
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(Comisión Nacional de Investigación sobre Agroquímicos del Ministerio de Salud) to
investigate the links between glyphosate spraying and health. At the time widely
celebrated as a success in the Sprayed Peoples struggle, in November 2009, the
Commission strikingly concludes that there is "not enough data on the effects of
glyphosate on human health in Argentina" (qtd. Arancibia 2013: 10). In 2012, right at the
same time the Mothers of Ituzaingó celebrate winning their trial against soy producers,
Ms. Fernández announces that Monsanto has been granted permission to build one of the
largest GM corn seed factories in the world.166 It will stand in Malvinas Argentinas, a
rural town 20 miles away the capital city of Córdoba, home of the Mothers of Ituzaingó
and their struggle.
These events exemplify the mixed results of the struggle: the conflicto del campo
has opened a window of opportunity for social movements, which was successful enough
to push political power for change. However, as described chapters 3 and 4, political
power is committed to the GM soy model, so that for every win, it retaliated with
stronger force, as exemplified by the permission granted to Monsanto to build the
Malvinas Argentinas GM plant.167 In this case it is clear how the political-economic
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"Monsanto invertirá $1.500 millones", La Voz del Interior, June 16, 2012. In its
brochure, Monsanto claims that with the new factory, Planta Malvinas Argentinas along
with the one already at work in Rojas (province of Buenos Aires), Argentina will have
the two largest GM hybrid corn seed plants in the world. Brochure available at
http://www.monsanto.com/global/ar/nuestros-compromisos/documents/Planta-MalvinasArgentinas.pdf
167
In what seems the outmost dismissal of the Mothers' struggle, the president proudly
and cheerfully announced the building of the plant, flaunting Monsanto's brochure,
extolling the corporation and its plans, Monsanto being the main and most iconic target
of anti-GM struggles. This can be seen in the Ms. Kirchner's discourse that announces
Monsanto's Malvinas Argentinas plant, in "Bad Seeds", AlJazeera, Op. cit.
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structure limits the success of collective action (McAdam 1982; Pellow 2007; Tarrow
2005a).
To conclude this section, and chapter, it is important to note that this powercounter offensive against anti-fumigation movements has not been as directly violent as
that inflicted to campesino and indigenous families in the north of the country. As
mentioned earlier, peasant and indigenous members of MOCASE-VC denounce forced
evictions with bulldozers and the murdering of their leaders. Yes it is true that the
Mothers of Barrio Ituzaingó denounce that glyphosate-spraying is a genocidio encubierto,
a "genocide in disguise" (see Carrizo and Berger 2012). However, there is a tangible
difference between getting your home bulldozed and having a plane fumigating in a
nearby farm: while there is no doubt that violence is being inflicted in the first place, in
the second case, whether this is a violent act or not is open to doubt (and this doubt arose
often in my interviews, for several reasons, from denial to real unawareness of the
problem, as I further show in the next chapter). There is a temporal distance between
cause and effect, from the moment of the spraying to the agrochemicals slowly building
in the body and getting sick. Moreover, for most people being sick is understood as a
personal problem (i.e., the consequence of genetics or poor diet) and thus showing the
links between environmental pollution and disease most times requires an "expert
approval," the scientific testing of agrochemicals' negative impact on health (McCormick
2009).168 There is also a relationship between the level of violence that can be inflicted on
populations and the physical distance of the producers: i.e., the farther soy producers are
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This is why it is so important for environmental health movements to build scientific
evidence on the links between pollutants and illnesses (Brown and Mikkelsen 1990,
Levine 1982, McCormick 2009)
155

from their farms (physically), the farther they are emotionally and psychologically of the
consequences of their decisions (Gould 2010; Gould 2006). Thus, it is easy for them not
to care, or to care less, just because they do not have to live with the consequences of
their acts; compared to soy producers who live in the village and share in the everyday
life with their sprayed neighbors, and their own family members. As one Paren member
told me, "they wouldn't do this to their own children."
In a sense, the most effective way to suppress dissent and create quiescence is
straight, outright violence: the first dimension of power (Lukes 2005). However, this has
important drawbacks for political power in a democratic society, which needs hegemony
and consent to be sustained. Thus, the government can't just go out murdering people (at
least, not overtly); while at the same time, when opposition grows, it has to provide
avenues for citizens to express dissent as well as to show that it is responsive to citizens'
demands. The creation of the Commission of Agrochemicals and the allowing for the
trials to GM soy producers described above are good examples of these. A negotiation
thus can be achieved between the government and aggrieved citizens, that in practice
could satisfy all: regulate spraying with "best practices" and set up a commonly agreed
distance from town to start fumigations. In that manner, fumigated peoples can get what
they ask for while the GM soy model can remain intact (and thus not threatening the
economic interests of the corporate-state elites). Now, with campesino and indigenous
peoples, it is a whole different story. With them, there is less interest in negotiating
consent: either consent is easily achieved through patronage and clientelism (votes are
won with social subsidies) or dissent is violently suppressed. Campesino and indigenous
movements like MOCASE-VC are truly restive populations who represent a real threat to
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the agro-export model of GM soy in particular, and to the extractivist neoliberal
economic model in general. It is also important to note that, compared to these
historically relegated and oppressed campesino and indigenous peoples, the movements
of sprayed neighbors have access to resources and so they aren't as powerless. These are
white people, many educated and professionals, students, teachers, medical doctors,
lawyers, journalists, who have access to resources that help the movement grow
(McCarthy and Zald 1977).
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CHAPTER 6. LATENT GRIEVANCES

As I have shown in the last chapter, there is some limited contestation around GM
issues in Argentina. However, even if growing and important in their demands, these
movements are a minority and do not have much visibility in national media. In broader
terms, as I described in chapter 4, there is support and adoption, quiescence overall.
Nonetheless, that there are no apparent or aired grievances among the population (and
thus quiescence) does not mean that no grievances exist at and that a shared sense of
justice reigns. In this chapter I show that in the zona núcleo, the Pampas' core of GM soy,
latent –underlying, unexpressed, veiled– grievances exist, in particular around the health
hazards of agrochemical use. These latent grievances hint at a conflict of interests
between the powerful and their subjects, the potential for conflict that reveals the third
dimension of power at work (Lukes 2005).

6.1

LATENT GRIEVANCES IN THE PAMPAS: HEALTH HAZARDS OF GM

SOY PRODUCTION
Agrochemicals and glyphosate in particular were a touchy topic all across my
fieldwork. In almost every interview or informal chat I had with rural producers and
inhabitants, I noticed a tension every time the word "glyphosate" was mentioned. Those
on the promotion side of GM soy found different ways to discard and/or find a
roundabout in conversation (i.e., from saying that glyphosate is innocuous to health when
applying best agronomical practices to just plain dropping the issue out of conversation).
Many rural inhabitants not profiting directly from GM soy production were, strikingly,
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doing the same. On my side, because of my research, I was well aware of the health and
environmental hazards of agrochemical spraying. I was also well aware that glyphosate
had been recently a prominent topic in the media (see chapter 4). Why was everyone
avoiding an issue that needed urgent discussion? In the Pampas, the health hazards of
GM soy production seemed to have become the "elephant in the room," the big fat issue
that could not be missed yet no one dared to address (see Zerubavel 2006).
Data for this chapter comes from observations from a rural town located in the
north of the Buenos Aires province, in the heart of the zona núcleo of soy, in February
2012. I will call it General Artigas. This is one of the many booming rural towns in the
Argentine Pampas that have benefited from GM soy production. These are charming,
beautiful towns, most particularly when compared to the poverty and abandonment of
other rural towns. Here, the main square has been recently renovated with new tiles and
well-groomed flowerbeds. There is a new private school and the hospital is being
renovated. There are newly paved roads, people moving in, and a vibrant construction
sector. People enjoy increased revenue from the ag-related sector that spills over town
(see chapter 4). As in other Pampas' soy towns, in General Artigas soybeans have
replaced other crops and cattle and now soy is grown almost exclusively and to the edge
of town. With the soy plants, right outside town also stand the silos of the grain traders,
parking lots for tractors and agricultural machinery, and a sizable fertilizer plant. General
Artigas is also a typical soy town in that no contestation against GM soy has emerged,
neither against GM biotechnology nor around glyphosate spraying. Yet it isn't all soy and
roses in General Artigas. To some, agrochemicals are, though in a veiled, covert way, a
prominent issue. Here I show how.
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The Elephant in the Room: Silence and Denial
A few kilometers away from General Artigas' entrance, scattered among farms,
stand the offices and silos of several multinational grain traders and exporters, such as
LDC Dreyfus, Bunge, and Cargill. Thanks to Mari, my main informant in this town, I'm
interviewing Diego, who works at one of these companies. Diego is a young man in his
late twenties; Mari and Diego are relatives. Diego is showing us around and explaining
how the company operates. This is from my fieldnotes:
When we're coming out [from the main storing area] passes by a plane, a
fumigating plane. I look around: On the left, I see a field of soy. Right across,
another one. On the right, there's sunflower. We're surrounded by ag-extensive
farming.
So, we're out there. In a split of a second, the plane flies by, I see the soy field, I
think: "glyphosate." Diego says, like nothing special, un avión fumigador, a
fumigating plane.
So I ask, a bit puzzled:
A: ¿Se fumiga acá? ¿Con avión? People spray here? With planes?
D: Yes, sure.
A: But isn't it prohibited?
At least, that was what I had been told that very morning when interviewing the
head of an agribusiness downtown.
Diego, shaking his head and rolling his eyes in disbelief, says, "there might be
regulation, but it's not observed (pero no se cumple)." Then, asserting, Se fumiga
con avión, "Fumigations are done with airplanes." I'm stunned. Shocked. So I
repeat, "But it's right there!!" –trying to make it clear: "This means spraying you
on your head!!"
Literally it is. The farm stands right across the fence.
There is a moment of silence. Diego shows resignation in his face. Then he adds,
in a low voice: "People say that a report came out, that there are malformations..."
His voice fades without finishing the sentence. I am now truly shocked, on the
verge. Can't tell if it's out of indignation or the realization that I'm facing one key
issue of this dissertation.
I snap back:
A: What then?!? ¿¡¿¡¿Nadie protesta?!?!? No one will protest???!!!!
D: ....... (silence)..... Well....... Es que da mucha plata. It's that it is very profitable.
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Diego is now silent. He lowers his head. In the end, I understand, he can't say
much. He works for a multinational corporation; and not just any but one of the
most powerful in the whole world. He could be fired, to say the least.
In the midst of our awkward silence, Mari steps in: "Well, but cancer... There has
always been cancer (Cáncer siempre hubo)... No one knows if it's because of the
fumigations, or what."

With her comment, unknowingly –and probably also unwillingly–, Mari
acknowledged what the three of us where thinking but never dared to mention, the
"elephant in the room" (Zerubavel 2006): the toxic effects on health of agrochemical
spraying. The "elephant in the room" is a common expression used to refer to what
Zerubavel (2006:2) conceptualizes as a "conspiracy of silence": a tacit agreement among
a group of people "to outwardly ignore something of which they are all personally
aware." How to miss an elephant standing in the middle of a room? The image is
ludicrous and points straight to the fact that avoiding such a conspicuous matter would
require a "deliberative effort to refrain from noticing" (Zerubavel 2006:9).
While acts of ignoring, denial, and silencing are individual and thus typically
explored by psychologists, they have a social basis (Zerubavel 2006). In his book The
Elephant in the Room, Eviatar Zerubavel sets to explore the social aspects of this
phenomenon, thus delineating a sociology of silence and denial. Case studies such as
Norgaard's (2011) and Auyero and Swistun's (2009) delve further into these issues, as
these authors describe and analyze the social basis of subjective experiences and denial of
environmental hazards. Through ethnographic accounts, these studies explore how
collective denial is expressed through everyday practices and emotions (Auyero and
Swistun 2009; Norgaard 2011). They thus show how people frame potential grievances in
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a very specific way: by denying their existence; and how, by doing so, they stifle latent
grievances that could be source of conflict and mobilization.

Whispers & Silences: The Women of General Artigas
It was in the moments of most confidence, when the men had left and it was just I
with a few women, when latent grievances emerged. These came out as concerns,
worries, and fears, always veiled, covered with a halo of doubt. Yet, it was a striking
difference to the "admits-no-doubt-all-benefits" narrative that men had to share with me.
In whispers, when no one else seemed to hear, women shared their concerns with me,
concerns around agrochemicals and illnesses. These women were particularly concerned
about people they know: Their concern thus is very specific, and it is about the health of
their neighbors, their relatives, and, most important, the children (theirs and others they
know). Most strikingly is that, despite their fears and concerns, these women never
seemed to attempt to find out more. Most on the contrary, by the time a doubt was raised,
it was almost automatically suffocated, by themselves or other women in the group. This
self-policing was performed by denial (Mari's commentary above "There has always been
cancer" was the most frequently employed intervention that put a sudden end to most
exchanges) or by doubting their very own thoughts and observations (i.e., by saying "I
am not sure," "No one knows," etc.). These two accounts taken from my fieldnotes
illustrate these exchanges among the women of General Artigas:
I'm with Julia. It's the afternoon; we're sharing mates in her kitchen. It's just her
and me. Julia's two daughters are playing in the backyard with some girlfriends,
her baby boy is sleeping in his cart. We've been talking for a while, on how well
the town –and her family– is doing with the soy boom. With her husband they run
a store downtown: "When el campo is doing well, we all do well," she tells me.
(...) As time and mates goes by, Julia starts telling a different story. Slowly, her
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fears and scares start to come out. She mentions her neighbor, a contractor, who
parks his agricultural machinery right across the street. Then, it's the fumigations,
far too close from town limits. There it is also the fertilizer plant. She is
concerned, but she's never too specific, so I have to prod her, "So what's the
problem with all that?" Julia first tells me about her plants in the front porch dying
out. Then, it is about the number of people in town suffering with cancer, "young
people, of thirty-something, forty..." Later it is about miscarriages and babies born
with malformations, one of those, her own niece. ¿Pero será por eso? "Would
that be the reason?" Julia raises the question herself, Would it be because of the
agrochemicals? She replies right away, seemingly to me, but not really, it seems
she's mostly talking to herself: "I don't know. No one knows."
We're having asado, a barbecue, at Martín and Carolina's home. They're a young
couple with two small children. There are other guests, some family friends.
Martín runs a 1,000 ha farm, most of which is dedicated to agricultural
production, mostly soy, and cattle raising in feedlots. The meat we're eating
comes from the family feedlot. At the table, everyone extols the quality of the
meat, Martín in particular, who leads the conversation on the superior quality of
feedlot raised beef. We spend most of our meal talking about my research and
thus we talk about el campo and its bounties, about technology, about progress,
and politics as well, how the Kirchners' policies hinder progress, etc.,169 a
celebratory mood on all the benefits of ag-extensive production. When the meal is
over we clear the table for dessert and coffee. "We" meaning "the women," the
men stay sitting, as it is usual. It is behind doors, back in the kitchen, where a
totally different story emerged. In the kitchen, doing dishes, it's just Carolina and
me: we are shoulder to shoulder, she's washing the dishes, I'm with a cloth drying
them. Out of the blue (as not a word had come out on the table on these issues)
and in a whisper, Carolina tells me about these three women in town who had to
interrupt their pregnancies because the fetuses' heads weren't growing.170 Then,
she tells me about the growing number of people with cancer in town. She's
worried, I can tell. To dispel her worries she calls often on the public mantra "I
know, there has always been cancer." Yet she can't help to add, Todos dicen que
no, pero yo creo que sí, que los agroquímicos tienen que ver, "Everyone says they
don't, but I think so, that agrochemicals have something to do with this."
These exchanges testify to women's worries and fears, speculations shared in
murmurs and whispers, about the potentially hazardous effects of agrochemical use. In
General Artigas, none of the men I had spoken to ever raised any of these issues. Why are
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Findings described in chapter 4.
Microcephaly is a common reason for miscarriages among sprayed people (see
chapter 5).
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the women the ones who notice the health hazards of agrochemical exposure? Research
on environmental justice and environmental health movements highlights the role of
women in cases of mobilization around environmental hazards (Bell and Braun 2010;
Brown and Ferguson 1995; Krauss 1993). These studies show that women are the ones
who take primary responsibility for the health of families, especially children, and that
children’s health is a primary motivator for environmental concern and protest. Thus,
they are the women who tend to take the lead in raising environmental health issues and
forming community-based environmental health social movement organizations (Bell and
Braun 2010; Brown and Ferguson 1995; Krauss 1993; Levine 1982; Shriver, Cable, and
Kennedy 2008).
The exchanges with the women of General Artigas exemplify as well how selfpolicing and denial work to contain grievance-framing and suffocate contestation. "Why
people do not protest?" I asked every time I could where these murmurs where whispered
around. And every time I was met with a face of resignation and a sigh as a reply. Every
time, their silence fed the "spiral of denial" (Zerubavel 2006). Of all, Julia's reply stood
out as the most symbolic of the "conspiracy of silence" around agrochemical use in GM
soy production in the Pampas. Also in resignation, she plain said, silencing me, and her:
De eso no se habla, "We don't talk about that." This is a most iconic phrase that to any
Argentine instantly recalls of terror and the complicities of silence around the
disappeared during the Dirty War, the latest and crudest of Argentine dictatorships; the
hugest elephant in Argentines' collective history.171
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That is until very recently, with the Kirchners' efforts to appeal for Memory. On
silence, terror, and the legacy of the Dirty War, see Kaiser 2005. The "We don't talk
about this" attitude of most Argentine citizens during the dictatorship is well exemplified
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In general throughout my fieldwork, men directly involved in soy production did
not raise any of these issues, except to minimize them, or otherwise plain disqualifying
the people involved in movements or anyone who dares to question glyphosate toxicity,
by questioning their level of knowledge, information, or mental sanity. Many times
throughout my research I heard soy producers calling anyone concerned about
glyphosate's toxicity, "uninformed," and even "paranoid." The Mothers of Barrio
Ituizangó Anexo, as I described in chapter 5, had been consistently called crazy and
hysterical. This is a most common way for men to dismiss women, calling them
emotional and irrational. As the women are the ones whistling the bell on the health
hazards of agrochemical spraying and leading the movements against GM soy producers,
it makes most sense that men and the institutional power structure will use any means to
dismiss their demands (see chapter 5). Feeling powerless, the women will silence
themselves; that is, probably only until their own children start dying.
Women are typically not directly involved in soy production so I did not frequent
many of them throughout fieldwork (if there were any women around, i.e., a wife, she
would leave the room by the time the "official" part of the interview would start). That
changed in General Artigas where my main contact and informant, Mari, was a woman
and a relative of a family friend. Through her I got, almost automatically, "insider" status
among the women (her friends, relatives, neighbors, and friends of friends). Spending
time with her gave me the opportunity to "hang out" with these women that were very
close to each other (and trusted each other) when I wasn't off in more formal interviews.
So I cooked with them, did dishes with them, played with their kids and shared mates
in the Oscar's winner movie The Official Story and in María Luisa Bemberg's movie, De
eso no se habla.
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with them when their husbands were out working or sleeping their siesta. It was then,
when I wasn't "working," when it seemed nothing was "happening," that everything was
going on. Unfortunately, I have not had the chance to gain this level of confidence with
any other group of women in other rural towns I visited. One has to wonder then, How
much whispering is happening in other kitchens, in other rural towns in the Pampas? For
this dissertation’s sake it is also important to ask, When (and Why) do the women stop
whispering and start whistling? When do they become the whistleblowers that break the
silence and unveil the elephant? Some thoughts on this in the Conclusions, coming next.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation is a case study of agrarian transformation in an agro-export
society, Argentina. I have presented the process of adoption of the technological package
of genetically modified (GM) soy in the Argentine countryside, its socio-ecological
consequences, and Argentines’ responses to it. In particular, this research addresses
Argentina’s unique situation of being a developing country that has positively embraced
the biotechnology of GM seeds as a key accumulation strategy without the emergence of
major contestation against GM soy monocropping. In order to answer the puzzle of
quiescence, I looked at how power relations structure access to social and environmental
goods and bads as well as how power relates to the causes of consensus and conflict.

7.1

SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENT & FINDINGS

The Social Basis of Technological Innovation
In this dissertation I have looked at how specific social actors and institutions
control and define purposes for GM biotechnology in Argentina. Thus I have aimed to
explore GM biotechnology not by itself but as an exercise of power.
In Argentina, GM biotechnology, GM soy in particular, has been promoted by a
corporate-state alliance as a key accumulation strategy. In the context of the neoliberal
restructuring in the 1990s, an agro-export model based on soy exports became the
preferred model of development for Argentina. Neoliberalism gave this Non-Traditional
Agro-Export (NTAE) model its institutional, legal, and ideological framework. In chapter
3, I have shown how the corporate-state alliance has been able to implement and promote
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the GM soy model through material and institutional means. The main goal of
corporations for promoting this model is to increase profits. For the state, the main goal is
to bring about socio-economic wellbeing through economic growth.172 To this goal it is
important to recall the reinstatement of agricultural export taxes, which have been
instrumental for funding the Kirchners' National and Popular model. It is also important
to underscore, as I showed in chapter 2, the existence of a conducive global context for
soy exports, as commodity prices rise fueled by growing demand from China and India.
Therefore, among the powerful there is consensus around the benefits of GM
biotech, and the expansion of GM soy in particular. They have been able to create
consensus among the general population as well. The main framing of GM biotechnology
and soy production, over which there is shared consensus, is in terms of its benefits:
Technological innovation and mechanization increases efficiency of agricultural practices
and thus production and profitability. Technological innovation is framed as the
consequence of an objective and neutral science that will bring Progress and Modernity
by means of economic growth. This 'techno-science' (Giarracca 2007; Lander 2000b;
Santos 2009) framing of GM biotechnology enjoys widespread consensus in Argentina.

Creating Consensus and Quiescence
In this dissertation I rely on Steven Lukes' theoretical framework on power
(Lukes 2005). Lukes' take on power emphasizes what he conceptualizes as the third
172

It is important to note that this not about any specific individuals but about the
institutional framework: how corporations and the state operate. Corporations need profit
to stay in business and deliver returns on investments to shareholders. The State needs
votes and money to pay for infrastructure, public sector service maintenance, and welfare
benefits, among other things, as well as it needs some agreement with the business sector
(or fear a lockout or a coup).
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dimension of power: the aspect of power that creates quiescence and consent by making
the interests of the powerful everyone's interests. In this dissertation I have shown how in
Argentina the corporate-state alliance has been able to secure consent through material,
institutional, and discursive means.
The corporate-state power alliance in Argentina controls resources and the
cultural apparatus and this is strategic in creating hegemony (Gramsci 1972; Newell
2009a). In chapter 4, I have given special attention to discussing the role of the media in
creating quiescence and consent. This is done by reporting on GM biotechnology and soy
almost exclusively in terms of the positive/benefits framing; and by not reporting on the
negative socio-ecological consequences of GM soy expansion, nor on events of
mobilization and contestation against the GM soy-based model. Reporting creates
visibility of the issue necessary for grievance-making. This would be particularly
important in Argentina, as the majority of population is urban and disconnected from
anything rural.
As this dissertation underscores, a key issue for mobilization and quiescence is
grievance-making: without grievances there is no contestation, and there cannot be
grievances if people do not see anything wrong with the current situation. For collective
action to emerge, it is necessary to frame the issue as a grievance, as a problem that
requires remediation. Due to biased reporting of positive consequences and
underreporting of negative ones, urban dwellers, that is, most of the population, no saben
ni se enteran, don't know or have a way to find out about negative consequences or
contestation around soy but rather easily buy into the hegemonic discourse of the benefits
of the soy model that the media feeds them.
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In terms of grievance-making in relation to GM biotechnology, as I show in
chapters 2 and 3, Argentina stands out in that rather the opposite happens: the technology
is framed almost solely in terms of benefits. There is a shared cultural predisposition to
see the countryside and agriculture as a profit-making activity, to see Argentina as a
food-producing country ("the Breadbasket of the World"), to see technology as the most
efficient way to control nature (and increase production), and to understand scientific and
technological innovation as a straight path to modernity and progress. It is in these terms
that soy producers claim that agriculture in Argentina is the "best in the world." As
shown in chapter 4, this hegemonic discourse takes hold in Argentine national identity,
and thus 'cultural preparation' is key to the consensus argument raised in this chapter.

Social and Ecological Impacts of GM Soy Production
As shown in chapters 3 and 4, consensus most significantly takes hold in the fact
that in the terms considered important/valuable, that is economic growth based on
increased production and exports, the model actually works: every year there have been
record harvests and record profits: It is the soybean boom. However, this dissertation
highlights the fact that the overall impacts of the GM soy model are less positive. As
shown in chapters 3 and 4, the GM soy-based agrarian transformation has implied radical
changes in socio-ecological dynamics in Argentina: increased inequality due to
concentration of landholdings and agribusinesses, rural displacement through a violent
politics of dispossession, loss of local control, the loss of food security, and health
hazards due to agrochemical exposure add to the disruptions at the ecosystem level,
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including deforestation, loss of biodiversity, emergence of glyphosate-resistant
superweeds, nutrient depletion, and air, water, and soil pollution.
As shown in chapter 5, some groups of people who experience these costs directly
have framed them as grievances. As such, two types of social movements have emerged
to contest GM soy in Argentina: One, composed by campesinos and indigenous peoples,
who contest GM biotechnology as part of a wider struggle against natural resource
extraction and neoliberalism. And the other one, assemblies of fumigated peoples,
organizing around concerns for the health effects of agrochemical spraying. While these
two movements have different constituencies and goals, there is a common ground in that
at the basis it is a matter of protecting lives and livelihoods. As such it fits in the common
experience of other environmental justice movements of the Global South (Guha and
Martinez-Alier 1997; Taylor 1995).

Unequal Distribution of Social and Environmental Goods and Bads
Another key theme explored in this dissertation is how distance and the unequal
distribution of social and environmental goods and bads have consequences on
grievance-framing. As shown, the powerful, the ones that reap most of the benefits of the
soy model, are also the ones the furthest removed from its social and ecological costs. So
it isn't simply that this model is highly profitable, but it matters also that elites are
distanced from the consequences of their decisions (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008;
Gould 2010; Gould 2006; Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts 2009). Probably things would be
much different if the children of agribusinesses' CEOs were the ones being sprayed with
agrochemicals. On the opposite side of the power spectrum are the powerless, who, on
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site, bear all the costs and reap none of the benefits: campesinos, indigenous peoples, the
fumigated people who lose their homes, their territories, their health and their children
due to the expansion of the agrarian frontier and the toxic effects of agrochemical
spraying.
As shown in chapters 4 and 6, most of the rural populations, in the Pampas in
particular, hover somewhere in between these extremes: they reap some benefits, and
bear still unclear/undefined costs (due to unawareness, uncertainty, and denial). As Tilly
(1991) argues, quiescence can also be explained by/when subjects get something in return
for compliance. This is certainly the case at hand here. As described in chapter 4, a key to
consensus and quiescence is that GM soy means direct and indirect income flowing into
rural towns. In these booming soy towns there is a shared notion of todos vivimos del
campo, "we all live off the countryside." In the Pampas, this is particularly important in
contrast to previous decades of crisis.
In terms of the ecological costs, while in the North the expansion of industrial
agriculture and deforestation are issues that concern rural and urban folks alike, in the
Pampas these do not seem to be issues that could be framed as grievances: Mechanization
of the Pampas is historical and framed as a positive development, as technological
innovation is a sign of modernization and progress. Deforestation is a given. The
adoption of no-tillage machinery (siembra directa) fulfills a double promise, that of
"technological innovation = modernity" as well as it comes to deal with the problem of
sustainability of agrarian practices. In terms of pollution, there is a shared perception that
this is a problem of large cities, living in the countryside is living in "nature" (outdoors,
where there's fresh air, open spaces).
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In terms of the social costs, the health hazards of agrochemical use are, –as
exemplified by the emergence of Paren de Fumigar movements (chapter 5) and the
veiled concerns of the women in General Artigas (chapter 6)–, the most salient source of
concern (and conflict and potential conflict) for rural inhabitants in relationship to GM
soy. Yet, these are not automatically framed as grievances. For rural populations, it is
hard to articulate claims: people are unsure and sometimes completely unaware or even
ignorant of the real effects of agrochemical exposure; a clear evidence of how successful
"bio-hegemony" is (chapter 4, Newell 2009a). Here "science" is particularly at stake:
Lay people, excluded from scientific knowledge, research, and development, have a blind
belief and trust on the "experts," who sustain glyphosate is of low toxicity. In chapter 5, I
discuss how power is behind science by showing how corporations and the state construct
and promote this discourse, as well as discourage doubt and dissenters. Thus, showing
how the power elite uses science as a means to create confusion, uncertainty, and
unawareness (and thus, quiescence) (see Brown 2007).
While compliance-in-exchange-for-something-in-return (i.e., economic benefits)
explains lots of the support for GM soy in rural towns, the reason for quiescence –
especially in relationship to health hazards of agrochemical exposure–, can be more
emotionally complicated than a straightforward preference for profits/material interests.
As the stories of the women of General Artigas tell (chapter 6), it is their own husbands
and neighbors who are directly involved in soy production. Raising questions on the
toxicity of agrochemicals, are, to say the least, very difficult: could it be your own
lifetime neighbors killing you and your family? Could it be your source of income, what
feeds you and your family? Could it be your own husband, the father of your kids? As
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Schurman and Munro (2010) argue, for a grievance to be framed as such, an oppositional
consciousness is necessary. In this case, this oppositional consciousness is hard to
emerge, as everyone is so deeply involved in the process. As such, the women in General
Artigas have found a very efficient way to deal with the problem: plain deny it. This, of
course, complicates issues even further: grievances are social problems that require a
shared framing (a shared interpretation of a grievance). By denying in public and selfpolicing, the women close the opportunity to come up with a common framing of
agrochemical spraying as a grievance.

Technological Trajectories and the Agent of Change
As social movement scholars argue, for contestation to emerge, it is required (1) a
grievance, an issue framed as a social problem, and (2) opportunities for mobilization,
including resources (Klandermans 2001; Schurman and Munro 2010). While some social
movement theories downplay the role of grievances in social movement formation,
grievances are not ubiquitous. On the contrary, they require active framing (Snow and
Benford 1988). Grievances thus are a necessary (yet not sufficient) cause for social
movement formation (Mahoney 2003). Moreover, as this dissertation shows, framing an
issue as a grievance is a complicated and contested matter, which depends on subjective,
cultural, and structural factors, which can then ignite contestation but also promote
consensus and quiescence.
This dissertation also shows that, in studies of quiescence, it is important to bring
into analysis another necessary (yet of course not sufficient) cause for social movement
formation. That is, (3) People, the actor of social change. The actual existence of human
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beings that make up a movement –just as grievances are– is often considered a trivial,
even tautological cause for the study of social movements, and thus usually left out of
analysis (Mahoney 2003). In its analysis of quiescence, this dissertation brings this issue
to the forefront. The existence of people that organize in collective action is the most
basic assumption for the existence of a social movement. People protest and mobilize. As
shown in chapters 3 and 4, the adoption of the technological package of GM soy has
further increased rural displacement and depopulation, increased land concentration, and
the loss of local control. Farming is done by machines, controlled by people who don't
have to be there anymore. That is how the treadmill of production replaces people with
technology (as chemicals and energy), decreasing employment and increasing ecological
disorganization (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008; Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994). Who would start a movement if no one is out there, in the countryside,
bearing the social and ecological costs of the agrarian transformation? Who would take
up these issues as grievances if these aren't directly experienced by anyone? This
dissertation highlights how technology is truly an exercise of power, as the technological
trajectory has been to depopulate and pacify (Shiva 1991), by getting rid of peasants, the
most restive of populations (Moore 1966; Paige 1975; Skocpol 1979; Wolf [1969] 1999).

7.2

SIGNIFICANCE
Argentina has been cited as a recurrent "success story" in studies on agricultural

transformations based on GM crop adoption (Chudnovsky 2006; Qaim 2005; Trigo
2011). These studies emphasize the smoothness of the transition and the benefits it has
brought, as the adoption of the technological package of GM soy increases both
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production and profits. However, set in context, the transition was not so straightforward
that the GM soy model can easily be replicated in other countries, nor are its
consequences all beneficial.
The particular institutional and ideological framework in a specific domestic and
international political economy, that of Argentina in the neoliberal 1990s, became the
most conducive context of adoption of the new technological package of GM RR soy. In
the first decade of the 21st century, the expansion of the modelo sojero occurred despite a
change in Argentina's domestic political economy. The rise of a self-proclaimed antineoliberal and progressive government, the Kirchners', has in fact not dismantled the
mode of production set in place by the previous neoliberal administration. To the
contrary, the Kirchners' administrations have created favorable conditions for the
expansion of GM soy. Driven by debt, both neoliberal and post-neoliberal governments
have relied on state policy to intensify Argentina's comparative advantage.
In terms of economic growth, the results of the modelo sojero have been
outstanding. Yet the overall impacts of the GM soy model are less positive. The GM soybased agrarian transformation has implied radical, negative changes in socio-ecological
dynamics in Argentina. Economic gains thus create socio-ecological unsustainability,
threatening the continuity of the model itself (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008;
Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).
In the last few years, the Kirchners' National-Popular model has offset the
negative social impacts associated with GM soy. Increased social spending and
infrastructure investment certainly improve people's wellbeing, in particular that of the
poorest. In an interesting twist, the success story of GM soy becomes legitimized under
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the Kirchners' model, as the expansion of production and profits now allegedly benefits
all instead of being appropriated by an elite now that the government directly intervenes
to redistribute soy-derived revenue. However, the potential of the National-Popular
model to fully address social problems is questionable. As funding for the NationalPopular model relies heavily on soy export taxes, at least as it is currently configured, its
continuity requires the continuous expansion of GM soy production, an already
unsustainable practice. The constant search for increased revenue ends up undermining
the project itself, in a destructive treadmill where the natural resource base is even more
rapidly depleted to allegedly increase social wellbeing (Gould et al., 2008, O'Connor,
1998, Schnaiberg, 1980, Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994).
Within this model, commodity exports remain at the core of Argentina's
development strategy, repeating Latin America's colonial pattern of dependent
development (see Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Dependence on natural resource extraction
is hardly a new phenomenon for Argentina, or Latin America. Pressured by external debt,
and under the ideals of progress and modernization, governments in the region have
promoted technological innovation to increase productivity of the export-commodity
sector (whether it is soy, fruits, minerals, or oil). With GM soy Argentina continues to
export Nature (Coronil 1997), relying on natural resource extraction for its sustenance.
Other progressive governments in the region, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Venezuela are also repeating this pattern, of funding local socio-economic development
through faster and further extraction (see Gudynas 2009). As this dissertation shows, the
consequences of this are manifold. It has to be emphasized moreover, that this is a highly
unstable model. In the short and medium term, this is a highly unstable model because it
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is subject to cycles of boom and bust. GM soy production in Argentina is driven by
constantly expanding demand in China and India, which caused international prices to
spike and absorbs increasing production at home. As with any cycle of boom and bust,
however, the question is not if demand will ever slow down or even end, but rather when
it will happen, and how hard it will hit.
In the long run, the quest for growth and profits through constant technological
innovation implies faster extraction and, thus, faster degradation of the social and
ecological base (Gould et al., 2008, O'Connor, 1998, Schnaiberg, 1980, Schnaiberg and
Gould, 1994). There is a tradeoff between immediate rewards and the long-term
consequences of a model of development based on natural resource extraction, where the
promise of material wealth is prioritized even at the cost of increased environmental
degradation (Gould and Lewis 2009; McMichael 2007; Redclift 1992). Transgenic crops
have been at the core of Argentina's development model as they are presented with the
promise of dynamism, efficiency, and increasing yields and profits; a technology
particularly fit and necessary to exploit Argentina's "potential" for feeding the world. At
the same time however, the constant expansion of production allowed by the
technological package of GM soy, under structural conditions that privilege GM soy over
other agricultural possibilities, accelerates socio-ecological degradation. In this way, the
GM soy-based agro-export model as currently configured in Argentina is a socially and
ecologically unsustainable model of development.
GM crops have been presented to the world as representing the promise of
modernization, progress, and development, a "success" narrative that has held up well in
Argentina. However, under close scrutiny, this study shows that the potential of
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transgenic crops to improve livelihoods in the Global South is less straightforward than
GM supporters suggest. It is important therefore to broaden the discussion of the "GM
promise" by taking into account who are in control of the technologies and of natural
resources, rather than assessing technologies in a vacuum. In other words, GMOs cannot
be taken as a promise by themselves. Technologies are tools: tools of power. It matters
who controls them. Until feeding the poor and protecting the environment become
desired goals by those in power, the promise will remain unfulfilled. These
considerations are urgent as transgenic crops are adopted throughout the Global South, as
the rapid expansion of Argentina's GM soy model in South America exemplifies.

7.3

FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several lines of research that derive from this dissertation that I would

like to explore in the near future. Of utmost personal importance, the most pressing
question to me now is how to promote anti-GM contestation in Argentina. Because of
their sheer number, urban citizens need to be involved. The question is then how: How to
get urban dwellers connected with rural issues? As consumers? Concerns raised by urban
movements as consumers of GM foods have not yet spread in Argentina. There are
events of agroecology urban farms and farmers' markets in some cities, such as in
Rosario, Mar del Plata, and Buenos Aires, but those aren't widely dispersed yet. How to
raise awareness among the urban population is thus a main concern. In this line, I would
like also to explore and maybe even provide suggestions for alternative modes of
agricultural production that, in contrast to large scale industrial agriculture, are just,
equitable, and sustainable.
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Another line of research that derives from this dissertation is to compare the case
of Argentina with the experience of other countries. Thus, future research will encompass
cross-national comparative research on GM soy adoption contrasting the case of
Argentina with other countries of the Global South, for example, comparing with Brazil
or Tanzania.
Third and last, timely and important research is necessary to understand and
assess the current state and consequences of the GM soy expansion in South America.
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